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Abstract 
The study examines intergovernmental fiscal relations in the Philippines 
focusing on central govern111ent transfers to local governments. The main objective of 
the study is to assess whether central government transfers promote equity and local 
revenue mobilisation. 
The fiscal capacity, measured by the fiscal gap, serves as the basis of the 
assessment. Using the province as the unit of analysis, the fiscal gaps of local 
governments were 1neasured as the difference between expenditure needs and revenue 
capacities. The revenue capacities and revenue efforts of local governments were first 
measured based on the relationship between their revenues and socioeconomic 
characteristics using a random coefficient regression model. The expenditures of local 
governments were then regressed on the estimated revenue capacities and various 
socioeconomic factors that can affect the costs of providing government services. The 
½xpenditure regression results were used to measure expenditure needs representing the 
relative disabilities of local governments to provide services at 'normal costs' due to 
factors beyond their control. 
The study shows that the allocation formula of the internal revenue allotment, 
both under the previous and the existing laws, tended to worsen the disparities in the 
fiscal gaps of local governments. The current law appears to be more inequitable. The 
same is true of the distribution of grants to local govern111ents. The study also shows that 
central government transfers neither stimulate nor substitute for local government 
revenue efforts. The failure of central government transfers to promote these objectives 
is attributed not only to their design, but also to other aspects of central-local 
government relations, such as the constraints on local taxation and budgeting, and the 
highly fragmented local government system. 
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Introduction 
Musgrave ( 1959) suggests that, fro1n an economic perspective, the public sector can 
be characterised as having three major objectives: 1) to promote efficient allocation of 
resources; 2) to redistribute income and wealth equitably; and 3) to maintain high and 
stable levels of employment and growth of output. This study, which is concerned 
witl~ intergovern1nental fiscal relations, dwells n1ainly on the first two objectives as 
the last is generally considered to be a central government function. 
An examination of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the Philippines 
focuses on central government transfers to local governments. Revenue sharing and 
grants are integral aspects of central-local government relations in the Philippines. 
They assu1ned greater significance with recent decentralisation refonns which 
increased the amount of central government transfers to local governments to enable ' 
the1n to carry out functions devolved to them. 
A 1najor hypothesis of this study is that central government transfers do not 
promote adequate and equitable financing and distribution of public goods and 
services across local government units. Central government transfers are not wholly 
used by local governments to increase provision of public goods and services; they are 
partly used as a substitute for local taxes. This is viewed with concern because the 
unmet demand for public services is large, and the dependence of local governments 
on central government transfers is heavy. The allocation of transfers also does not 
adequately take account of the varying fiscal positions of local government units. 
Thus, without significant modifications to the system of transfers, there is a strong 
possibility that decentralisation refonns will worsen the inadequacy of and disparity in 
the financing and provision of public services across the country. 
This study is organised into nine chapters. The next chapter provides an 
overview of public finance in the Philippines. It describes how three major aspects of 
public finance-public expenditures, revenue mobilisation and intergovernmental 
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relations-have contributed to poor economic performance, persistence of poverty, 
and urban/rural and regional disparities. 
Chapter 3 discusses intergovernmental relations in the Philippines. It describes 
the structure of governn1ent, the assign1nent of expenditure and taxing power to each 
governn1ent level, the planning and budgeting process, and the fiscal conditions of 
local governments. Overcentralisation and attempts at decentralisation are the major 
themes of the discussion. The linuted revenues of local government and their uneven 
fiscal capacities surface as the major issues of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
These issues have become more critical with the decentralisation reforms under the 
recently enacted Local Government Code. 
Chapter 4 provides a theoretical background to the study. It exa1nines the 
reasons for decentralisation in the broader context of the theories of assignment of 
expenditure functions and taxing powers among levels of government. The literature 
suggests that vertical fiscal imbalance (mismatch between expenditure requirements 
and revenue sources of governments at different 'levels') and horizontal fiscal 
imbalance (inequality in the expenditure needs and revenue capacity of governments 
at the same level) are likely to occur with decentralisation. The chapter continues with 
a discussion of the implications of vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances, and 
concludes with a discussion of intergovernmental fiscal transfers as a means of 
addressing these problems. 
Chapter 5 presents the conceptual framework and methodology. The varying 
fiscal positions and performance of local governments, with the province as the unit of 
analysis, provide the bases for the assessment of whether central govern1nent transfers 
promote adequate and equitable financing and distribution of public goods and 
services. The fiscal positions of local governments are indicated by their fiscal gaps 
which measure the difference between what they need to spend to provide a basic 
package of local services (expenditure needs) and their available revenues at a 
standard level of tax effort (revenue capacity). The chapter reviews the various 
methodologies of measuring revenue capacity and effort, and suggests an alternative 
approach. This approach is based on the random coefficient regression model which is 
~ 
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used in the estimation of firm potential output and efficiency. The chapter also 
reviews the various methodologies used to measure expenditure needs, which are 
largely based on expenditure determinants analysis. 
Chapter 6 discusses the legal fra1nework of the revenue raising powers of local 
governments, and examines the growth and con1position of local government 
revenues. An in-depth; · cross-sectional analysis of the variation in local government 
revenues is undertaken using the province as the unit of analysis. A revenue 
function-wherein the dependent variable is the per capita local government revenue, 
and the independent variables are the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
provinces-is estimated using the random coefficient regression model. The 
paran1eter estin1ates of the model are used to calculate revenue capacity and revenue 
efforts of each province. Rank analysis is then used to assess whether a local 
government's low or high tax revenue is due to tax capacity or tax effort factors. 
Chapter 7 discusses the legal aspects of local government budgets and analyses 
. the trends and patterns of local government expenditures. Based on the Il).edian voter 
constrained utility maxi1nisation model discussed in chapter 5, the variation in per 
capita local government expenditures across provinces is examined. Per capita local 
government expenditures are regressed on revenue capacity, average per capita 
income, central government transfers, and socioeconomic characteristics which could 
affect the costs of providing public services. Differences in expenditures due to 
socioeconomic cost factors beyond the control of local government authorities 
constitute the basis of expenditure needs. Based on the regression results, cost indices 
and measures qf expenditure needs are calculated by province. 
Chapter 8 examines the system and role of central government transfers, 
particularly revenue sharing, in local government finance. The equity of the revenue 
sharing and grants is evaluated in relation to the two components of fiscal 
capacities-revenue capacities and expenditure needs-and their summary measures, 
the fiscal gaps. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient and the Schutz coefficient 
of inequality are used to assess the equity of the transfers. The 
3 
chapter also examines whether revenue shares and grants substitute for local 
government revenue efforts. An alternative allocation method of revenue shares aimed 
at reducing disparities in fiscal position of local governments is then presented. 
Chapter 9 summarises the results and limitations of the study. 
4 
2 
Public finance in the Pl1ilippines 
Overview 
The Philippine Medium_..Tenn Development Plan covering 1987 to 1992, identified 
three fundamental problems: 1) persistence of poverty and income inequality, 2) high 
unemployment and underemployment, and 3) urban/rural and regional disparities. 
Public finance policies, instead of alleviating them, contributed to all three problems. 
The Philippines is the only country in Southeast Asia which has not 
experienced a demographic transition. Its average annual population growth rate of 2.5 
per cent during the past decade was the highest in the region and constitutes a minimal 
improvement on the 2.8 per cent population growth rate registered from 1965 to 1980 
(de Dios, 1993). The workforce has been increasing by over 600,000 a year. Because 
of persistent slow growth, 11 per cent of the workforce is unemployed and another 20 
.to 30 per cent is underemployed (Fegan and Purcal, 1993). High unemployment and 
underemployment rates have led to severe income inequality. The richest fffth of the 
population receives more than 50 per cent of the total income while the poorest 
two-fifths receive only 14 per cent (de Dios, 1993). 
Regional development in the Philippines has been highly uneven with the two 
upper income regions (Metro Manila and Southern Tagalog) accounting for 45 per 
cent of gross domestic product. The gross domestic product of Metro Manila alone is 
equal to the middle inco1ne regions (Central Luzon, Central Visayas, Western 
Visayas, and Southern Mindanao) which have a combined share of 31 per cent. The 
low income group, consisting of seven regions and representing 48 per cent of the 
population, accounts for 23 per cent of gross don1estic product (Table 2.1). Uneven 
regional develop1nent has constrained the overall growth of the economy. 
Table 2.1 Shares of real GDP by region, Philippines, 1973-89 (per cent) 
Rcgiorl/)'.ear 1973- 76 1977-80 1981-84 1985- 88 1989 
Upper income 44.8 45.5 45.6 43.9 44.4 
Metro Manila 30.8 31.6 31.6 29 .7 31.0 
IV. Southern Tagalog 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.2 13.4 
Middle income 32.2 29.7 31.1 29.6 29.5 
III. Central Luzon 8.6 8.4 8.8 8.2 8.2 
VI. Western Visayas . 9.2 8.2 8.3 7.0 6.7 
VII. Central Visayas 7.2 7.3 7.2 7 .2 7.5 
XI. Southern Mindanao 7.1 5.8 6 .8 7.3 7.1 
Low income 23. l 23.8 23.4 26.5 25 .9 
X. Northern Mindanao 4.5 4.8 4.6 5.5 5.5 
I. Ilocos 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.5 4.4 
XII. Central Mindanao 3.0 3.2 3.7 4.0 3.9 
IX. Western Mindanao 2.8 3.4 3.2 3.7 3.7 
V. Bicol 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.2 
II. Cagayan Valley 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.3 
YUL Eastern Visai'.as 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.9 
Source: Padilla, E., 1987. The growth center strategy to regional development: the Philippine experience, 
PhD Thesis, Michigan State University~ and Philippines, National Statistical Coordinating Board, 
1991 . Phili£.Fine Statistical Yearbook. 
The spatial and geographical dimensions of poverty in the Philippines are 
closely related to unbalanced inter- regional and intra- regional development. The 
lowest poverty incidence was recorded in Metro Manila at 32 per cent while the 
highest povetiy incidence was in Bicol at 65 per cent (Table 2.2). 
In 1988, it was estimated that 5. 8 1nillion Filipino families or 55 per cent of the 
total population lived below the poverty line. The incidence of poverty remained 
virtually unchanged during the previous two decades. The number of poor families 
increased. This was in marked contrast to other Southeast Asian countries which have 
made considerable progress in poverty alleviation ( de Dios, 1993). 
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Table 2.2 Incidence of poverty, by region, Philippines, 1985 and 1988 
1985 1988 
Region Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty 
thresholda incidenceb thresholda incidenccb 
(2esos) (eer cent) (eesos) (eer cent) 
Metro Manila 3,282 44 4,037 32 
I. llocos 2,389 52 2,597 48 
II. Cagayan Valley 2,201 56 2,576 49 
Ill. Cental Luzon 2,552 44 2,881 40 
IV. Southern Tagalog 2,471 55 2,832 49 
V. Bicol 2,143 74 2,443 65 
VI. Western Visayas 2,453 73 2,654 62 
VII. Central Visayas 1,987 70 2,173 55 
VIII. Eastern Visayas 2,105 70 2,263 60 
IX. Western Mindanao 2,119 63 2,289 52 
X. Northern Mindanao 2,249 66 2,439 52 
XI. Southern Mindanao 2,389 60 2,763 52 
XIL Central Mindanao 2,212 64 2,468 47 
Philieeines 2,381 59 2,709 50 
a Minimum average monthly income that a family of six members should receive to be considered above 
poverty. For 1988, the poverty tlu-eshold level was derived using 1985 levels inflated to 1988 prices. 
BProportion of families below poverty level. 
Source: Philippines, National Statistical Coordinating Board, 1991 . Philippine Statistical Yearbook. 
Slow and erratic economic growth is the major reason for worsening -poverty in 
the Philippines ( de Dios, 1993). During the 1970s the Philippine econo1ny grew at an 
historically unprecedented rate-average annual growth rates in gross national product 
and per capita gross national product were 6.4 per cent and 3. 5 per cent, respectively. 
However, this growth paled in comparison with that of other East Asian countries 
(Table 2.3). Worse still, it was not sustained. In 1983, the Philippines experienced its 
worst econo1nic and financial crisis. A moratorium was declared in servicing external 
debt obligations. Real output of the economy contracted in 1984 and 1985. Positive 
growth rates were achieved in the latter half of the 1980s, but these were short-lived . 
In 1991, the economy suffered another contraction. 
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Table 2.3 Average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, Southeast 
Asian countries, 1960-85 (per cent) 
Count!16:'.ear 1960- 70 1970- 80 1980- 85 1960-1985 
Indonesia l.Ga G.G 3.4 4.1 b 
Malaysia 3.3 7.4 1.9 4.6 
Philippines 2.3 3.6 - 2.6 1.8 
Singapore 
Thailand 
al 962-70 
b1 962- 85 
Note: 
Source: 
6.5 7.3 11 . l 7.7 
4.4 4.8 2.3 4.1 
For international comparability, per capi ta GDP was based on purchas ing power 
parity at constant 1980 international prices. 
Austria, M ., 1992. Aggregate productivity in the Philippine economy, 
PhD Thesis, The Australian National University. 
l1nprudent Fiscal Policy and Macroecono1nic Instability 
Poor economic performance and economic and financial crises of the early 1980s in 
particular, have been attributed to excessive protectionism (Shepherd and Albur~, 
1991 ; AJburo, Medalla and Pante, 1989) and macroecono1nic instability. Poor fiscal 
· policies lie at the centre of macroeconomic instability in the Philippines. Jmprudent 
policies led to huge budget deficits which resulted in internal imbalances (as manifested 
by high inflation, rising real interest rate and falling private invest1nent) and external 
imbalances (in the form of current account deficits, capital flight and rapidly expanding 
external debt) . 
Traditionally, the Philippines had a small public sector. A low tax effort and 
inadequate government invest1nent, particularly in rural infrastructure, hampered 
economic development in the 1950s and 1960s (International Labour Organisation, 
1974). In the 1970s the government pursued an active fiscal expansion policy aimed at 
stimulating econo1nic growth. Total national government expenditure as a percentage 
of GNP rose from 12 per cent in 197 4 to 15- 16 per cent in succeeding years (Table 
2.4) . Public sector investment rose to unprecedented levels, averaging 10 per cent of 
GNP in 1975- 1984, compared to 1.5 per cent of GNP in 1971 (Manasan, 1988). The 
growth in government expenditures was not matched by c01n1nensurate improvement 
in tax effort especially for 1980. As a result, the country experienced chronic and 
8 
severe budget deficits. In the two years immediately preceding the 1983 cns1s, the 
budget deficit of the national government averaged more than 4 per cent of GNP, 
compared to the less than l per cent prior to the 1nid-seventies (Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4 National government budget deficit, Philippines, 1960-91 
Vear Billion ~csos Percentage of GNP 
Total revenues · Expenditures Surplus/ Total revenues Expenditures Surplus/ 
~DcficiQ ~Defi ciQ 
1960 1.71 1.70 0.01 12.33 12.27 0.06 
1961 1.86 2.09 -0.23 12.24 13.77 -1.53 
1962 2.05 2.00 0.05 12.04 11 .73 0.31 
1963 2.64 2.75 -0.12 13 .31 13 .90 -0 .58 
1964 2.48 2.46 0.03 11 .62 11.48 0.14 
1965 2.53 2.84 -0.30 10.83 12.13 -1.29 
1966 3.04 3.19 -0.15 11 .80 12.39 -0.59 
1967 3.58 3.81 -0.24 12.45 13.27 -0.82 
1968 4.06 4.32 -0.26 12.76 13 .58 -0 .82 
1969 4.5 1 5.51 -1 .00 12.88 15 .73 -2 .84 
1970 4.85 4.79 0.06 11.61 11.47 0.14 
1971 5.87 6.05 -0.18 11.83 12.20 -0.37 
1972 6.97 8.07 -1.10 12.47 14.44 -1.97 
1973 9.50 10.34 -0.84 13.16 14.32 -1.17 
1974 12.16 11.71 0.44 12.17 11.72 0.45 
1975 16.84 18.20 -1.36 14.72 15 .91 -1.19 
1976 18.30 20.65 -2 .35 13 .64 15 .39 -1.75 
1977 19.96 22.77 -2.81 13 .02 14.85 -l.83 -
1978 24 .01 26.18 -2.17 13.56 14.79 -1.23 
1979 29.32 29.67 -0.35 13.45 13 .61 -0.16 
1980 34.37 37.76 -3.38 13 .00 14.28 -1.28 
1981 35.74 47.89 -12.15 11.77 15.77 -4.00 
1982 37.99 52.41 -14.41 11 .33 15.63 -4 .30 
1983 45 .61 53.07 -7.47 12 .04 14.01 -1 .97 
1984 56.83 66 .78 -9 .96 10.77 12.66 -1.89 
1985 68.96 80.12 -11.16 12.40 14.41 -2.01 
1986 79 .24 109.89 -30.65 13 .28 18.42 -5 .14 
1987 103 .2 1 119.94 -16 .73 15 .32 17.80 -2.48 
1988 112.86 136.10 -23 .24 14.18 17.11 -2 .92 
1989 152.41 171.98 -19.57 16.68 18.82 -2 .14 
1990 180.90 218.10 -37.19 16.80 20.25 -3.45 
1991 220.79 247.14 -26 .35 17.64 19.74 -2 .11 
Source: Inlemalional Monetary fund, 1992. Intemational Financial Statistics, Washington, D.C. 
The government budget deficit and the manner in which it was financed 
introduced serious distortions and widespread instability into the economy. The deficit 
was financed in a number of ways : money creation, reserve requirements in banking, 
domestic borrowing and foreign borrowing. Between 1975 and 1984, around 7 per 
cent of the budget deficit was financed by money creation-that is, by the Central 
Bank funding of government debt. Domestic borrowing outside the Central Bank 
9 
financed close to 36 per cent of the deficit. The bulk of the deficit, a1nounting to 57 per 
cent, was financed by external borrowing (Manasan, 1988). 
Although money creation financed a relatively s1nall portion of the budget 
deficit, it accounted for a significant portion of the total change in reserve 1noney, 
particularly in 1976, 1980- 82 and 1985. High inflation ensued . Using 1975- 84 data, 
Manasan (I 988) estimated the inflationary effects of increases in money supply. Her 
study suggested that a 10 per cent growth in net Central Bank holding of government 
debt would result in a 4.5 per cent increase in money supply, which in turn would 
cause around a 6 per cent increase in the consumer price index. 
Inflation also contributed to the worsening balance of payments . The peso 
remained overvalued in real terms in spite of a series of nominal devaluations because 
the Philippines' inflation exceeded that of its trading partners (Hill and Jayasuriya, 
l 985) . The Philippine public shied away from holding currency because of inflation and 
expectation of depreciation. As a result the money printed and the debt incurred by the 
government to finance its deficit increased the demand for foreign goods and foreign 
financial assets. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (1986) esti1nated that from 1976 to 
1985 the ratio of capital flight to external debt averaged 3 9 per cent, while Khan and 
Ul Haque (1987) estimated it at 36 per cent from 1974 to 1982. 
The government's domestic borrowing competed with the private sector for 
savings in the economy and crowded out private investment projects . Manasan (1988) 
noted that net domestic credit to the private sector was markedly reduced in · 1984-
1985 when treasury bills offered unprecedentedly high yields. 
Massive foreign borrowing worsened the current account deficit and the 
government budget deficit. Given the repressed financial system and the controls on 
foreign exchange, the inflow of foreign loans resulted in the appreciation of the peso . 
This enabled greater consumption of imports and at the same ti1ne penalised expo1is, 
thus exerting a doubly adverse effect on the current account deficit. The current 
account deficit averaged around 5 per cent of GNP in 1975- 80 and rose to nearly 8 
per cent of GNP in 1982 (Dohner and Intal, 1989) . Debt servicing was also a huge 
drain on the government's budget and exerted strong pressure to bloat the deficit given 
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the low income elasticity and buoyancy of the revenue system·. The government budget 
deficit peaked in 1981- 82, averaging around 4 per cent of GNP; the consolidated 
public sector deficit reached close to 6 per cent of GNP (Dohner and Intal , 1989). 
The Philippine government experienced increasing difficulties in 1nanaging its 
budget and current account deficits in the early 1980s. The goverrnnent's external debt 
rose from only US$1.2 billion in 1971 to US$14 billion in 1983 . The capacity to 
service debt weakened considerably as the debt- service ratio increased from 21 per 
cent in the J 970s to 3 8 per cent in 1980- 1983 . External factors such as the 
deterioration in the terms of trade, oil price increases and rise in world interest rates 
contributed, but it was the failure to adopt reforms in the midst of these developments, 
however, that severely weakened the economy. Fiscal policy continued to be 
expansionary. Borrowing from commercial sources increased at floating rates to 
sustain an aggressive public investment program (Dohner and Intal, 1989; World Bank, 
1986). 
Table 2.5 Comparative exchange rates, Southeast Asia, 1970, 1980- 82, 1990 
(1970= 100) 
Y ear/count1)'._ PhiliJ2J2incs Mala)_'.sia Thailand Indonesia 
1970 
1980- 82 
1990 
Source: 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
106.4 79.4 80.9 89. 9 
69.9 51.4 54.4 35.7 
fcgan, B. and Purcal , J. T. , 1993. 'Philippines', Asia- Australia Briefing Papers , 2(6). 
Imprudent government spending created a momentu1n that made it difficult to 
introduce reforms. It took a long time for the government to initiate financial 
liberalization policies, because repressed interest rates supported its domestic 
borrowing. Foreign exchange was kept significantly overvalued because devaluation 
increased the burden of servicing the external debt in peso terms. Devaluation also 
contributed to the inflationary pressure arising from the manner of financing the 
government budget deficit. Ainong Southeast Asian currencies, the Philippine peso 
was most overvalued. 
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The political and economic crises in 1983 resulted in an acute balance of 
payments problem. Foreign creditors stopped lending and called up their maturing 
loans. The Philippines was forced to declare a moratorium on servicing its debt 
obligation and to initiate a program of stabilisation. Drastic cuts were made in public 
expenditures and a restrictive monetary policy was enforced . National govermnent 
expenditures were considerably reduced to around 2 per cent of GNP (Table 2.4) . The 
peso was devalued several times, but the devaluations were not sufficient to adjust the 
exchange rate to a realistic level. Quantitative and tariff restrictions were imposed on 
impo1is, a_nd foreign exchange was rationed, thereby reducing the efficiency of private 
investment. 
The stabilisation measures reduced the current account and budget deficits. 
Inflation was reduced to a single digit. But these achievements were at the cost of 
growth. Real GNP decreased by around 7 per cent and 4 per cent in 1984 and 1985, 
respectively (Dohner and Intal, 1989). 
With low inflation and excess capacity, the econo1ny, led by increased 
~ consumption, managed to achieve positive growth rates in l 986- 1989. Government 
pump pri1ning activities helped and so did economic reforms. Agricultural monopolies 
were dismantled, increasing rural incomes. An import liberalization program lowered the 
prices of several comtnodities . Recovery was also aided by a favourable 1novement in the 
terms of trade resulting from lower oil prices, higher exports, and increased foreign 
investments facilitated by debt conversion schemes (Yap, 1991 ). 
The government budget deficit, however, worsened in 1986- 90, averaging 
more than 3 per cent of GNP. This was brought about mainly by increases in current 
operating expenditures, in particular, the accretion in debt service. Around 40 per cent 
of the govermnent budget went to payment of interest and amortisation. Personal 
service expenditures also rose in response to the need to raise the wages of 
government employees which had been seriously eroded by inflation. Failure to tritn 
the fat from the bureaucracy also increased govermnent expenditures. (Manasan, 
1990). Capital outlays were kept within the reduced 1984-85 levels. 
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The budget deficit was largely financed by domestic borrowing which pushed 
interest rates to very high levels. External borrowing was substantially cut because of 
the tightness of the credit market, and a net capital outflow was brought about by debt 
servicing. Monetary policy was generally restrictive, to control inflation which had 
risen to double digits as a result of increased wages in both the private and public 
sectors. In 1990 the -economy was thus in a very unfavourable position with high 
inflation and interest rates. This was co1npounded by a large current account deficit at 
6 per cent of GNP (Yap, 1991 ). The following year saw the government cutting its 
deficit and the economy contracting, a manifestation of the boom- bust cycle which has 
characterised the Philippines' econo1nic performance since the 1950s. 
Inefficient and Inequitable Govenunent Spending 
Debt servicing poses a major constraint to closing the govermnent budget deficit 
without severely cut1ailing expenditures on critical infrastructure and essential services. 
. The size of the debt is a major reason for balance of payments deficits . The manner in 
which the loans were used also posed proble1ns. 
Borrowing was justified on the grounds of increasing the productive capacity 
of the economy. Between 1975 and 1984, gross don1estic capital fonnation rose to an 
average of 3 0 per cent of GNP. Public sector investment which grew by 20 per cent a 
year, accounted for most of the increase. Private sector investrnent growth lagged 
behind at 9 per cent a year and its share in gross domestic capital formation fell from 
76 per cent in 1975 to 57 per cent in 1984 (Manasan, 1988). Incre1nental capital-
output ratios were high, indicating that investments, private as well as public, were 
highly capital intensive and hence, inefficient for the Philippines. As Dohner and lntal 
' 
( 1989) noted, the Philippines' growth rate would have been over 8 per cent per year 
and real GDP in 1980 would have been ahnost 12 per cent higher had the Philippines' 
incremental capital-output ratio equaled the median (Malaysia's) in the list of countries 
in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6 
Country 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Korea 
Source: 
Comparative investm ·nt and growth rates, Southeast Asian countries, 1974-80 
Gross domestic capital Average annual real Incremental 
formation as a GDP growth (per capital- output 
12ercentage of GDP cent) ratio 
29.3 6.26 4.68 
20.0 7.42 2.70 
25 .8 7.26 3. 55 
26.1 7.48 3.48 
29 .8 7.67 3. 89 
Dohner, R. and Intal , P., 1989. 'The Marcos legacy: economic policy and foreign debt in the 
Philippines', in J. Sachs and S. Collins (eds.), 1989. Developing Country Debt and the World 
Economy, National Bureau of Economic Research Proj ect Series, Chicago. 
Public sector investment was carried out mainly by government corporations. 
The number of government owned and/or controlled corporations rose from 70 in 
1973 to 245 in 1985 . Most of these were involved in activities previously dominated by 
the private sector: services (26 per cent), manufacturing (19 per cent), finance (16 per 
cent) and energy (2 per cent) (Manasan, 1988). These corporations became recipients 
of large transfers from the national government and accounted for most of the public 
sector deficit and external debt. Their poor performance was largely responsible for the 
financial crisis in 1983 . Many became bankrupt leaving the national government and 
government financial institutions with large non- perfonning assets . 
The composition of the national government budget changed . The share of 
conventional infrastructure, for example, roads, bridges, irrigation, school buildings, in 
the capital outlay of the national government declined in the mid- seventies. In the 
latter half of the 1970s, almost half of public investments went to energy projects with 
heavy capital requirements. The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant which cost the 
government almost one- tenth of its external debt and later had to be abandoned, was 
one of many unwise investments. 
Public investment strategy shifted to industrial development in the early 1980s. 
Eleven major industrial projects designed for secondary import substitution were 
identified . These projects required huge capital outlays which were expected to be 
partly financed by foreign direct investment. However, they were carried out mainly by 
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government corporations with heavy equity participation from the national govermnent 
(Dohner and Intal, 1989). 
The share of current expenditures in the national government budget declined . 
Operations and maintenance expenditures declined by 14 per cent in real terms 
between 1978 and 1983 in spite of the build up in capital stock Such expenditures 
were squeezed to provide local counterpart finances to foreign assisted projects and 
maintain the inflow of foreign capital. This, however, resulted in the premature 
deterioration of existing capital stock (Dohner and Intal, 1989). 
Budget sectoral allocations also changed markedly. Expenditure on social 
services declined relative to economic services. This had adverse implications for poor 
people and on human resource development. Social services such as education, health 
and sanitation enhance people's productivity and their capacity to help themselves. 
They are i1nportant for both growth and equity. 
The decline in the share of traditional infrastructure such as roads and bridges, 
. also deepened poverty. The absence of adequate infrastructure increased transaction 
costs which drove a wedge between prices charged by producers and paid by 
consumers ( de Dios, 1993). This hindered investment and reduced e1nployment 
opportunities for the poor. 
The rural sector was disadvantaged by the public invest1nent program. Both 
physical and social infrastructure spending were heavily skewed in favour of the urban 
centres, particularly Manila, to support the industrialisation via i1nport substitution 
strategy which was also biased against the agricultural sector. 
Three tiers characterised the allocation of central government expenditures. 
The first tier, consisting solely of Metro Manila, captured 43 per cent of total central 
government expenditures. Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog, with 10 per cent and 
12 per cent respectively of central government expenditures, comprised the second 
tier. The remaining l O regions were each allocated less than 5 per cent of total 
govermnent expenditures (Manasan, 1992a). 
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The inequitable allocation of govermnent expenditures was a major factor in 
the highly uneven level of regional development. Lamberte, Llanto and Manasan 
(1993) observed a strong positive correlation among gross regional product and 
average fan1ily income on the one hand, and road density, percentage of households 
with electricity, and percentage of households with running water, on the other hand. 
They also pointed out the importance of infrastructure in attracting private investments 
to a region . 
Goven11nent Revenue Effort 
The revenue effort of the government is low by international standards, and is a major 
reason for large budget deficits . Among Southeast Asian countries the Philippines had 
the lowest ratio of government revenue to gross national product (Asher and Kintanar, 
1989). It is also at the botto1n of low- inco1ne and 1niddle- income countries in terms of 
taxes collected as a share of gross national product (World Bank, 1988). 
Table 2.7 Composition of tax revenue of the national government, by broad 
categories, Philippines, 1975-86 (per cent) 
Tax cate~ Average share 
Taxes on income and profits 23 
34 
26 
17 
Taxes on domestic goods and services 
Taxes on international trade 
Others 
Total 
Source: 
100 
Asher, M. and Kintanar, A , 1989. 'Fi scal systems and practices in the 
Philippines ', in M.G. Asher (ed.), 1989. Fiscal systems and practices in 
ASEAN: trends, impact and evaluation , Illstitute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore. 
The govermnent relied heavily on indirect taxes (Dohner and Intal, 1989). 
Taxes on domestic goods and services, and international trade, accounted for around 
70 per cent of the national tax revenue. These taxes have a very low income elasticity; 
they are not responsive to changes in gross national product. Changes in tax rates, in 
the definition of tax bases, and administrative reforms had to be continuously 
introduced to keep up with the growth in gross national product. The tax measures 
adopted in the Philippines were, nevertheless, not sufficient to make growth in tax 
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revenue match that of GNP. This was indicated by the low buoyancy of total tax 
revenue of 0. 88; allowing for all discretionary measures, a 10 per cent increase in GNP 
would increase total tax revenue by only 8.8 per cent (Manasan, 1988). 
Table 2.8 Buoyancy and elasticity estimates of tax revenues, by broad 
categories, Philippines, 1975-86 
Tax cate~ 
Total tax revenue 
Taxes on income and profits 
Taxes on domestic goods and services 
Taxes on international trade 
Real property taxes 
Buoyancy 
0.88 
0.97 
0.92 
0.72 
0.86 
Elasticit_y 
0.25 
0.82 
0.22 
0.45 
0.59 
Source: Manasan, R. , ] 988. Financing Public Sector Development Exp enditure in 
Selected Countries: Philippines, Asian Development Bank, Manila. 
The tax base was eroded . Corporate taxes fell sharply in spite of the growth of 
the corporate sector in the mid- seventies because of tax incentives- exemptions, 
credits, and holidays- granted extensively to industries and individual finns to promote 
industrialisation. Tax exemptions were also used to dispense political favours to 
selected individuals and 'crony' corporations (Dohner and Intal , 1989; -Asher and 
Kintanar, 1989). 
Inadequate and inefficient administration plagued the tax system. Individual 
income earners, impo1iers and consumers were not fully taxed. In 1985 , only 13 to 27 
per cent of potential inco111e tax payers filed returns . It was estimated that in 1989, P27 
billion to P66 billion remained uncollected (Krugman, et al., 1992). Atnnesties were a 
recurrent feature of the tax system. Between 1972 and 1981 there were 10 tax amnesty 
decrees. Since 1986, three tax amnesties have been associated with the Tax Refonn 
Program (Asher and Kintanar, 1989). 
Centralised Government Structure 
The fiscal system in the Philippines is highly centralised. ~he national government 
controls the major taxes on income and profits, goods and services, and international 
trade. The only 111ajor tax assigned to local governments is the real property tax which 
accounted for 3 7 per cent and 40 per cent of locally sourced revenues in 1976 and 
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1990, respectively. Local taxing powers are also circumscribed by the national 
government's prescription of allowable rates and exemptions. Instead of being active 
pa1iners of the national government in revenue mobilisation, local governments are 
highly dependent on transfers and grants. National government transfers account for 
around 40 per cent of total local government income (Manasan, 1992a). 
Table 2.9 
Source: 
Percentage dist.-ihution of total government revenues between 
national and local governments, Philippines, 1976, 1980, 1985 and 
1990 
Year National government Local government 
197(> 95 5 
1980 93 7 
1985 94 6 
1990 95 5 
Manasn11 , R., 1992. flltergove111111e11tal /1'iscal Relations, Fiscal .Federalism and 
l!-'co11omic Development, Working Paper 92-04, Philippine Inslilulc for 
Dcvclop1ncnl Studies, Makali . 
The central government also dominates total government expenditures. Prior to 
tJ1e Local Government Code of 1991, the national government was involved in the 
provision of all government services, even at the local level, with minimal involvement 
of local governments. The International Labor Organisation mission to the Philippines 
in l 974 pointed out that lack of active involvement of local governments was one of 
the major reasons for the inadequacy of infrastructure in the rural areas . 
Table 2.10 
Source: 
Pen.:entage dist.-ihution of total government expenditures between 
nation al and local governments, Philippines, l 980, 1985 and l 990 
Year 
1980 
1985 
1990 
Nationc1I government 
89 
91 
93 
Local government 
11 
9 
7 
Manasan, R., 1992. Intergovernmental J'ii·scal Relations, Fiscal Federalism and 
rico11n111ic Development in the Pliilij1pi11es, Working Paper 92-04, Philippine 
Institute for Development Studies, Makati . 
Highly centralised government has been blamed for the general inefficiency of 
the public sector. Red tape, bureaucratic rules and congestion in the channels of 
administration and communication between national and local agencies have resulted in 
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long delays and 1nisallocation of resources (Lim, 1992). The highly uneven level of 
development among and within regions also reflects costs of overcentralisation . 
Decentralisation has recently been initiated, notably through the Local 
Government Code of 1991 . There are no guarantees, however, that this will result in 
higher, more even levels of public service provision and development. Decentralisation 
reforms are being carried out on an uneven playing field . Fiscal capacities of local 
govermnents differ because of varying socioecono1nic characteristics.• Those with 
greater fiscal capacities are in a better position to provide the services that could 
further enhance their socioeconomic position, thereby further widening inter- regional 
and intra- regional inequities. Yet under more favourable intergovernmental fiscal 
arrange1nents, transfers and grants can play a critical role in pro1noting equity and 
encouraging greater local tax efforts. 
Sun1111ary 
. Public finance policies are largely to blame for the persistence of poverty and rncome 
inequality in the Philippines. Imprudent public spending and low resource mobilisation 
efforts have led to chronic fiscal deficits and macro economic instability which stunt 
economic growth. Too much concentration of tax and expenditure powers in the central 
govermnent has prevented local governments from being active partners in the provision 
of econo1nic and social services, and has resulted in inefficiency and uneven geographic 
development which is closely linked to poverty. Recent attempts at government 
decentralisation 1nay not help bring about macro economic stability, but under favourable 
intergovermnental fiscal arrangements it can help pro1note equity and efficiency in the 
allocation of resources. 
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Intergovernmental relations i11 the Philippines 
Govern1nent Structure 
The Philippines is a unitary state which is subdivided into regions, provinces, cities, 
municipalities and baraiigays. 
The National Government. The national government has responsibilities and 
powers which extend over the whole country. It consists of three independent branches: 
the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The executive, headed by a popularly 
elected president, is primarily responsible for imple1nenting the laws, policies and 
programs of the government. The executive is functionally organised into sectoral 
departments, each headed by a cabinet secretary. The legislature, or Congress, is 
bicameral and composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Senators are 
nationally elected while representatives are elected by legislative districts. All revenue 
.and appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. The 
judiciary which interprets the laws of the land is composed of the Supre1ne Court and 
the lower courts (The Philippine Constitution of 1987 ). 
The regions. A region consists of contiguous provinces with a co1nmon resource 
(such as a body of water or mountain range), economic and social structures or a 
distinctive historical and cultural heritage. The regions originated as focal points for the 
decentralisation of some administrative and planning functions of the national 
government. Each department of the national government, particularly those with 
project imple1nentation functions (line agencies) has regional offices functionally 
organised parallel to the central office (De Guzman, Reforma and Panganiban, l 988~ 
Brillantes, 1987). 
The number of regions has increased from 13 to 15 with the creation of the 
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras (Appendix 3.1). Unlike 
the other regions, these newly created regions have political autonomy. Having a 
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, and economic and social structures, the two 
regions were formed on the basis of organic acts defining their basic structure of 
"'111111 
government. They have executive and legislative offices whose officials are elected by 
their constituents, and special cowis with personal, fa1nily and property law jurisdictions 
(The Philippine Constitution of 1987). 
The National Capital Region, composed of the cities and municipalities of Metro 
Manila, is a special metropolitan political subdivision. It was created to ad1ninister 
programs and services c01nmon to its cities and municipalities . It is governed by the 
Metropolitan Manila Commission which is vested with the power and attributes of a 
municipal corporation, and the power to impose taxes and enact/repeal ordinances 
pe1iinent to its cities and municipalities (De Guz1nan and Padilla, 1985). 
The Local Govenunents. 1 The territorial and political subdivisions of the 
country are the barangays, municipalities, cities and provinces. The barangay is the 
lowest tier of local governance. A group of barangays comprises a 1nunicipality. A city 
consists of more urbanised and developed barangays. A city 1nay be classified as highly 
urbanised and be independent of the province upon 1neeting certain requirements . A 
. cluster of municipalities, or municipalities and component cities, comprises a province. 
The creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to 
another, is based on three criteria: income, population and land area. As a general rule, 
its territory 1nust be contiguous. A local government unit is created by law enacted by 
Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or, by ordinance passed by the 
legislative bodies of the province or city concerned in the case of a barangay. Legislation 
creating a local government unit is subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a 
plebiscite called for the purpose. 
Table 3 .1 details the requisites for the creation of local government units based 
on Republic Act No. 7160 which took effect in 1992 and the previous law, Batas 
Pambansa Big. 337 (series of 1983). The main reasons for these require1nents are to 
avoid gerry1nandering and to guarantee that each local government unit can adequately 
perform its assigned functions (De Guz1nan, Reforma and Panganiban, 1988). There are 
doubts, however, whether these require1nents effectively serve their purposes. There is 
no evidence that they were drawn with regard to the functions and revenue ra1s111g 
1 
Un.less 0U1erwise staled, this section is based on Batas Pambansa Big . 337 and Republic Act No . 7160. 
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Table 3.1 
Unit 
Barangay 
Municipality 
City 
Province 
Requisites for the creation of local government units, old and new Local Government Codes, Philippines 
Statute 
Criteria 
mcome 
population 
land area 
mcome 
population 
land area 
mcome 
population 
land area 
mcome 
population 
land area 
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 
{Old Local Government Code) 
no requirement 
1,000 
no requirement 
P200,000a 
10,000 
no requirement 
component 
PlO milliona 
100,000 
no requirement 
PlO milliona 
500,000 
3,500 sg. km. 
highly urbanised 
P30 milliona 
150,000 
Republic Act No. 7160 
(New Local Government Code) 
no requirement 
5,000 for barangays in cities and municipalities within 
Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions 
or highly urbanised cities; 2,000 for all other barangays 
no requirement 
P2.5 millionb 
25,000 
50 sq. km. 
component highly urbanised 
P20 millionb and either P50 millionc 
150,000 or 200,000 
100 sq. km. 
P20 millionb and either 
250,000 or 
2,000 sg. km. 
aRefers to average estimated annual income (in the case of municipalities and provinces) or average regular annual income (in the case of cities), 
for the last three consecutive years and includes income allotted for the general and infrastructure funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and 
non-recumng mcome. 
bRefers to average annual income for the last two consecutive years [although pertinent provisions on the province fail to state a time frame] 
based on 1991 constant prices, and includes income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income. 
cRefers to the latest annual income based on 1991 constant prices. 
Sources: Batas Pambansa Elg. 337 (1983) and Republic Act Nd.7160 (1991) 
powers assigned to each local government level. In the case of barangay, for exainple, 
the only requirement is population size. It is no wonder that the number of barangays 
has increased very fast. Fro1n 1991 to 1994, an additional 93 barangays were created. 
As of 1994, the Philippines had 77 provinces,2 60 cities, 1,542 n1unicipalities and 
41,914 barangays. Aside .from political reasons, there are incentives for the creation of 
local government units, such as central govern1nent transfers.3 
Every local government, in exercising its powers, assumes a dual personality: 
public or governmental, and private or corporate. As a public entity, it exercises by 
delegation, a part of the sovereignty of the state and is an agent of the state for the 
government of its ten:itory and inhabitants. In this capacity, it performs functions such 
as the preservation of peace, the establishment of schools, the construction and 
maintenance of local roads, bridges, parks and public buildings, the provision of basic 
health care and hospital services, and the delivery of agricultural extension services. As 
a private entity, a local government acts much like a business corporation performing 
functions which are not strictly governmental or political such as the establishment of 
markets and slaughterhouses, and the operation of waterworks, transportation and 
telephone sys te1ns (Rodriguez, 19 84). 
Each local governn1ent level plays a different role in the performance of these 
functions. The barangay is supposed to serve as the primary planning and implementing 
unit of government programs and as a forum for the articulation of the problems and 
needs of the people. The municipality and city are designed to serve as general-purpose 
governments for the coordination and delivery of basic, direct and regular services. The 
province is supposed to assume area-wide and more specialised functions which are 
likely to benefit from economies of scale. 
The powers of local government are primarily vested in their elected officials. 
These consist of the punong barangay and the sangguniang barangay n1embers for the 
barangay; the mayor, vice-mayor and sangguniang bayan (municipal council) members 
for the municipality; the mayor, vice-mayor and sangguniang panglungsod (city 
2This includes Metro Manila. 
3See chapter 8. 
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council) me1nbers for the city; and the governor, vice-governor and sangguniang 
panlalawigan (provincial council) members for the province. The punong barangay, 
mayor and governor are the chief executives. The sanggunians are the legislative bodies 
and are composed of regular elected and ex officio 1ne1nbers. 
The President of the Philippines exercises general superv1s1on over local 
government units to ensure that they act within the scope of their prescribed powers and 
functions. With the assistance of the Department of Interior and Local Government, 
such supervisory authority is exercised directly over provinces, highly urbanised cities 
and independent component cities; through the province with respect to co1nponent 
cities and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to 
barangays. 
Government decentralisation 
The Philippines has espoused the decentralisation of government both as a policy 
. objective and as a means of attaining its development goals. Government 
decentralisation efforts can be categorised into two major types. The first 1s 
administrative decentralisation ( or deconcentration) which involves the delegation of 
certain functions of the central government to its field offices and agencies. The second 
is political decentralisation (or devolution) and is akin to local autonomy. Essentially, 
this involves the transfer of power and authority for the perfonnance of certain functions 
from the central government to local govermnent units (Oainar and Rivera, 1975; 
Brillantes, 1987). 
Adn1inistrative decentralisation. Administrative decentralisation mostly 
consists of the deconcentration of the national planning and administration function to 
the regional level (Brillantes, 1987). Planning is an integral aspect of public finance in 
the country. The government operates on the basis of ~ five-year medium tern1 
development plan which contains general macroeconomic targets such as gross 
domestic product growth rate, employment, balance of payments, and the rate of 
inflation. It also contains a blueprint of the programs and policies of the sectoral 
24 
....... 
_. 
depart1nents and agencies of the national government for the different regions. The plan 
is updated annually and serves as a basis for fonnulation of the national budget. 
A regional approach to planning has been given emphasis to address the problen1 
of uneven regional growth, alleviate poverty, and develop public programs and projects 
which are more sensitive and suitable to local development needs (Nuqui, 1992). The 
Integrated Reorganisation Plan (Presidential Decree No. 1, series of 1972) under the 
Marcos administration created a regional development council in each region ( except 
for the national capital region) to coordinate planning, implementation and 1nonitoring 
of programs and projects of the national governn1ent in the region. The regional 
development council was to be an extension of the Board of the National Economic 
Development Authority (Lamberte, Manasan and Llanto, 1993). Its major responsibility 
was to undertake a 'comprehensive and detailed survey of the resources and potential of 
the region' and to prepare on the basis of such survey 'long range and annual plans 
within the guidelines set by the National Economic and Development Authority'. The 
. members of the regional development council initially consisted of representatives from 
the regional offices of the national government with sectoral functions, and elected local 
govern1nent officials (Brillantes, 1987). The regional office of the National Economic 
Development Authority provided technical support and acted as the secretariat. 
To facilitate local consultation and participation, local development councils 
were created in each local government unit. The local development councils, which 
parallel the composition of the regional development councils, are charged with 
assisting the local governments to formulate their respective plans. These are integrated 
to come up with a regional development plan and strategy. 
The planning process envisages a 'bottom-up' approach that begins at the 
barangay level with the conceptualisation of the barangay development plans through 
the barangay develop1nent councils. The plans, containing a list of project proposals, 
are then forwarded to municipal development councils for evaluation and incorporation 
into the municipal development plan and invest1nent program. The same process occurs 
in the cities and provinces. The approved development plans of provinces and highly 
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urbanised cities are submitted to the regional development councils, which consider 
them for integration into the regional development plans (Hubbell, et al., 1989). 
Regional development plans are enriched by the integrated area development 
projects, which used to be coordinated by the National Council on Integrated Area 
Development. The integrated area development projects emphasise 1nulti-sectoral 
intervention focused on a specific geographic area within a region. The targeted areas 
are depressed areas with high development potential. The major objectives are to spur 
economic development in these areas and to promote equitable distribution of its gains. 
Each integrated area development project office has corporate powers and has the 
authority to call for assistance on any national government agency and local government 
in the area, although it has no control or power over them (Nuqui, 1992; De Guzman 
and Padilla, 1985). 
The regional development plans are forwarded to the National Economic and 
Development Authority which is the primary agency of the government for planning. 
.The National Economic Development Authority evaluates and integrates them to 
formulate the regional development and physical planning framework which is part of 
the medium term development plan. The lists of proposed projects contained in the 
regional development plans serve as the bases for the five-year regional development 
investment program. The projects are prioritised yearly to come up with an annual 
investment program which is linked to the national budget (Lamberte, Manasan and 
Llanto, 1993). 
To reinforce regional planning, a regional budgeting system was instituted with 
the issuance of Letter of Instructions 447 and 448 in 1976. All major national 
government implementing agencies are required to have a breakdown of their budgets 
by region. Each agency's regional office prepares a budget proposal based on the 
regional development investment progran1, which is presented and justified before the 
respective regional development councils. The proposed regional budgets are then 
submitted to their respective central offices, where they are evaluated and integrated to 
come up with the departn1ent or agency budgets. The Department of Budget and 
Management then holds budget hearings to evaluate and prioritise the agencies' 
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proposed budgets with respect to the aggregate revenue, expenditure and debt ceilings 
determined and approved by the Development Budget Coordination Co1nmittee4 and the 
President. After each agency's expenditure ceiling is determined, each agency makes the 
necessary changes and realignments on its budget. This is submitted to the Department 
of Budget and Management which consolidates all budgets and submits the1n to the 
President and the Cabinet. The President then prepares the national budget and submits 
it to Congress in the form a General Appropriations Bill. The Bill is discussed in 
Congress and an Appropriations Act, which serves as the basis for government 
expenditure, is 'passed (Laya, 1979; Lamberte, Manasan and Llanto, 1993). 
The decentralised planning process has not yet developed as envisioned. 
Regional offices which were established supposedly to deconcentrate national powers 
and authority merely serve as extensions of the central government (Republic of the 
Philippines, 1987). The central offices still exercise strong influence in the prioritisation 
of regional projects and their funding allocation and releases. Though regionalised, the 
.budgeting system is in essence more agency-based than area-based. The regional 
offices are forced to adopt the projects that are regarded as having priority by their 
central offices rather than those favoured at the regional level (Lamberte, Manasan and 
Llanto, 1993). The regional development councils perform largely coordinating 
functions since they have no line of authority over their members (Brillantes, 1987). 
The local governments do not take the planning process seriously, and simply 
submit to the regional develop1nent councils a 'wish list' of projects without any 
indication of their priorities. A major reason is that the local government units have very 
limited financial resources and there is no assurance that the projects they propose to the 
regional develop1nent council will be approved. The transaction costs involved in 
following up their requests are high (Hubbell, et al., 1989). 
The Aquino administration (1986-1992) co1runitted itself to greater 
decentralisation. The government was reorganised and the Administrative Code of 1987 
(Executive Order No. 292, series of 1987) was passed with the objective of improving 
4The Development Budget Coordination Committee consists of the National Economic Development 
Authority Director-General, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of Budget and Management, 
and Finance. 
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government responsiveness tlu·ough the decentralisation of powers, resources and 
capabilities. The Code declares as policy that: 
The functions of the different Departments shall be 
decentralized in order to reduce red tape, free central 
officials fro1n administrative details concerning field 
operations; and relieve the1n from unnecessary 
involve1nent in routine and local matters. Adequate 
authority shall be delegated to subordinate officials. 
Ad1ninistrative decisions and actions shall, as much as 
feasible, be at the level closes to the public (Executive 
Order No. 292, Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, 
Chapter 1, Section 3) . 
The modified disbursement scheme (Memorandum Order No. 279, series of 
1990) allowing direct releases of funds to regional and local agencies of the national 
government was introduced to overco1ne these problems. It allowed regional and local 
offices to directly submit disbursement and liquidation reports to the Department of 
Budget and Managen1ent, thus enabling faster flows of resources to the regions 
(Lamberte, Manasan and Llanto, 1993). 
The President appointed Cabinet Officers for Regional Development ~nd created 
the Cabinet Action Committee on Decentralisation. Aside from their regular duties as 
cabinet members, the Cabinet Officers for Regional Development were given the task of 
articulating the concern of their respective region in the cabinet, and assisting the 
President in the speedy resolution of problems in the region. The Cabinet Action 
Committee, which consisted of the Secretaries of Budget and Management, Local 
Government and Finance, was to identify the powers and responsibilities of central 
government agencies that could be delegated to their regional offices and those which 
could be devolved to local governments (Yoingco and Guevarra, 1989). 
A pilot decentralisation project, an experiment in decentralising national 
govern1nent operations, was carried out in 1988 in five provinces. An expected output 
of the project is a 1nemorandum of agreement identifying and delegating certain 
functions to local governments. However, only two provinces managed to come up with 
a memorandu1n of agreements. The experience from the pilot projects shows the 
i1nportance of clear guidelines for the assignment of functions between national 
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government agencies and local govermnents, which were unfortunately not totally 
developed in the pilot provinces. Congress has also an i1nportant role in the formulation 
and i1nplen1entation of decentralisation (Lamberte, Manasan and Llanto, 1993 ; Y oingco, 
1989). 
Executive Order -308 (I 987), as amended by Executive Order 366 (1989), and 
Executive Order 319 (1988) reorganised the regional and local development councils 
respectively, and instituted private sector participation by including representatives of 
non- government organisations in their membership . Executive Order 366 (I 989) 
endorsed the participation of Members of Congress in the various aspects of regional and 
local development through their membership in the regional development assemblies and 
the local develop1nent councils . This allowed better coordination in the planning and 
implementation of regional and local projects, particularly with regard to the Countryside 
Development Fund which is allocated by congressional districts . 
The regional development fund was reinstituted in 1988 to support the expansion 
. of powers and functions of regional development councils and to finance the operating 
requirements and capital outlays of regional and local develop1nent projects. The 
regional development fund was set up initially in the early 1970s under the annual 
General Appropriations Act. It was designed to influence local government budgeting 
and encourage local government revenue efforts and inter- local govermnent 
coordination by providing counterpart funding to projects whose benefits extended 
beyond the boundary of a local govermnent unit. I--Iowever, it was soon abolished 
because of low utilisation which reflected both poor local tax collections and greater 
preference of local govermnent units for purely local projects (Carague, 1991 ; Nuqui, 
1992). The local govermnents have very litnited resources which are 1nostly allocated to 
current expenditures, particularly general public services which have mostly to do with 
running local govermnents. 5 
The Medium- term Philippine Development Plan emphasised the i1nportance of 
strengthening the linkages between sectoral and regional investment .planning and 
program1ning. To this end, the President issued Memorandum Order No . 295 (series of 
5This is discussed in chapter 7. 
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1990) directing the adoption of a synchronised planning, programming and budgeting 
system designed to properly coordinate these activities at the sub-national and national 
levels through a careful definition of objectives, procedures and schedules, and 
establishment of an appropriate institutional network. A1nong the key features of the 
system are (Diokno, l 99l) : 
I) Proper sequencing and ti1ning of planning, programming and budgeting in 
accordance with the relationship between their inputs and outputs- the 
preparation and updating of development plans, and investment progra1runing 
are conducted two years prior to their i1nplementation, and budgeting one 
year prior to implementation; 
2) Clear guidelines establish direct linkages and consistency between national and 
regional plans, invest1nent programs and budgets; 
3) Greater authority to the regional development councils and agency regional 
offices- regional agency budget proposals approved by the regional 
development councils are integrated without 1nodification into the central 
agency budget proposals provided that the fonner are within fhe regional 
budget ceilings; and 
4) Installation of a pe1formance evaluation system linked to the planning, 
program1ning and budgeting system. 
Note that the regional plans, investment programs and budgets include only 
agency regional programs and projects, and local govermnent proposed projects which 
are to be funded or implemented by national line agencies. Local govermnent programs 
and projects which are to be financed out of local funds 6 are not incorporated in the 
regional develop1nent invest1nent program. 
Political decentralisation. Political decentralisation has been carried out mostly 
through legislation . In 1959, the Local Autonomy Act broadened the powers of local 
governments and lessened national control over local actions, particularly in planning, 
6Local funds is defined as those derived by the local govenunents from local taxes and fees, internal 
revenue allotment and other shares, domestic and foreign grants, and domestic loans . 
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budgeting and implementing public works projects. The Decentralisation Act of 1967 
devolved additional powers to local governments and remove certain restrictions in the 
local fund structure to allow more rational planning of resources. Provinces and cities 
were granted the authority to undertake their own agricultural extension and rural health 
services and allowed to retain the amount they contributed to the national government 
for these purposes. The national government, however, retained the prerogative of 
programming these functions and extending technical and financial assistance (Oamar 
and Rivera, 1975). 
The local governments remained weak in spite of these laws. Williams (1981) 
attributed their weakness to four major factors. First, the capacity of local governments 
to mobilise resources to finance their activities was impaired not only by linlited taxing 
powers, but also by narrow local tax bases. The i1nport-substitution strategy of the 
national governn1ent, which was biased against rural areas restricted their growth. 
Second, decentralisation conflicted with the interest of congressmen who shared the 
.same constituency with local government officials. Given the patronage syste1n of 
politics in the Philippines, it was in the congressmen's interest that the local officials 
remained weak. Thus, legislation devolving greater powers to local governments was 
always short of expectations. Third, the devolution of powers to local governments also 
involved complex issues and proble1ns because of their varying sizes and levels of 
development. Finally, decentralisation posed a threat to the bureaucracy because it 
would reduce its power and influence. 
The 1973 Constitution was ratified during the Martial Law period. For the first 
time local government units were constitutionally recognised as political units and were 
guaranteed autonomy. The Constitution guaranteed the power of local governn1ent to 
create its own sources of revenue and levy taxes subject to certain linlitation as may be 
provided by law. It also provided for the enactment of a local government code. 
Presidential Decree No. 231 ( 1973) also known as the Local Tax Code was 
passed. However, except for transferring a few minor national taxes to local 
governments, the Local Tax Code only consolidated the taxing powers of local 
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governments that were already provided in various laws. 7 The local governments were 
denied access to the major revenue bases, such as taxes on income and profits, goods 
and services, and international trade, that were assigned exclusively to the national 
govern1nent. 
The Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) was passed by the 
National Assembly in 1983. It provided the criteria for the creation of local government 
units and defined their powers and responsibilities. It also defined the relationship 
between central agencies and local govern1nent units. As provided in the Code, national 
agencies' supervision over local governn1ents was to be confined to the setting of 
standards and guidelines. Various provisions, however, allowed them to act on local 
matters such as education, justice and local government audits. The Code also directed 
national agencies to exercise technical supervision over local governments, and to 
secure their participation in national programs and projects that would be implemented 
in the local units. 
Political decentralisation remained largely rhetorical. The authoritarian 
administration consolidated power in the national government as a way of entrenching 
its rule (De Guzman, 1988). The President continued to exercise legislative powers 
which included the power to create, merge, or abolish local governments . Police, jail 
and fire services which used to be purely local functions were centralised and placed 
under the control of the Philippine Constabulary (De Guz1nan, Reforma and 
Panganiban, 1988). Local government discretion over budgets was reduced by several 
restrictions and obligations mandated by the national government. Local government 
budgets had to be reviewed by at least four national govern1nent agencies (Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Budget, Ministry of Local Government and Community 
Development, Commission on Audit) for consistency with national government 
guidelines. The local treasurers and assessors were appointed by the national 
government (Bahl and Schroeder, 1983a). 
In general, the national-local government relations in the sharing of power, 
authority and responsibilities were not conducive to the success of decentralisation 
7Chapter 6 discusses in detail the revenue raising powers of local governments. 
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policies. Ad111inistrative decentralisation and political decentralisation tended to 
contradict rather than reinforce each other. The existence of field offices of national 
governn1ent depart1nents and agencies performing functions similar to local 
governn1ents caused confusion and conflict in the lines of responsibility and 
accountability. This inhibited the development of local govcrn1nent capacity, and 
resulted in disjointed and inefficient provision of government services (De Guz1nan, 
1988). 
The Aquino administration endeavoured to resolve the impasse in the 
duplication of functions among different levels of government and promote local 
govern1nent autonomy. Several laws were passed by Congress in accordance with the 
provisions of the 1987 Constitution which adopted local autonomy as a principle and 
policy of the state. These laws included Republic Act No. 6734 (1989) and Republic 
Act No. 6766 (1989) also known as the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao and the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. These 
.laws defined the basic structure of government for these regions and devolved to them 
significant fiscal powers and responsibilities, except in matters of defence and security 
which remained the sole responsibility of the national government. The President 
exercises general supervision over these regions. 
The most significant law passed by Congress was Republic Act No. 7160 
( otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) which took effect in 1992. 
The most i1nportant provision of the Act was the devolution of certain functions, 
responsibilities and regulatory powers from national government agencies to local 
govern1nents. The new local government code specifically assigned to each local 
govern1nent level a set of basic services and facilities that they have to provide in 
connection with the devolved functions. The personnel, property and equipment of the 
national government agencies which used to carry out these functions were transferred 
to the respective local government units. As a general principle the national government 
agencies would mainly be responsible for policy formulation, program development, 
standard setting, technical assistance and monitoring. The local government units would 
be responsible for the implementation and provision of these services. 
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Table 3 .2 Cenh·al goven1111ent services and facilities devolved to local govern1nents, new Local Governn1ent Code, Philippines, 1991 
Central govermnent agency 
Department of Agriculture 
Depart1nent of Environinent and Natural 
Resources 
Department of Health 
Depart1nent of Public Works and 
Highways 
Department of Education, Culture and 
Sports 
Department of Social Welfare and 
Development 
Department of Tourism 
Department of Transpo11ation and 
Communication 
Devolved services/facilities 
Agricultural extension and on- site research 
Implementation of community- based 
projects and enforcement of 
environmental protection laws 
Delivery of field health services, hospital 
services and other tertiary health 
services 
Public works and infrastructure funded out 
of local funds 
Construction and maintenance of school 
buildings 
Delivery of social welfare services 
Tourism facilities and tourism 
promotion/development 
Inter- municipal telecommunication 
services for provinces 
Source: Lim, J. , 1992. 'The macro aspect and tl1e political economy of decentrali sation' in Lim, J. and Nozawa, K. (eds. ), 1992 . Decentralisation and Economic Development in the PhilrjJpines, Illstitutc of Developing Economies, Tokyo. 
Issues and proble1ns 
The success of decentralisation hinges on several factors. A 1najor pitfall of 
previous decentralisation efforts was the failure to match the responsibilities and 
functions assigned to local governments with an equivalent increase in their revenue-
raising powers. The Local Government Code of 1991 also did not add 1nuch to the 
revenue-raising powers of local governments except for the transfer of a few 1ninor taxes 
and the higher rate ceilings prescribed on local taxes . To bridge the gap, the Code 
provided for a higher share of local governments in the internal revenue allotment. The 
dependence of local goverrunents on central government transfers, however, still 
undennined local government autonomy. 
It is also i1nportant to consider whether the existing highly fragmented local 
government structure with very many small barangays and municipalities that are hardly 
viable is conducive to decentralisation. Previous decentralisation efforts showed that 
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most of these small units were hardly capable of undertaking the services assigned to 
them. Thus, it seemed unwise to assign additional political and ad1ninistrative powers to 
these local goverrunent units (De Guzman and Padilla, 1985). The frag1nented local 
government structure also creates problems for administration and coordination. 
Closely related ·to the issue of local govermnent fragmentation, is the highly 
uneven financial, technical and administrative capacity of local govermnent units . Neither 
the allocation of develop1nent funds in the planning, progra1n1ning and budgeting process 
nor the allocation of internal revenue allotment in the local govermnent code, addresses 
the varying capacities of the different regions and local government units. 
Decentralisation is likely to result in greater inequity if nothing is done about this . 
Sununary 
The Philippines is a unitary state with a multi-tiered govermnent syste1n consisting of the 
national govermnent and the different local govermnent levels, namely: province, city, 
municipality and barangay. Each govermnent level is headed by officials directly elected 
by the people. The national government, as the highest policy making body, defines the 
system of intergovermnental fiscal relations which include the assignment of revenue 
raising powers and expenditure functions, and the concornitant intergovernmental 
transfers . Decentralisation, both in ad1ninistrative and political terms, has been a major 
policy direction of the govermnent. Ad1ninistratively, this consists of the deconcentration 
of the national government planning, budgeting and administration functions to its 
regional offices. Politically, this involves the transfer frorn the national government to 
local govermnent units of responsibility for the performance of certain functions and 
authority over certain revenue raising activities. 
Decentralisation has not been without problems. Regional offices which were 
established to deconcentrate national govermnent powers have merely served as 
extension offices. The central offices still exercise strong influence in the planning, and 
prioritisation of regional projects and their funding allocation and releases, which 
discourages meaningful participation of the local govermnents. The revenue ra1smg 
powers assigned to local govenunent units have not also been co1n1nensurate to their 
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assigned expenditure functions. As such, the local govermnents are very dependent on 
central governn1ent transfers which tend to undermine local autonomy. The highly 
fragmented local government structure also 1nilitates against decentralisation. The 
existence of numerous and small local government units, many of which are lacking in 
technical capabilities, makes ad1ninistration and coordination problematic. It is also partly 
to bla1ne for widespread disparities in fiscal capacities among local government units 
which, unless addressed by a proper system of intergovernmental transfers, are likely to 
be exacerbated by the decentralisation refonns. 
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Appendix 3.1 Regions ancJ their component provinces after the Organic Acts, Philippines, 1991 
National Capital Region 
composed of cities and municipalities 
in Metro Manila 
Region I - Ilocos 
!locos Norte 
Ilocos Sur 
La Union 
Pangasinan 
Region II - Cagayan Valley 
Batanes 
Cagayan 
Isabela 
Nueva Viscaya 
Quirino 
Cordillera Autonomous Region 
Abra 
Benguet 
Mountain Province 
lfugao 
Kalinga-Apayao 
Region III - Central Luzon 
Bataan 
Bulacan 
Nueva Ecija 
Pampanga 
Tarlac 
Zamboanga 
Region IV - Southern Luzon 
Aurora 
Batangas 
Cavite 
Laguna 
Marinduque 
Occidental Mindoro 
Oriental Mindoro 
Palawan 
Quezon 
Rizal 
Romblon 
Region V - Bicol 
Albay 
Camarines Notte 
Camarines Sur 
Catanduanes 
Masbate 
Sorsogon 
Note: 
Source: 
1Formerly a part of Region XII 
2Formerly a part of Region IX 
Department of the Interior and Local 
Government 
Region VI - Western Visayas 
Aldan 
Antique 
Capiz 
Guimaras 
Iloilo 
Negros Occidental 
Region VII - Central Visayas 
Bohol 
Cebu 
Negros Oriental 
Siquijor 
Region VIII - Eastern Visayas 
Biliran 
Eastern Samar 
Leyte 
Northern Samar 
Wes tern Sama r 
Southern Leyte 
Region IX - Western Mindanao 
Basilan 
Zamboanga del Notte 
Zamboanga dcl Sur 
Region X - Northern Mindanao 
Agusan dcl Notte 
Agusan del Sur 
Bukidnon 
Camiguin 
Misamis Occidental 
Misamis Oriental 
Surigao dcl Norte 
Region XI - Southern Mindanao 
Davao dcl Norte 
Davao Oriental 
Davao <lei Sur 
South Cotabato 
Suri gao dcl Sur 
Region XII - Central Mindanao 
North Cotabato 
Lanao del Norte 
Sultan Kudarat 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
Lanao del Sur1 
Mag uindanao 1 
Sulu2 
Tawi- tawi 2 
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Introduction 
4 
Theoretical background 
Vertical fiscal i1nbalances and horizontal fiscal imbalances are major issues which 
invariably surface in the discussion of intergovermnental fiscal relations in multi- level 
governn1ent systems. Vertical fiscal i1nbalance refers to the 1nis1natch between 
expenditure requirements and revenue sources of govermnents at all 'levels'. Horizontal 
fiscal i1nbalance refers to inequality in expenditure needs and revenue capacities of 
governments at the sa1ne level. The presence of these problems and attempts by 
govermnents to address the1n, either through assigmnent and reassigrnnent of tax and 
expenditure functions or through intergovernmental fiscal transfers, impact heavily on the 
provision and financing of public services in particular and the operation of the economy 
in general. 
The issues of ve1iical and horizontal fiscal in1balances have gained currency 111 
many countries in connection with decentralisation. Theoretically, these issues are not 
relevant in centralised governments where sub- national govermnents are mere 
administrative agents of the central government, because in effect there is only one 
government. However, the current thrust of policies in n1any countries is to decentralise 
the delivery of govermnent services and foster local govenunent autono1ny. 
Why Decentralisation? 
Improving Correspondence Between the Demand for, and Supply of, Public Goods. 
One of the 1nost co1n1nonly cited reasons for support for a decentralised govermnent 
structure stems from differences in the degree of public goods' 'publicness'. 
Technologically determined, spatially differentiated 'benefit areas' are associated with 
different public goods. Some public goods are national, conferring benefits on all 
citizens, while s01ne are local, conferring benefits only on a subsector of the society. The 
argument for decentralisation is based primarily on local public goods. Specifically, it is 
argued that if the desired levels and 1nixes of local public goods differ between 
geographical areas (that is, there is greater ho1nogeneity of preferences within than 
between areas), then decentralised service provision by sub- national governtnents will 
result in greater efficiency. Sub-national govermnents are considered to be more 
responsive to local preferences than central governments. Local provision allows 
gover111nents to cater better to the tastes and needs of local residents by differentiating 
the quantity, quality and 1nix of public goods. Central provision often results in a 
tendency towards undesirable uniformity. Unifonn provision of public services, 
according to Oates (I 972), is likely to cause welfare loss-that is, overprovision in some 
areas and underprovision in others. 
The literature provides two major explanations for this argu1nent. Both are based 
on the difficulty of obtaining infonnation on preferences for public goods because of 
problems of exclusion and jointness of consumption . It is not in the individuals' interest 
to reveal their preferences for public goods if they will be charged on the basis of their 
revealed benefits. 
According to the first explanation, govermnents are i1nperfectly informed of 
citizens' preferences, and the more distant a government is from its constituents, the Jess 
well infonned it is likely to be. Difficulty in obtaining information about people's 
preferences could lead to inefficiency in the provision of goods and services. Local 
governtnents which are closer to the people, therefore, are likely to be more efficient 
than central governments. They are in a better position to know the needs and 
preferences of their constituents (Walsh, 1992). 
The second explanation is based on the 'voting with the feet' Tiebout model 
(1956). The Tiebout model is concerned pri1narily with the mechanis1n by which 
consumer- voters register their preferences for public goods. The model shows that 
patterns of expenditure for local public goods, reflecting the preferences of the 
population, are more likely to occur through local provision than national provision of 
these goods. Drawing an analogy to the consumer shopping trip to the market place to 
buy private goods at given prices, Tiebout suggests that the 1nove1nent of voter-
taxpayers between local jurisdictions to ones which best match their preferences for 
public services and corresponding tax liabilities can be viewed as the mechanism by 
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which preferences for public goods are revealed . This brings out a major difference 
between central and local provision of public goods. According to Tiebout (1956, 
p.418) : 
... at the central level the preferences of the consumer-
voter are given, and the govermnent tries to adjust to the 
pattern of these preferences, whereas, at the local level, 
various governments have their revenue and expenditure 
patterns more or less set. Given these revenue and 
expenditure patterns, the consumer- voter moves to that 
community whose local government best satisfies his set of 
preferences. The greater the number of com1nunities and 
the greater the variance among them, the closer the 
consumer will come to fully realising his preference 
position. 
Note that in the Tiebout model, the focus is mainly on the consumption side. The 
consumer-voter chooses between alternative jurisdictions but not strictly competitive 
jurisdictions. Local govermnents do not necessarily attempt to adapt to the preferences 
of consUJner-voters. This is understandable considering that Tiebout is primarily 
concerned with the mechanis1n by which preferences for public goods are revealed. The 
.problem, however, is that the model has to depend on a very large number of local 
jurisdictions and unrestrained and costless mobility of citizens to achieve efficiency or 
optimality. 
Another argument for decentralisation , in contrast, focuses on the supply side of 
public goods. 
Enhanced Intergovernmental Competition. Decentralisation could promote 
greater efficiency in public resource allocation through intergovernmental competition 
that results in the development and subsequent diffusion of innovative government 
policies . In contrast to the Tiebout model, which depicts intergovernmental competition 
hinging on the mobility of people across different local jurisdictions, Breton (I 987) 
considers a Schumpeterian concept of entrepreneurial competition, that is, competition 
among governments in the development of innovative policies that might satisfy the 
demands or preferences of their citizen- voters . In a multi- tier government syste1n, each 
citizen- voter can be thought of as simultaneously belonging to more than one 
governmental jurisdiction; an individual is simultaneously a voter for the central and local 
governments . This makes governments at different levels potential competitors for the 
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development of policies that could earn votes for them. Policies that prove successful can 
then serve as models for other governments . 
Constraining Abuses of Taxing Powers. In a somewhat different view of 
government, Brennan and Buchanan (I 980) suggest another reason for decentralisation 
resulting in more efficient resource allocation. They postulate centralised government as 
a Leviathan- that is, a 1nonolithic organisation composed of individuals seeking to 
maxi1nise their utility by maximising the amount of 'surplus' revenues available for their 
discretionary use. They do not claim that governments inevitably or invariably act in this 
way, but this modelling assumption provides a 'worst case' possibility against which fiscal 
constitutions need to be designed to protect the interests of citizen- voters. With this 
view of government, Brennan and Buchanan suggest decentralisation as one way of 
constraining governments from abusing their taxing powers which involve the transfer of 
economic resources from the private sector to the goverrunent. Decentralisation fosters 
intergovernmental competition (similarly to the Tiebout model), which forces 
governments to exercise prudence in their tax and expenditure decisions. Exploitative 
governments risk diminishing their tax bases with the migration of their citizen- taxpayers 
or their taxable activities to less exploitative governments, which on the other hand, 
increase their tax bases. This competition restrains governments in much the same way as 
the electoral process does . 
Greater Fiscal Responsibility. To the extent that it devolves both tax and 
expenditure powers, decentralisation will promote greater accountability and fiscal 
responsibility. This is because it results in a closer link between tax and expenditure 
decisions; it promotes greater transparency as people can more easily associate the taxes 
they pay with the services governments provide. 
Agents for Redistributive Policies. Redistribution 1s generally regarded as 
primarily a central government function . Local governments acting independently are not 
likely to pursue redistributive fiscal policy such as progressive taxation for fear of losing 
their wealthy residents. However, there is growing recognition that local governments 
can also make an important contribution to redistribution particularly in the provision of 
basic social primary goods (or merit goods) whose primary beneficiaries are low income 
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groups. Local governments are in a better position to identify the target beneficiaries and 
provide appropriate services. Bird (1990, p.279) noted that whether and how local 
goverrnnents deliver basic services, and how such services are financed, may have more 
direct impact on the well- being of poor people than many grandiose national policies. 
Macro econo1nic ConstJ~aints to Decentralisation 
While decentralisation augurs weIJ for the promotion of efficiency in the allocation of 
resources, and to some extent for equitable distribution of income, it can be a hindrance 
to effective economic stabilisation efforts of the government. Inflation, unemployment, 
recessions and booms tend to be events of national scope. Thus, the function of 
economic stabilisation is generally reserved for the national government, which can 
internalize the benefits and costs of its provision . Independent stabilisation efforts of 
local governments are likely to be ineffective because of leakages arising from the 
smallness and openness of local economies (Bomfin and Shah, 1991 ) . Besides, local 
governn1ents cannot have access to 1nonetary policy which is one of the basic tools of 
econo1nic stabilization. To grant a local goverrnnent the power to create money would be 
tantamount to giving that local government an unlimited claim on the resources of other 
localities (Oates, 1968), and granting this power to all local governments would lead to 
uncontrollable inflation. 
For the national governtnent to be effective in stabilizing the economy, it needs to 
have considerable control over taxes, public expenditure and the money supply. 
Devolving certain taxes and expenditures to local government can possibly undermine 
the capability of the national government to effectively perform its macroeconomic 
stabilisation function . 
Assign1nent of Expenditure Functions 
The literature provides a strong a priori case for decentralisation. However, it is 
important that decentralisation be understood in the broader context of proper 
assignment of expenditure functions among levels of government. In this regard, the 
'economics of federalism' literature provides guidelines which can be generalised to all 
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multi- level governments. These guidelines can be categorised under two maJor 
approaches which will be referred to as the traditional and new approaches. 
Traditional Approach. The traditional approach considers three major factors 
in the assignment of functions, namely, the benefit area of the public good, jurisdictional 
spillovers or externalities, and returns to scale in the production of public goods. 
(i) Fiscal equivalence. According to Olson (1969), to achieve a Pareto- optimal 
level of public expenditure, there tnust be a match between the boundary of goverrunent 
and the benefit area of the public good it provides so that there will be a correspondence 
between those who receive the benefits of a public good and those who pay for it. This 
condition, which Olson defines as fiscal equivalence, is also referred to as perfect 
mapping (Breton, 1965 ) and perfect correspondence (Oates, 1972). 
The basic idea embodied in the fiscal equivalence principle and its alternative 
formulations, is that all benefits and costs associated with a public good must be 
considered or internalised in the decision ca1culus of the goverrunental jurisdiction 
responsible for its provision. On the basis of this principle, it is suggested that public 
goods which are national 1nust be provided by the national government; those which are 
regional, by regional governments; those which are local, by local governments, and so 
on. 
Note, however, that if internalisation of all benefits and costs associated with 
public goods is the only consideration, there is no necessary reason why a centralised 
unitary government will be less efficient than 1nulti- level govermnents. In other words, 
by assigning the provision of all public goods to the national government, theoretically 
there would be zero externalities- all benefits and costs in the provision of any public 
good are capable of being internalised . 
In explaining the rationale for the principle of fiscal equivalence, Olson justifies 
the importance of sub- national govermnents by alluding to the mechanis1n of public 
good provision in a democratic system with voting by majority rule. For instance, in the 
case of local public goods which benefit only a sub- sector of the population, provision 
by national goverrunent will result in a less than Pareto-efficient level. This is because 
the benefits of local public goods are confined to a few groups of individuals while the 
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costs are likely to be shouldered by the whole population . Olson noted that log-
rolling- where minority groups which stand to benefit from local goods and services can 
trade votes or enter into coalitions to become a majority and have their desired public 
goods provided- is not enough to correct this inefficiency. 
Oates (1972, p•. 35) also underscores the importance of local governments in the 
efficient provision of local goods. In an extension of the fiscal equivalence principle, 
which he terms 'perfect correspondence', he proposes the decentralisation theorem: 1 
For a public good-the consumption of which is 
defined over geographical subsets of the total population, 
and for which the costs of providing each level of output 
of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central 
or the respective local govermnent- it will always be 1nore 
efficient ( or at least as efficient) for local government to 
provide the Pareto- efficient levels of output for their 
respective jurisdictions than for the central government to 
provide any specified and unifonn level of output across 
all jurisdictions. 
The decentralisation theorem focuses on the possible differences in the desired 
levels and 1nix of public goods between geographic areas, and the proclivity of central 
govermnent for unifonn provision. 
(ii) Spillover effects. In reality, however, it would be difficult to establish full 
fiscal equivalence. Each public good is likely to a have a different benefit area or 
boundary. Hence, there would have to be a govermnental jurisdiction for each public 
good. This is not practicable. Actually, what we have are mainly multi- purpose 
govermnents which are responsible for the provision of a nwnber of public goods and 
services which may not have exactly the same benefit area or span. As a result, spatial 
externalities and interjurisdictional spillovers, which arise when benefits or costs of public 
services are received or incurred by non- residents, cannot be entirely ruled out. 
Consideration of inte1jurisdictional spillovers does not alter the basic allocation of 
functions suggested by the fiscal equivalence principle and the decentralisation theorem. 
Except for public goods which are national in scope (such as econo1nic stabilisation, 
1 
A corollary to the decentralisation theorem is the subsidiarity principle, in U1c European Community, 
which implies that central government intervention in constituent states is notjustificd unless there arc 
significant cross border spill-over effects (Walsh, 1992). 
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defence and foreign affairs) and which should be the responsibility of the national 
government, other public goods should be provided by sub- national governments. The 
problem of spatial externalities can be corrected through intergovernmental grants or, as 
Coase ( J 960) suggested, through negotiation and bargaining among concerned 
governments designed to internalise all benefit/cost spillovers. 
(iii) Econo1nies and disecono111ies of scale. The presence of economies or 
diseconomies of scale in the production of public goods 1nay suggest a different 
allocation of responsibility than that suggested by either the decentralisation theore1n or 
the principle of fiscal equivalence. For example, if significant econo1nies of scale in the 
production of certain goods which are not achievable by the independent local 
goverrnnents can be achieved by the central government, then centralisation may be 
desirable in spite of the localised benefit area or span of the good . Tullock (I 969), 
however, makes an i1nportant distinction between production and provision of public 
goods, suggesting that the presence of economies of scale in the production of public 
. goods may not necessarily imply an allocation of functions that conflicts with the 
decentralisation theorem or the principle of fiscal equivalence. As Oates (1972) 
suggests, in some cases, it is possible for local governments to purchase the desired level 
of public goods from higher- level governments ( or another 'encompassing' authority or 
agency) whose expanded operation permits the realisation of increasing returns to scale. 
This is actually practised in certain areas in the USA, where small 1nunicipalities contract 
for the bulk of their public services with the county goverrunent. Local councils in South 
Australia si1nilarly apply such a scheme. Different local governments can also work 
jointly to produce the public goods with increasing returns to scale, and reap for 
themselves the econo1nies fro1n large-scale production (Walsh, 1992). 
In a nutshell, the traditional approach suggests a rather neat, rigid and vertical 
division of functions an1ong different government levels, which rese1nbles a 'layer cake' . 
The larger the benefit area of a public good, the higher will be the level of goverrunent 
responsible for its provision (as dictated by the principle of fiscal equivalence) . 
However, the higher the level of government, the more limited is its ability to provide 
services responsively and efficiently ( as suggested by the decentralisation theorem and 
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the subsidiarity principle) . The problem of externalities and interjurisdictional spillovers 
can be addressed by intergovernmental transfers or negotiation among the govermnents 
concerned (Spahn, 1992). 
New Approach. The new approach to the assigmnent of functions is based on 
the consideration of organisational costs in the provision of public goods which is almost 
completely ignored i11 the traditional approach. Breton and Scott (1978) suggest that 
public goods provision and all governmental functions generally entail 'certain resource-
using organisational activities'. In the case of govermnent, they broadly classify these 
activities into adtninistration, which pertains to all activities which are internal to 
governn1ents, and coordination, which pertains to all activities between govermnents . 
Citizens also engage in organisational activities to make known to the government their 
preferences for public goods. Again, Breton and Scott broadly classify these activities 
into two: signalling and mobility. Si1nply put, the provision of public goods entails 
organisational costs which include administrative and coordination costs on the part of 
government, and signalling and mobility costs on the part of citizens. 
Breton and Scott then note that the organisational costs vary with the assigmnent 
of functions or the structure of govermnent. Under a decentralised govermnent 
structure, tnobility and signalling costs for all citizen- voters are presumably lower; 
however, coordination and administrative costs to the govermnents ( which are ultimately 
borne by citizens as taxpayers) are likely to be higher. The appropriate assigmnent of 
functions will , therefore, be that which minitnises the organisational costs. Breton and 
Scott recognise that even if the heavy information requirements are not taken into 
account, the actual assignment of functions may deviate from that suggested by the 
least- cost govermnent structure, pri1narily as a result of political factors . In particular, 
they suggest that where the 'constituent assemblies', which determine the allocation of 
functions between levels of government, are composed of politically motivated 
individuals, consideration of organisational costs will influence the outcomes only 
indirectly, through their effects on citizen- voters and consequently, on the possibility of 
re- election of politicians. 
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The new approach is based on the same factors as the traditional approach. 
Governments and citizen- voters engage in organisational activities in response to varying 
degrees of 'publicness', interjurisdictional spillovers and externalities, economies and 
diseconomies of scale that characterise provision of public goods and other government 
functions . In contrast to the traditional approach, however, si1nple prescriptions for the 
assignment of government functions are not provided . On the contrary, there is so1ne 
indication that the appropriate assignment of functions is not a rigid and exclusive 
vertical division of powers and responsibilities as suggested by the traditional approach. 
In recent years, there has been growing realisation (particularly in federal 
countries) that a vertical division of powers and responsibilities along functional lines is 
no longer appropriate for most functions of government: 
Such a division of responsibility 1nust be replaced by a 
horizontal division along activity or program lines, which 
recognises the fact that services such as transport, 
economic development, urban services, education, health 
and welfare services have national, regional and local 
di1nensions, and cannot be regarded as the sole 
responsibility of a single level of govermnent if they are to 
be provided adequately, effectively and equitably -
(Mathews, 1980, p. 6) . 
The Economic and Social Com1nission for Asia and the Pacific, in a study of the 
government decentralisation reforms in the region came up with a si1nilar observation: 
In conclusion, it needs to be emphasized that 
decentralization cannot work if viewed as antithetical to 
centralization. Success in decentralization requires close 
cooperation and interlinkages between centralization and 
decentralization. A clear idea of the goals, concrete plans 
for development, powers and functions are a prerequisite 
for decentralization to strike roots . But equally i1nportant 
is a sense of partnership among goverrunents at all levels · 
(ESCAP, 1991). 
Assignn1ent of Taxing Powers 
Additional Costs l111posed by Taxes. The discussion of the merits of 
decentralisation and the appropriate assigrnnent of functions has assu1ned that 
corresponding revenue sources come together with functions or that functional 
assignment precedes and determines the assignment of taxing powers. The literature 
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suggests, however, that the assigmnent of taxing powers in a multi- level government 
system has efficiency and equity implications which are quite independent of functional 
assignments. In particular, aside from reducing the purchasing power of individuals, 
taxes impose other burdens which can be aggravated by inappropriate tax assignment. 
These other burdens can be classified into: administration and compliance costs incurred 
by collectors and taxpayers; and the less obvious costs, known as 'excess burdens' which 
refer to the di starting effects on the economic behaviour of taxpayers (King, 19 84). 
Govermnents incur costs in the collection of taxes which are generally referred to 
as administration costs. These include the costs of assessors, collectors and their offices, 
the legal costs of dealing with defaulters, etc. Taxpayers also incur costs aside from their 
tax payments, which are collectively referred to as compliance costs. These include the 
time spent in completing tax returns and in devising ways of reducing tax payments, tax 
consultant fees, etc. It is widely believed that administration and compliance costs are 
subject to economies of scale (King, 1984; Oates, 1972; Breton and Scott, 1978). 
Administrative complexities and duplication in both assessment and collection can be 
substantially reduced by centralisation. Uniformity in guidelines and a sillg!e taxation 
office can also facilitate tax compliance. 
Two factors figure prominently in the discussion of the 'excess burden' that could 
result from inappropriate tax assignment, namely: mobility of taxpayers or tax bases, and 
the possibility of tax exporting by jurisdictions. When taxpayers or tax bases are mobile, 
the progressivity and variations of tax rates between jurisdictions are limited . Tax rate 
differentials can serve as stimuli for labour and capital to move to areas where taxes are 
low, but where their marginal productivities may be lower, thus resulting in inefficient 
resource allocation. Tax expo11ing, on the other hand, occurs when taxes levied in one 
jurisdiction are paid partly by residents of other areas. This usually happens when an area 
possesses market power in relation to production and pricing of certain commodities . 
Taxes imposed on local production can be shifted to residents of other· jurisdictions 
through higher prices of the output sold outside of the taxing jurisdiction (Wal sh, 1992). 
Jurisdictions which succeed in tax exporting may not have to shoulder the whole cost of 
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their public programs and may, as a result, increase them beyond efficient levels at the 
expense of other jurisdictions (Oates, 1972). 
Guidelines for the Assign111ent of Taxing Powers. Musgrave (1983) suggests 
the following set of broad guidelines for the assigrnnent of taxing powers in multi- level 
government system: 
I. Hjghly mobile tax bases (for example, company income) should be 
assigned to the central government because of the capacity for taxes 
imposed on them to distort locational choices. 
2. Middle and especially lower-level jurisdictions should tax those bases 
which have low inter-jurisdictional mobility (for exa1nple, land and 
natural resources) to avoid the risk of tax base flight and distorting 
locational decisions. 
3. Tax bases that are highly unequally distributed a1nong sub-jurisdictions 
(for example, natural resources) should be used centrally to avoid 
inequities and allocative distortions that may arise from local taxation. 
This may conflict with rule 2 above; thus, central taxation should apply to 
an excess base only, while leaving a 'normal' or average base for sub-
national use. 
4 . Progressive taxation, designed to secure redistributional objectives should 
be allocated to the central govermnent to avoid counter- productive and 
inefficient location decisions through adverse selection; for example, rugh 
income individuals leaving and poor individuals seeking jurisdictions with 
highly redistributive policies. 
5. Taxes suitable for stabilisation policy should be central, while local taxes 
should be cyclically stable. The underlying principle is that stabilisation is 
primarily a national government objective. Local stabilisation policies are 
likely to be ineffective due to heavy leakages arising fron1 the openness of 
local or regional economies. The central goverrnnent has to coordinate 
the use of fiscal stabilisation with other stabilisation tools such as 
monetary and credit policies. 
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6. Benefit taxes and user charges in principle, do not create distorting 
incentives. They may thus be appropriately used at all levels. Pragmatic 
evidence tends to suggest that they are better employed at lower levels of 
government, where benefit attribution to particular groups of beneficiaries 
is more feasible. 
In summary, . the literature suggests that centralisation of taxing powers 1s 
impo1iant for effective economic stabilisation policies. It has also so1ne efficiency and 
equity benefits. Assigning taxes to lower-level governments has so1ne li1nitations which 
do not apply to the central government. It seems that only non- 1nobile tax bases, and 
benefit and user taxes can be appropriately assigned to lower-level governments. For the 
central government, there are virtually no restrictions and there can be economies of 
scale in the collection and administration of 1nost taxes. 
Spahn (1992) notes, however, that econon1ies of scale may warrant centralised 
tax ad1ninistration, but not the assignment of tax proceeds to the central government. 
. The central government can serve as a tax collection agent for some local taxes. Ideally, 
this should involve a 'contractual arrangement' in which revenues are collected on behalf 
of lower- level govermnents and regarded as their revenues, not those of the central 
government. 
In general, Musgrave's criteria of tax assig111nent tend to assume that 
governments can and should act independently in making their taxing decisions when in 
fact they are interdependent and need to develop institutional arrange1nents to coordinate 
their policies. Costly tax competition that could arise from the assignment of highly 
mobile taxes to lower level governments can be avoided with tax hannonisation policies 
among governments. FinaIJy, because the assignment of expenditure responsibilities is 
not considered, Musgrave's criteria of tax assignment ignore the issue of vertical fiscal 
imbalances (Mathews, 1985a). 
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Vertical Fiscal hnbalance 
Description. Ve1iical fiscal i1nbalance refers to a situation in which there is a 
mismatch between expenditure requirements and revenue capacities of govermnents at 
different levels . In many countries, including the Philippines, decentralisation has been 
carried out mainly in terms of devolution of expenditure functions or service delivery to 
local governments, without com1nensurate devolution of revenue- raising powers, 
thereby accentuating vertical fiscal i1nbalance. The central govermnent has kept for itself 
1nost of the 1najor tax sources, expressly providing for only a few items to be subject to 
local taxation. Fu1ihermore, local taxation is circumscribed by central govermnent laws 
on allowable tax rates, exemptions and other controls . In the Philippines, this can be 
attributed to the unitary government system and the long tradition of centralisation. 
However, the concentration of revenue sources in the hands of the central government 
characterises many other co_untries, even some of those with federal systems. 
Causes. As the above discussion suggests, centralisation of taxing powers is not 
. without a theoretical basis . However, it seems that if expenditure and taxing powers are 
to be assigned according to the major principles that have been discussed, vertical fiscal 
imbalance is likely to occur. The Musgravian principles of appropriate tax assigrunents, 
demand centralisation of the major and most productive taxes, while the decentralisation 
theorem and the subsidiarity principle suggest local provision or decentralisation of many 
expenditure functions. 
Vertical fiscal balance is not a static concept. The assigmnent of tax and 
expenditure powers may initially achieve vertical fiscal balance. But over time the 
expenditure needs of different government units may change, for example, due to 
changes in costs of or demand for different public goods and services. The taxes assigned 
to each goverrunent level may also differ and change in yield and elasticities. These 
factors can easily destroy the initial fiscal balance. 
l1nplications. Vertical fiscal i1nbalance poses a problem to the achievement of 
the benefits of decentralisation and the efficient operation of the public sector in general. 
The claim that there can be no genuine local autono1ny without fiscal independence is not 
without basis . The dependence of local govermnents on central government financial 
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assistance makes them highly vulnerable to central government control and tends to 
undermine effective decision- making by local governments. The conditions prescribed 
for local govermnent budgeting, and the instability of central government grants in the 
Philippines attest to this. 
Another consequence of local govermnents' heavy reliance on central grants and 
the central government's ability to influence local budgeting, is that people learn to 
depend on the central government and put pressure on it even in matters that are purely 
of local concern. This tendency is shared and reinforced by local governments which are 
encouraged to rely on the politically costless central grant funds rather than exploiting 
their own- source revenue or tax bases which can make them unpopular in their 
electorate. As a result, the central government is forced to make decisions on local 
matters about which it has little information. On the other hand, local governments, 
suppotied by their electorates, are encouraged to put greater pressure on the central 
government for n1ore grants and to expand local public goods and services without 
seriously considering the benefits and costs at the margin of these expenditures. 
It may be argued that local residents ultimately bear the burden of central grants 
through increased central taxes, and therefore, are likely to restrain their demand for 
public goods and services. To achieve efficiency in public sector decision- making, 
citizen- taxpayers and their governments should consider the marginal benefits and costs 
of every public program. Vertical fiscal imbalance and the consequent intergovermnental 
financial flows, however, tend to weaken the link between taxes paid and government 
expenditures at a given level of government. This leads to 'fiscal illusion' or 
misperceptions by voter-taxpayers regarding their share of financing of public spending 
(Romer and Rosenthal, 1980; Winer, 1983). 
Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance 
Description. Horizontal fiscal imbalance can exist even when there is vertical 
fiscal balance. The concept of horizontal fiscal imbalance can perhaps be best understood 
with reference to its opposite condition-that is, horizontal fiscal balance. Horizontal 
fiscal balance has been characterised by Mathews (l 980, pp. 11- 12) as follows : 
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... a situation in which each unit within a particular level of 
government ( e.g . each state in a federal system) has the 
capacity to provide services at a comparable standard. 
f-Iorizontal fiscal balance does not imply unifonnity of 
service prov1s1on or unifonnity of revenue- raising 
arrange1nents as between units of govermnent within the 
sa1ne level. It is the capacity of govermnents to provide 
comparable services, provided they impose comparable 
taxes and charges, which need to be equal in a state of 
horizontal fiscal balance. Two govermnents with equal 
fiscal capacity may decide on different levels of service 
provision and revenue raising, and on different patterns of 
expenditure and taxation, without causing a departure 
from horizontal fiscal balance. 
Mathews thus makes it clear that horizontal fiscal balance refers to the relative 
equality of fiscal capacities of government units at the sa1ne govermnental level and does 
not imply uniformity in their tax and expenditure policies. This is attuned to the 
arguments for decentralisation which are based on i1nproved correspondence between 
the demand for and supply of public services through diversity in tax- expenditure mix 
and for intergovernmental competition. These arguments assume all government units 
are equally capable of providing the tax- expenditure packages which voter- taxpayers 
want. Decentralisation, however, is likely to cause and/or accentuate horizontal fiscal 
imbalance and, unless proper policies are adopted, horizontal fiscal imbalance is likely to 
militate against the realisation of the benefits of decentralisation. 
Causes. The factors which cause horizontal fiscal imbalance can originate from 
both the revenue and expenditure sides of government budgets. On the revenue side, 
government units may have varying levels of fiscal capacities as a result of differences in 
· resources which usually are taken to include the advantages of transportation, ports, 
climate, soil, location, mineral deposits, as well as possession of a stock of capital goods 
and the head offices of financial corporations (Scott, 1950). 
On the expenditure side, government units may face varying expenditure needs 
due to different socioeconomic and demographic factors . Some government units, for 
instance, may face relatively greater spending requirements on education and welfare 
services because of their population's unduly high ratios of school- age children and the 
elderly. Expenditure requirements may also vary for different government units because 
of cost variations in the provision of public goods and services arising from locational 
and physical differences. 
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It is thus not difficult to see that decentralisation is likely to accentuate horizontal 
fiscal imbalance. As more and more expenditure functions are devolved to local 
goverrunents and as they are made to rely 1nore and 1nore on their own- revenue sources, 
the variation in their fiscal capacities is accentuated . 
Horizontal fiscal imbalance can also be caused or accentuated by central 
government activities which have uneven effects on different local jurisdictions. Central 
government expenditures or grants, for example, may be allocated to local units on the 
principle of 'derivation' (that is, in proportion to the amount of central government 
revenues generated in the local governn1ent unit) . On this basis, the rich jurisdictions 
would be entitled to greater allocations than the poor jurisdictions as a result of their 
bigger tax bases. Central goverrunent taxation may also contribute to horizontal fiscal 
i1nbalance. A progressive central government tax structure, for instance, which fails to 
include all the real income accruing to residents of local governments in its income tax 
base can exacerbate horizontal fiscal imbalance (Boadway and Flatters, 1982a; Petchey 
and Walsh, 1993). 
Economic policies of the central government may also have uneven geographic or 
locational effects. The i1nport substitution strategy of the Philippine goverrunent in the 
l 950- 60s, for exatnple, benefited the metropolitan areas (particularly Metro Manila) 
where the import substituting industries were located, at the expense of the agricultural 
areas. 
Political factors also may play a donunant role in the allocation of central 
govermnent expenditures and grants to local government units . Central goverrunent 
expenditures, and grants to local governments can be used by national politicians to gain 
the suppo11 and votes of local govermnent officials and their constituents. In the electoral 
process in the Philippines, for instance, 'pork barrel' funds are dangled before local 
politicians and their constituents as rewards for pro1nised support for national politicians 
who are seeking re-election. The awareness of national politicians of their power to win 
votes by preferential disbursement of grants may result in inequitable intergovernmental 
transfers (that is, unrelated to relative expenditure needs or revenue raising capacities) 
thus, contributing to horizontal fiscal imbalance . 
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ln1plications. l-Iorizontal fiscal imbalance has both equity and efficiency 
implications. In the absence of any corrective measure, horizontal fiscal imbalance wiJI 
cause fiscal inequalities among residents of local govermnent units . Those units with high 
fiscal capacities, in terms of more revenue sources or less expenditure needs, will be in a 
position to provide their constituents with given levels or standards of services at lower 
tax rates, and at given tax rates will be able to provide more and better public goods and 
services. On the other hand, those units with low fiscal capacities will be forced to 
charge high tax rates, or provide fewer and lower standard goods and services to their 
constituents. The result is that individuals who are identical in all respects except their 
place of residence may be levied different tax rates to obtain the same level and standard 
of public services, or, faced with equal tax payments, may be provided with unequal 
levels and standards of public services. This violates one of the principal maxims of 
public finance- that is, horizontal equity or 'equal treatment of equals', which is "the 
'central tenet of equity' in all formulations of fiscal justice" (Grewal , Brennan and 
.Mathews, 1980, pp. 175- 176). 
-
Buchanan (I 950; p591) notes that equal treatment of 'equals' does not mean 
unifonnity- "neither the tax burdens nor the standard of public service need be equal for 
'equals' in any of the states" . Satisfaction of the equity criterion requires only that the net 
fiscal benefits- that is, the difference for individuals between the benefits they receive 
from government expenditures and the taxes imposed on them to finance these 
expenditures, or what Buchanan has termed fiscal residuum2- should be the same for 
similarly situated individuals. 
Graham (1964, p.134) notes, however, that equalisation of the fiscal residue will 
not necessarily result in horizontal equity because the welfare of individuals is partly 
determined by the level of public services they receive, unless public and private goods 
are perfect substitutes, which is not the case. A more complete application of the 
horizontal equity principle would require that individuals in different provinces or 
2
Buchanan ( 1950) defined the fiscal residuum as the difference between an individual's tax burden and 
his benefits from public services. Many authors preferred to define the fiscal residuum the other way 
around, as being equal to benefits minus the burden so thal it will have a positive value when benefits 
exceed the burden. Hence U1e term, 'net fiscal benefits' , is used. 
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localities with the same income, expenditure, and value of property should incur the sa1ne 
tax burdens and receive the same level of services, wherever they live in the country. But 
this conflicts with the decentralisation principle which is a basic reason for the existence 
of local governments . As discussed later, fiscal capacity equalisation transfers provide a 
means of reconciling this apparent dilemma. 
In addition to its impact on equity, horizontal fiscal imbalance also affects 
efficiency. Differences in net fiscal benefits will serve as an incentive for individuals to 
move fro1n poor units with low fiscal benefits to the rich jurisdictions with high fiscal 
benefits. This movement of voter- taxpayers between government units should be 
contrasted with the mobility described in the Tiebout model. In the latter, the voter-
taxpayer mobility is seen as a mechanism through which the preferences of individuals 
for public goods are revealed, leading to a 1nore efficient provision of these goods. The 
1novement of individuals is in response to differing net fiscal benefits is different. In the 
latter case, the 1novement of individuals does not reflect their preferences for public 
. goods, but 'rent- seeking' behaviour. By moving from poor jurisdictions, to rich 
. jurisdictions, individuals can obtain more and better public goods and services with the 
same tax payments, and/or pay less taxes to obtain the same level and quality of public 
services. 
Buchanan and Wagner (1970) also point out that individuals' migration decisions 
in response to differences in net fiscal benefits are likely to neglect the external effects of 
their behaviour on others, which result in inefficiency. The tnigration of individuals 
affects both the residents of the jurisdiction of destination (in terms of lower tax price but 
greater congestion) and the residents of the jurisdiction of origin (in terms of higher tax 
price but lower congestion) . Differences in net fiscal benefits are likely to result in too 
1nany people 1nigrating to the wealthier jurisdictions, resulting in the positive tax- side 
externalities being swamped and reversed by the negative benefit- side externalities of 
overcrowding. The poor jurisdictions 1nay also be worse off because their tax bases are 
reduced by the 1nigration of some of their resident tax payers, resulting in higher tax 
prices or a lower level of services. 
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The 'rent-seeking' mobility of individuals has wider efficiency i1nplications, since 
as well as being consumers, they are also factors of production. So far, the discussion of 
efficiency has been confined mainly to the efficient provision and financing of public 
goods and services. We now consider another aspect of efficiency- that concerning the 
allocation of the factors ·of production. 
Based on neoclassical theories, efficiency is obtained when the marginal 
productivities of si1nilar factors of production are similar in all their alternative 
employment. If a factor of production can find other employment where its marginal 
productivity is higher, then national production or income can be increased by the 
movement of that factor to the alternative employ1nent. In perfectly competitive markets, 
prices act as the signalling device that enables factors of production to be allocated to 
their most productive use. In the labour market, for instance, perfectly competitive 
conditions require that wages equal the value of the marginal product of labour. Thus, 
the movement of individuals in response to wage differentials ensures efficiency in labour 
allocation. 
In reality, however, wages are not the only consideration in individuals' choices 
of employment. Usually, the choice of employment involves decisions about where to 
reside. Individuals make their e1nployment decisions on the basis of comprehensive 
income (CI), which is defined as market sector income (w) plus the net fiscal benefits 
(NFB) generated by the actions of governments. Thus, individuals trying to maximise 
their comprehensive income will migrate across jurisdictions until the following 
equilibriwn condition is established : 
CI 1. = w 1. + NFB 1. = CI2. = w2. + NFB2. = = CI . = w . + NFB . (4 1) I I I I I I ' ' ' n1 n1 n1 ' 
Equation ( 4.1) shows that in equilibrium the comprehensive income an individual 
i expects to receive must be equal in all jurisdictions, otherwise he has an incentive to 
move. Note that the equality of Cls does not necessarily requires that NFBs be equal. 
The equilibrium condition requires that if the NFBs are not equal, the 1narket incomes 
(w) must also be unequal; jurisdictions with low 1narket income 1nust have high net fiscal 
benefits, and vice-versa. 
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A rational individual who is maxi1nising his comprehensive income may therefore 
choose employment where his market income is lower than alternative e1nployment 
elsewhere, provided, that he gets a higher net fiscal benefit. From the individual's point of 
view this is optimal behaviour, but from the nation's point of view it is otherwise, 
because it means that faGtors of production are no longer located in their most efficient 
use- that is, where their marginal productivity is highest (Boadway and Flatters, 1982a; 
1982b; Courchene, 1984; Petchey and Walsh, 1993). 
Scott (1950) argues that differences in net fiscal benefits can help promote 
efficiency. Because of i1nperfect labour mobility, differentials in net fiscal benefits may be 
necessary as an additional incentive for individuals to 1nove to the areas where they are 
most productive or where their marginal productivity is higher. Thus, attempts to 
equalise net fiscal benefits through intergovermnental transfers are inefficient. 
But Graham (1964, p.140) notes that where there is imperfect mobility of the 
factors of production, it is unlikely that all labour and capital should move out of a 
jurisdiction; what is more likely is that so1ne amounts of some kinds of capital and labour 
should move out and some a1nounts should move in . The persistence of differences in net 
fiscal benefits will indiscri1ninately exert pressure on all factors of production to move 
out from poor jurisdictions, even if those factors are well located there. It will also inhibit 
the movement of some factors of production to the poor jurisdictions where they could 
be more productive. As Bennett (1980) observes, the disparity in net fiscal benefits is 
likely to accu1nulate, and result in greater inefficiency. 
It is worth noting that the efficiency argument for the neutralisation of net fiscal 
benefits rests on the assumption of perfect mobility and perfect co1npetition. These 
conditions are difficult to satisfy in practice. Nonetheless, in the presence of market 
distortion, neutralisation of net fiscal benefits can be regarded as a second best solution 
especially when the source of market distortions is unknown. It also has the virtue of not 
impeding other policies aimed at correcting departures from optimal allocation of 
resources (Graham, 1964). 
58 
~ 
_..... 
lntergovernn1ental Fiscal Transfers 
The problem of fiscal imbalances can be addressed in various ways: reassignment 
of expenditure functions and/or of taxing powers, credit financing, and intergovermnental 
fiscal transfers. 3 This study focuses on intergovernmental fiscal transfers. 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers, which 1nay take the fonn of revenue sharing 
arrangements and/or grants, are the primary instruments used by government in 
addressing vertical fiscal itnbalance and horizontal fiscal imbalance. They present a way 
of reconciling the apparent differences in the assigmnent of expenditure functions and 
taxing powers a1nong various levels of government, and of pro1noting a reasonable 
balance of public service provision and tax burdens in all govermnental jurisdictions. 
The tenn revenue sharing has been used in different contexts. It first achieved 
wide currency in the United States of Atnerica where it was used to refer to an 
appropriation by the federal government of a fixed formula- based amount of general 
purpose grant to state and local govermnents. Revenue sharing has been defined in some 
studies as a formal arrangement between govermnents to apportion revenue fro1n a 
com1non tax base to avoid uncoordinated or competitive exploitation (Mathews, 1980). 
In this study, revenue sharing is used in the context in which it was firstly used. Grants 
are used to refer to all other types of central government transfers to local goverrunents. 
Nonnative Aspect. The normative aspect of intergoverrunental transfers deals 
with the problem of designing an appropriate transfer system that promotes efficiency 
and equity. Mathews (1980) states that there are three major purposes of 
intergovernmental transfers :4 (1) responsibility sharing, (2) vertical fiscal adjustment, and 
(3) horizontal fiscal adjustment. The literature suggests that for each purpose, there is a 
corresponding type or design of grant program. 
3For a discussion of a tax arrangements approach to the problem of vertical fiscal imbalance, see Mathews, 1985a; Collins, 1990; Walsh, 1990; Galligan, Hughes and Walsh (eds.), 1991. 4Mathews (1980) used the term 'revenue sharing' (which refers to both tax sharing and grants) instead of 'intergovenunental transfers'. In the Philippines, 'revenue sharing' has a different meaning, hence the term 'intergovernmental transfer' is used to avoid confusion in the subsequent discussion. Note that in the literature, grants, transfers and revenue sharing are used interchangeably. 
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Briefly, transfers can be generally divided into two rnaJor types: specific and 
general. As the term implies specific purpose transfers have designated uses defined by 
the grantor. Specific purpose transfers can be either lump sum or matching. A specific 
lump sum transfer restricts the amount of transfer and the service on which it can be 
spent. A specilic matching transfer depends on how much the recipient spends of its own 
revenues. Matching transfers can either be dosed or open ended. In the former, the 
matching transfer is given only up to a certain level of expenditure; in the latter, the 
amount of transfer matches the recipients' expenditure up to the last dollar spent on the 
aided service. The other major type of transfers, the general purpose transfer, has no 
restriction on its use. The recipient government can use it for any purpose, even to 
substitute for its own revenue efforts. Some general purpose transfers, however, have 
revenue effort conditions to prevent substitution (I<jng, 1984). 
Specific purpose transfers are usually associated with responsibility sharing. As 
noted earlier, it is difl1cult to establish a perfect correspondence between the benefit span 
of public goods and the jurisdictional boundary of governments. lnterjurisdictional 
spillovers of benefits or costs are likely lo occur. Local governments acting 
independently are likely to ignore these externalities in their cost- benefit calculation. 
They are likely to provide these se1vices below (in the case of positive externalities) or 
above (in the case of negative externalities) optimum levels. To encourage local 
governments to provide the optimal levels of these services, specific matching transfers, 
depending on the magnitude of the marginal spillovers, are usually rcconunended. 
Unfortunately, although externalities provide a sound basis for specific matching 
transfers, in practice it is almost impossible to come up with the correct size of transfer 
or matching requirement (Boadway and Flatters 1982a; Wildasin 1986). 
Another case of responsibility sharing wherein specific purpose transfers are usually 
employed, is the provision of merit goods, for example, low- cost housing and public health 
care, whereby both central and local governments are likely to be involved. The central 
government, concerned about establishing a minimum standard of these services across the 
country, is well advised to provide specific lump sum grants-equivalent to the minimum 
expenditure requirements-to local governments that are directly responsible for their 
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prov1s1on (Boadway and Wildasin, 1984). Mathews ( 1980) cites other uses of specific 
purpose grants in connection with responsibility sharing. 
A major objection usually raised regarding specific purpose transfers is that they 
serve as instruments that enable central goverrnnent to extend its control (Petchey and 
Walsh, 1993). The expenditure priorities of the recipient governments are distorted . 
However, specific purpose transfers are not necessarily centralising. In the case of 
matching transfers which are tied to the expenditures of the recipient govermnent, the 
central government also loses control of its budget. Mathews ( 1980) cites examples of 
matching transfers beco1ning in effect a lower- level government device for influencing 
the level of central government financial assistance. Hence, the objection against specific 
transfers that they result in unrestrained growth of the public sector. 
Other criticisms raised against specific transfers include: inadequate arrangements 
for policy coordination, the growth of grant lobbies and grantmanship, inadequate 
accountability, and failure to consider the relative needs and capacities of recipient 
govermnents. Aspects of intergoverrnnental transfers other than design are in1portant. 
They include machinery which is concerned with fitting the transfer program into budget 
priorities and the coordination of the policies of the granting and recipient governments 
(Mathews, 1980). 
A general purpose transfer is regarded as most appropriate in restoring or 
maintaining vertical fiscal balance. General purpose transfers can be spent by the 
recipient gover11111ents for any purpose just like taxes raised fro1n its own revenue 
sources (Mathews, 1980 and 1983). Some general purpose transfers, however, may have 
revenue effo1i conditions which render them less than perfect substitutes for own 
revenue sources of the recipient government. 
In evaluating whether general transfers meet the requiren1ent of vertical fi scal 
imbalance, two major factors are usually considered . The first is whether the amount of 
revenue sharing transfer is sufficient to bridge the gap between the expenditure 
requirement and revenue sources of govermnents (Bird, 1990); the second is the manner 
in which the amount of revenue sharing is determined, that is whether by unilateral 
decision by the granting authority or by joint decision by both granting and recipient 
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governments (Mathews, 1980 and 1983). When the amount, structure and manner of 
sharing of intergovernmental transfers are jointly determined by the goverrunents 
concerned, there may not be a problem of vertical fiscal imbalance. It must be noted that 
intergovermnental transfer is a second-best solution to the proble1n of vertical fiscal 
imbalance. Vertical fiscal i1nbalance is a proble1n of non-correspondence in the 
assignment of revenue-raising and expenditure functions and is best addressed through 
proper reassignment, or tax sharing arrangements (Mathews, 1983). 
Fiscal equalisation transfers provide the main instru1nent for achieving the third 
major objective of intergovermnental transfers, that is, horizontal fiscal balance. Fiscal 
equalisation transfers are usually allocated on the basis of a formula which takes into 
account the relative revenue capacities and expenditure requirements of governments . 
The most general fiscal equalisation transfer model may be expressed in the form :5 
A;= Ef- R'f (4.2) 
The fiscal equalisation transfer (A) of a government i equals the difference between its 
standardised expenditure ( Ef) and standardised revenue (Rf ). The following chapter 
-discusses in detail the process of standardisation. It suffices to note at this point that 
standardisation is necessary to eli1ninate or reduce the effects of policy differences, so 
that equalisation transfers reflect only unavoidable disparities in fiscal capacities of 
recipient govermnents (Mathews, 1983). 
Mathews (1980, 1983 and 1993) distinguishes two major types of equalisation 
transfer: fiscal performance equalisation and fiscal capacity equalisation. Fiscal 
performance equalisation usually takes the form of a specific purpose transfer, and is 
concerned with equalising services across jurisdictions. Fiscal capacity equalisation 
transfer, on the other hand, is concerned with equalising the revenues needed to provide 
a standard level of services. It mainly e1nploys general transfers and it does not constrain 
recipient govermnents to provide uniform services. Thus, fiscal capacity equalisation 
transfers are more attuned to decentralisation. 
Musgrave ( 1961) and Le Grand (1975) consider it proper to include revenue 
effort factors in the formula for the allocation of transfers. The rationale is that 
5See Mathews (1980, 1983) for explicit forms of this general fiscal equalisation model. 
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governments with little interest in providing services should receive less aid to prevent 
free riding. A govermnent should not receive compensation if it is not taxing its residents 
as heavily as other govermnents. The inclusion of a revenue effort factor in a fiscal 
equalisation formula, however, represents a depa1iure from pure fiscal capacity 
equalisation and a loss of degree of freedom on the pa1i of governments being equalised 
(Mathews, 1983). 
Behavioural Responses. The use of different types of transfers is based on 
theoretical proposition about the behavioural response of recipient government to each 
type of transfer. Two of the most com1nonly discussed types of transfers are matching 
transfers and general transfers. Based on standard indifference curve analysis, 6 it has 
been theoretically established that matching transfers encourage greater recipient 
government spending than equal value general transfers. This is illustrated in Figure 1 
where the x- axis and the y-axis represent recipient spending on local public services and 
dollars available for private spending, respectively. 7 With its pre- transfer budget line 
depicted by AA, the local government chooses to provide Ox
1 
level of public services by 
imposing a tax of Ay1 to its residents. A matching transfer that meets a fraction of the 
costs of providing local public services, rotates the budget line of the recipient 
govermnent to AA'. The reduction in the price of local public services encourages the 
recipient to increase its consumption of these services to Ox,. The effect of the matching 
transfer on the consu1nption of public services can be decomposed into a 'pure' price 
effect represented by the distance x1- x' and an inco1ne effect measured by the distance 
I x-x
3 . 
6
Indi1Ierence curves reflect preferences between government expenditures and residual income to be 
spent on private goods. There is diversity in the indifference curves used. Sometimes they are used to 
represent the preference function of the authorities of the recipient government (e.g. Wilde, 1968); 
sometimes the preference function of the median voter ( e.g. Bradford and Oates, 197 la; 197 lb) ; and 
sometimes t11e preferences of the community (e.g. Scott, 1952; Boadway, 1979). 7 
A government finances its public services from the taxes it coIJects from its residents. The higher the 
level of public services, the higher wiIJ be its taxes and the lower wiIJ be the amount of dollars available for private spending. 
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Y2 
Y1 
Dollars 
for private 
spending 
B 
Notes: 
1) AA parallel to BB 
Figure 4.1 General transfer versus matching transfer 
A' 
X1 X2 X' X3 Public services 
2) Broken budget line without label parallel to AA' 
An equivalent value general transfer, represented by a shift of the budget line to 
BB, provides the recipient with the resources to increase its consumption of public 
services to x3. However, since the general transfer is not restricted, the recipient 
government can increase its provision of public services by less than the amount of the 
transfer (represented by ~) and pass part of it on to its residents in terms of lower taxes 
or subsidies (that is, more resources for private spending) . Thus, the equivalence 
proposition that a general transfer and an equal increase in private income generate the 
same effects on recipient government expenditures (Bradford and Oates, 1971 a; 1971 b ). 
In surveys of empirical studies of the determinants of state and local government 
expenditures in the United States, Gramlich (1977) ·and Inman (1979) note that empirical 
results tend to confirm the proposition that matching transfers result in greater recipient 
government expenditures. However, the equivalence proposition does not seem to hold. 
Almost all studies showed that general transfers sti1nulate greater recipient government 
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expenditures than an increase in private income does . This phenomenon has come to be 
known as the flypaper effect. 
The Flypaper Effect. The flypaper effect controversy can be expressed formally 
in terms of the following median voter model. The median voter model asswnes that a 
local government's dec\sions reflect the choice of individuals in its jurisdiction, in 
particular, the median voter who wields the decisive vote. Local govermnent officials act 
in accordance with the median voter's preference and choose the level of public 
expenditures that 1naximises the latter's utility, that is: 
Maxi1nise 
subject to 
Ui(Xj, G) 
l = X + h. (G - A) 
I I I 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
For simplicity, the utility function of the median voter is defined in terms of a single 
private good (X) and a single public good (G). 
Equation ( 4.4), which represents the budget constraint, has two components : (I) 
the median voter's budget constraint, and (2) the local government's budget constraint. 
The former requires that the median voter's income (I) equals his consumption of the 
private good (X) whose price is assumed to be unity plus his fixed share -(h) of local 
taxes (T) : 
I. = X. + h.T 
I I I (4 .5) 
The latter constraint requires that local goverrunent expenditures (G) equal local taxes 
(T) plus the general transfer (A) . Thus, 
G=T+A (4.6) 
Solving equation ( 4.6) for T, and substituting this into equation ( 4 .5) yields the budget 
constraint in equation (2). 
In terms of the utility maxi1nisation model spelled out in equations ( 4.3) and 
( 4.4), the equivalence proposition can be formally expressed as: 
dG/dA = hJdG/dI) 
while empirical results which yield the flypaper effect suggest that: 
dG/dA > hJdG!dI) 
(4 .7) 
(4 .8) 
Several explanations have been advanced to explain the flypaper effect and 
improve on the theory of behavioural response of governments to transfers. One 
65 
explanation attributes the flypaper effect to a fiscal illusion when voter- tax payers equate 
the price of local public services to their average cost instead of their marginal cost. 8 
Another explanation concerns the redistribution of income caused by the system of 
transfers (Fisher, 1982). Noting the li1nitations of these explanations, others have sought 
to explain the flypaper effect phenon1enon in terms of institutional characteristics and/or 
bureaucratic behaviour (Romer and Rosenthal , 1980, Wyckoff J 988). Others dismiss the 
theoretical proposition of differences between types of transfers and recipient 
government expenditure behaviour altogether, suggesting that other more i1nplicit 
conditions (political, institutional, etc.) governing intergovernmental transfers can affect 
the level and pattern of the recipient's expenditure (Brennan and Pincus, 1990). 
The flypaper effect controversy may be a case of 'much ado about nothing' . In 
the median voter model presented earlier, it was assumed that the voters' tax shares (h/s) 
are fixed. This is a rather strong and litniting assutnption, the result of which is the 
equivalence proposition which has been rejected by empirical evidence. A more realistic 
. assumption would be to regard an individual's tax share as a function of his income, that 
is h. = h.(l) 
' I I I ' 
By assuming that tax share is a function of income, the 1nedian voter model yields 
the following comparative statics result :9 
dG/dA = hJ dG/dI) + [Q] ( dh/dI) (4 .9) 
where [Q] represents a complex term whose value is shown to be positive (See Appendix 
4.1). Equation ( 4.9) reconciles the equivalence proposition of the original 1nedian voter 
1nodel and the flypaper effect observed in e1npirical studies. The equivalence proposition 
and the flypaper effect are two cases of equation ( 4. 9) . The fonner assumes that tax 
shares are fixed ( dh/dli = 0) hence, dG/dA = hJ dG/dIJ On the other hand, the latter 
implies a progressive tax structure ( dh/dli > 0) hence, dG/dA > hJ dG/dIJ 
Under a progressive tax structure, an increase in private income would sti1nulate 
a s1naller increase in public expenditure than an equivalent transfer. This is because an 
increase in income results in a higher tax share or a higher price of the public good, thus 
8
This explanation, attributed to Oates, is cited in Wyckoff, 1991 ; Schwallie, 1989; King, 1984 and 
Fisher, 1982. 
9The derivation of this result is shown in the Appendix 4.1. 
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reducing its demand . General transfers, on the other hand, simply represent an implicit 
increase in individuals' incomes and do not increase their tax shares. As predicted by 
equation ( 4. 9), a general transfer would result in a greater amount of public expenditures 
than an equivalent increase in private income by an amount equal to [Q]( dhi/dI) . This 
explains the flypaper effect. A lesson that, neveriheless, emerges from the literature on 
the flypaper effect is that intergovernmental transfers should be examined in the context 
of the overall structure of intergoverrunental fiscal relations and with regard paid to 
economic, political, institutional and legal aspects. 
Sununary 
Decentralisation can promote efficiency by improving correspondence between the 
demand for and supply of public goods, enhancing intergovernmental competition, 
constraining abuses of taxing powers, and promoting greater accountability. To a certain 
extent, decentralisation can also promote equity, pariicularly in the provision of basic 
. social services, as local governments are in a better position to identify the target 
beneficiaries and provide appropriate services. However, decentralisation can be a 
hindrance to macro econo1nic stabilisation, a function that is generally reserve for the 
national goverrunent. 
While the literature provides a strong a priori case for decentralisation, it offers 
no single hard and fast rule for its operationalisation . The traditional approach suggests a 
rather neat, rigid and vertical division of functions a1nong different government levels. 
The larger the benefit area of a public good, the higher should be the level of government 
responsible for its provision. Local public goods whose benefits and costs are confined to 
a certain subset of the population should be provided by local governments, unless there 
are significant cross border spill-over effects necessitating central government 
intervention. The new approach which is based on consideration of organisational costs, 
on the other hand, suggests no clear cut division of powers and responsibilities. It 
recognises the fact that most if not all of public goods and services have national, 
regional and local dimensions, and cannot be regarded as the sole responsibility of any 
single level of government. 
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There are two major issues that usually arise with decentralisation : vertical fiscal 
imbalance (mismatch between expenditure requirements and revenue sources of 
governn1ents at different levels) and horizontal fiscal imbalance (inequality in the 
expenditure needs and revenue capacity of governments at the same level) . If expenditure 
and taxing powers are to be assigned according to the major principles in the literature, 
vertical fiscal imbalance is likely to occur. The Musgravian principles of appropriate tax 
assigmnents demand centralisation of the 1najor and 1nost productive taxes, while the 
decentralisation theorem and subsidiarity principle suggest local prov1s1on or 
decentralisation of many expenditure functions . Ve1iical fiscal imbalance can result in the 
inability of local governments to carry out their assigned functions and poses an obstacle 
to genuine local autonomy and the achievement of the benefits of decentralisation. 
Horizontal fiscal imbalance, on the other hand, can arise due to varying revenue 
capacities and expenditure requirements of govermnents which can be attributed to their 
varying socioecono1nic, de1nographic and physical characteristics. Horizontal fiscal 
imbalance violates one of the principal maxims of public finance, that is, the 'equal 
treatment of equals'. It can also cause inefficient migration decisions and ~allocation of 
factors of production. 
Intergovermnental fiscal transfers, which may take the form of revenue sharing 
arrangements and/or grants, are the primary instruments used by govenunent in 
addressing fiscal imbalances. The literature suggests that there is a corresponding type or 
design of transfers for each purpose. Specific purpose transfers are usually associated 
with responsibility sharing, while general purpose transfers are regarded as 1nost 
appropriate in restoring or maintaining vertical fiscal balance. Fiscal equalisation transfers 
provide the main instrument for achieving horizontal fiscal balance. The use of different 
types of transfers is based on theoretical proposition about the behaviou\al response of 
recipient government to each type of transfer. 
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Appendix 4. I 
The n1edian voter rnodel with variable tax shares 
Max U,-(G,X) 
subject to J,. = X + h (I,.)[ G - A] 
f = U( G, X,.) + A[ J,. - X,. - h, (J,.)G + h (J,.)A] 
First Order Condition: 
/!,)_ = J,. - X,. - h,(J,.)G + h(I,)A = O 
ea= Ua - Ah,(J,.) = 0 
fx = Ux - /4 = 0 
Totally differentiate the first order condition : 
di,. - d x;. - h,- dG - Gh~dl + h1 dA + Ah~dl = 0 
UccdG + Uc.'(dX - h,.d), - Jh',.dJ = 0 
Uxa dG + U xxdX - d), = 0 
In matrix notation : 
0 -h,. 
-h, Uac 
- 1 Uxa 
- 1 II dl I I -d J,. + G h~ di - Ah',. dl - h, dA 
Ucx II dG I =1 Ah~dl 
Uxxl/ dX 0 
0 - h,. 
/J/ = 1- h,. Ucc 
- 1 Uxc 
- 1 
Uax! cc (-I)( - h;)/- h,. Uax!- l/- h,. Ucc 
Un·/ - l Uxx - 1 Uxc 
= h(- hUxx+ Ucx) - 1(- h Uxa + Uca) 
= h(Ucx- hUxx) + (h,.Uxx- Ucc) 
= hUcx- h; Uxx+ hUxc - Uaa 
(- ) (- ) 
= 2h,. Ucx- h; Uxx- Ucc > 0 
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Comparative statics : 
Let: 
Note: 
. 0 - h; - 1 
- h O Uax 
dG 1- 1 O Uxx 
dA Ill 
- h; Uax 
- (- h): - 1 Uxx 
--
111 
IPI = J-h Uaxj 
- 1 u~ 
(- ) 
= -hUxx + Uax> 0 
dG IPI 
-= h- -> 0 
dA IIJI 
0 - 1 + Gh';- Ah'; - 1 
- h; lh'; 
dG 1- 1 O 
- .:___· --------'-
di Ill 
- (- 1 + G h°; - Ah';) - h U GX + ( _ 1) I- h; l h'; 
- - l Uxx I l O 
111 
dG = IPI + h';(A-G)IPI _ Ah
0
; > O 
dl Ill Ill Ill 
IPI = J_ dG 
Ill h; dA 
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dG dG 
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Research methodology 
The research proble111 
Grants and revenue -sharing arrangements are integral aspects of central-local 
goverrunent fiscal relations in the Philippines. Local goverrunents have been assigned 
more expenditure functions than taxing powers. Central transfers are used to bridge this 
gap. This study examines central transfers in relation to the fiscal position and behaviour 
of local governments, as inferred from their expenditure and revenue perfonnance. The 
major objective of the analysis is to assess whether central transfers promote equity and 
local resource mobilisation. 
Conceptualisation 
The fiscal capacity. The equity of central transfers is evaluated in relation to the 
. fiscal capacities of local goverrunents in a given area. Fiscal capacity relates to the ability 
of govenunents to provide services. This depends on their revenue bases and costs of 
rendering services. Differences in fiscal capacities of local govermnents result in 
horizontal inequities. Individuals who are si1nilar in all respects except for their place of 
residence are treated unequally in terms of the tax burden exacted and/or services 
provided by their local goverrunent. 
The fiscal gap. The fiscal capacity of a local government unit is sum1narised by 
its expenditure need-revenue capacity gap, or fiscal gap . The fiscal gap measures the 
difference between what a com1nunity must spend to provide a basic package of local 
services and its available revenues at a standard level of tax effort (Bradbury, et al. , 
1984, pp .161-162). The fiscal gap is different fro1n the budget deficit which is readily 
measured as the difference between actual revenues and expenditures. 
Expenditure needs. Actual government expenditures depend on various factors 
which include the resources available to the com1nunity, the choice of quantity and 
quality of goods and services provided, and the costs of providing them. Expenditure 
need is a theoretical concept which abstracts from preferences and resource effects, and 
depends solely on costs factors . It is designed to 1neasure disabilities of local 
governments to provide goods and services at 'nonnal costs' due to factors which are 
beyond their control. These factors include the demographic, socioeconomic and physical 
characteristics of an area which affect the size of client groups requiring services, and the 
unit costs of providing them (Mathews, 1993; Bradbury, et al., 1984). 
Revenue capacity and effort. Government revenue is determined both by its 
revenue capacity and revenue effort. The revenue capacity represents the potential or 
maximum a1nount that could be collected by a government unit while the revenue effort 
represents the choice of the amount it decides to collect (Weist, 1991 ). In the short run, 
the revenue capacity of a govermnent unit is independent of its fiscal decisions and is 
largely detennined by factors beyond its control. 
The expenditure need-revenue gap, thus, abstracts from fiscal choice variables. 
Not all fiscal differences justify equalisation. Only those differences which arise from 
factors outside the control of local authorities are regarded as causes of inequity. Central 
transfers are considered equitable if they reduce or 1ninimise disparities in the fiscal gap 
among government units, notably, by giving greater amounts to those with lower tax 
bases (revenue disadvantage) and/or greater expenditure needs ( cost disadvantage) . 
It is worth noting that while intergovernmental transfers are designed primarily to 
help ensure horizontal equity ( or equal treatment of equals), they can also advance 
vertical interpersonal equity, which relates to how the fiscal system treats individuals 
with different income levels. This is because c01n1nunities with greater fiscal capacity 
usually have greater numbers of wealthy residents. Transfers which 1nini1nise differences 
in fiscal capacities among co1nmunities, therefore, also help to reduce income disparities 
among individuals. 
Measuring fiscal capacity 
Weist ( 1991) noted that the concept of fiscal capacity arose through public finance 
applications rather than public finance theory; thus, there is no single correct method of 
measuring fiscal capacity. Based on the literature, she pointed to three important 
characteristics of a suitable measure of fiscal capacity based on the literature. First, it 
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should enable co1nparisons of the fiscal position of various govermnent unjts; second, it 
should be comprehensive, that is, it should be measured with respect to sources of 
revenue and expenditure requirements; third, it should be independent of fiscal choices or 
preferences. 
The fiscal gap wh~ch is used to measure the fiscal capacity of a government urut 
can be expressed algebraicaJly as : 
where: 
-
Gi = ECi - r Bi 
G; - fiscal gap of local government i 
Ci - cost index for local govermnent i 
(5.1) 
E - standard expenditure ( e.g. average expenditure of all local governments) 
r - standard revenue effort ( e.g . average revenue effort) 
Bi - revenue base of local government i 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1) represents standardised expenditure 
need, wrule the second term represents standardised revenue capacity. The 
standardisations of expenditure and revenue are designed to isolate the effect of fiscal 
choice variables in the measure1nent of the fiscal gap. 
Trus study uses a two-stage approach to measure the fiscal gap . Measures of 
revenue capacity and expenditure need are developed separately, based on actual revenue 
and expenditure data, and then brought together as in equation (5.1). Considering the 
relationship between revenue and expenditure, a general model that considers them 
together, thus allowing for all possible interactions between them would be a better way 
of esti1nating fiscal capacity. Problems involved in the measurement of govermnent 
output and services and specifications of demand and supply for public goods, make trus 
very difficult. The methodology in this study is a practical compro1nise that responds to 
these difficulties and to limited data availability. 
Figure (5. 1) provides a bird's-eye view of how the fiscal gap is 1neasured. It 
shows the major categories of variables that affect government revenues and 
expenditures. Based on behavioural assumptions about local goverrunents, multivariate 
regression equations expressing govermnent revenues and expenditures as a function of 
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these variables can be specified. The regression analyses provide a way of isolating and 
measuring the effect of individual factors on revenue and expenditure, enabling 
measure1nent of revenue capacity and expenditure need. 
Measuring revenue capacity and effort. Per capita income is the si1nplest and 
most c01runonly used measure of revenue capacity. People pay taxes out of their inco1ne, 
and income generally reflects the level of available resources within a jurisdiction. The 
use of per capita inco1ne as a 1neasure of revenue capacity, however, has several 
limitations. It does not reflect the diversity of tax and revenue sources that are actually 
used . In the case of local govermnents, income taxes are not part of the tax structure. Per 
capita income as a 1neasure of revenue capacity does not also account for the 
exportability of taxes-that is for the taxes levied by a local government unit on its 
residents to be passed on or ulti1nately paid for by residents of other local government 
units (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1976; United States Advisory Council for 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1990). 
Another approach to measuring revenue capacity is the representative revenue 
system developed by the United States Advisory Council for Intergovernmental 
Relations . The representative revenue system measures revenue capacity and effort with 
respect to individual taxes and quasi-taxes that are actually levied by states and local 
governments . The 1nethod consists of the following steps : 
1. Calculate the average tax rate for each of the bases by dividing total collections 
nationwide by the national total base for that tax . 
2. Apply each average tax rate to the appropriate tax base in each state. This 
detennines the tax capacity of each state for each of its tax bases. 
3. Add together the tax capacity from each base to obtain the total tax capacity 
for each state, and for the whole nation. 
4 . Each state's fiscal capacity index is calculated by dividing each state's per 
capita total tax capacity by the per capita total tax capacity of the whole 
nation, and multiplying the result by 100. 
5. The tax effort index in each state is computed by dividing each state's per 
capita collections by its per capita capacity, and multiplying this by I 00 . 
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The most critical step in the representative revenue system approach is the 
identification of the appropriate tax or revenue base which is the basic source of 
differences in estimated revenue capacities. This step is also the most difficult to 
implement (United States Advisory Council for Intergovernmental Relations, 1990). 
Chelliah and Sinha (1982) who applied this method in India noted that data on tax bases 
are rarely available with the necessary degree of disaggregation, and aggregated data 
tend to conceal significant differences in capacity. 
The representative revenue system also has some conceptual problems. The 
average tax rates do not provide good estimates of the revenues that government units 
are likely to obtain from their tax bases. The estimates tend to deny the interdependence 
of the various tax bases and rates within a given governmental unit. The average tax rate 
weighting method applied to individual tax bases does not take into account that the 
heavy use of one base may preclude the heavy use of another because of the constraints 
of income and wealth . Furthermore, the revenues that govermnents can raise from their 
_revenue bases depend on the interaction of various factors . Although local governments, 
for example, are not allowed to impose income taxes, per capita personal income is likely 
to play an important factor in their revenues . So are other factors such as urbanisation, 
inco1ne concentration, and level of development which cannot be completely linked to 
any specific revenue base (Akin, 1973 ; Dwivedi, 1986). 
Akin ( 1973) suggests that multiple regression can provide estimates of revenue 
capacities that better reflect the amount of revenues that are likely to be raised by 
governments. This is done by regressing per capita revenues of govermnents on various 
factors that are viewed a priori to be related to revenue capacities. The predicted per 
capita revenues of the regression equation are treated as the measure of revenue 
capacities. Revenue efforts are measured as the ratios of actual to predicted revenues. 
The multiple regression analysis had been used in various studies of the 
International Monetary Fund to gauge revenue capacity and efforts of aid recipient 
countries (Bahl, 1971, 1972; Chelliah, 1971 ; Tait, Gratz and Eichengreen, 1979). It had 
also been used to examine revenue capacities and effo1is of local govermnents (Bahl and 
Schroeder, 1983a; Dwivedi, 1986; Bawazier, 1988). 
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The revenue capacity measure based on the fitted value of the regression 
equation does not represent the potential or maximum revenue as the term revenue 
capacity i1nplies. It measures the amount that would be raised by a local unit if that unit 
responded to the 'predictor' variables in accordance with the 'average' response of all the 
units (Akin, 1973). Actual revenues generated by some government units may exceed 
their estimated revenue capacities because the ordinary least squares regression 
represents an average function and not a potential or maximum function. 
To measure local government revenue capacity and effort, this study adopts the 
Random Coefficient Regression Model1 used by Kalirajan and Obwona (1994a, 1994b) 
to estimate firm potential output and technical efficiency. A 1najor feature which 
distinguishes the Random Coefficient Regression Model from ordinary least squares 
regressions is the inclusion in the former of observation-specific characteristics. The 
observation-specific characteristics are modelled in terms of coefficient or parameter 
variations. The maxi1num or potential output is estimated using the highest estimated 
coefficients of each individual input which are viewed as representing the 'best practice' 
techniques of applying the inputs . 
Based on the Random Coefficient Regression Model, the local government 
revenue function is specified as : 
where: 
' Ri = X; /3; + &; 
/J; = /J + V; 
R; - per capita revenue of local govermnent i 
~ - a K x 1 vector of revenue capacity factors 
/J; - a K x K matrix of parameters or coefficients 
/3 - mean coefficients 
£i , ui - random errors 
(5.2) 
(5 .3) 
The revenue function specified in equation (5 .2) differs from the revenue function 
implied by the ordinary regression equation used in earlier studies, with respect to the 
parameters or coefficients. In the former, each revenue capacity factor has a 
1See Appendix 5.1 for a full discussion of the Random Coefficient Regression Model. 
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corresponding vector of coefficients representing the individual responses of each local 
governn1ent. In the latter there is only one coefficient- the mean response of all local 
governments- for each revenue capacity factor. The Randotn Coefficient Regression 
Model is conceptually more appropriate in esti1nating local government revenue capacity 
and effort, since it is ·widely observed that local goverrnnents exploit their various 
revenue bases to varying degrees. Even with the same level of revenue bases, actual 
revenues collected by local govermnents differ due to factors such as political will and 
collection efficiency which are difficult to quantify. The applicability of the Random 
Coefficient Regression Model is an empirical matter which depends on the data being 
exa1nined. 
The computer program TERAN, which was written to provide estimates of finn-
and input-specific efficiency measures (Zhang and Obwona, 1993), was used in the 
esti1nation of the local government revenue function. The progra1n also calculates the 
Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared statistic for testing the applicability of the Random 
Coefficient Regression Model to the data. The revenue function was estimated as a 
Cobb-Douglas function of the form: 
m 
In R; = /31; + L f31a In X 1a + &; 
k=2 
(5.4) 
where subscripts k and i denote revenue capacity factors and local govermnents, 
* respectively. Based on the highest estimated regression coefficients ( denoted by /3k , 
k = 1, .. . ,m), the revenue capacities (Rt) and revenue efforts (r;) of local govermnents 
are calculated as follow: 
* * m * In R; = /31 + L/3k In Xki 
k =2 
* * R; = exp(ln Ri ) 
R; 
r; = R;* 
(5 .5) 
(5 .5a) 
(5 .6) 
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Measuring Expenditure Needs. A major obstacle to the 1neasurement of 
expenditure needs or cost disparities is the problem of describing and measuring the 
production of public goods and services. The level of public outputs is difficult to 
quantify. In most cases, the only data readily available are government expenditures. 
Thus, it is no surprise that approaches to measuring expenditure needs have taken off 
from expenditure detenninants analysis . 
Beginning in the 1950s with the study of Fabricant (1952), several studies have 
sought to determine the factors that affect state and local government expenditures. The 
early studies have been reviewed by Auten (1972), Bahl, Johnson and Wasylenko 
(1980a), Pirasteh (1985), Selim (1988) and Bra1nley (1990) . They all discovered 
significant relationships between certain state and/or local government characteristics and 
their expenditures. The observed relationships, however, were not uniform. So1ne 
characteristics which were found to be significantly related to expenditures in some states 
or regions were insignificant in others. The relationships also varied across government 
functions and over time. 
The expenditure determinant studies show that variation in locar goverrnnent 
expenditures can be attributed to various factors, both within and beyond the control of 
local goverrnnent authorities. The disparities in per capita government e~penditures due 
to factors beyond its control, particularly those factors related to the size of client groups 
requiring services and costs of providing services, serve as the basis for the assess1nent 
of expenditure needs. In the context of fiscal capacity equalisation, which provides the 
rationale for the assessment of expenditure needs, only cost disparities due to "need 
factors" beyond the control of government authorities 1nerit co1npensation. Otherwise, 
inefficiencies will be tolerated and even encouraged . 
Fro1n 1974 to 1980, the United Kingdom used 1nultiple regression to measure 
expenditure needs and allocate central goverrnnent rate support grants to local 
governments . A similar approach was used in Denmark following 1979 legislation 
introducing social criteria in the measure1nent of expenditure needs. Socioecono1nic, 
demographic, and physical characteristics of local governments which are viewed a priori 
as affecting the costs of providing services were regressed on per capita local 
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goverrunent expenditures. Variables with statistically significant coefficients were 
regarded as need factors, and were used in a formula to allocate central goverrunent 
transfers with their coefficients as weights (Bradbury, et al., 1984; Jack111an, 1981; Lotz, 
1981 ). 
This method of estimating expenditure need was criticised on several grounds . 
Many of its critics noted that there are other factors (e.g., resources and preferences) 
which could affect local government expenditures that are not included in the regression 
equation. Thus, the estimation is biased. There could also be a feedback effect of grants 
on expenditure needs. Those government units which received higher grants and incurred 
greater expenditures would be likely to be assessed as having higher expenditure needs. 
Multicollinearity can also be a problem because the various need factors are interrelated; 
serious 111ulticollinearity problems can result in inefficient estimates, although they are 
unbiased (Jacktnan, 1981; Lotz, 1981; Mouritzen and Skovsgaard, 1981). 
Most of these criticisms can be traced to the absence of an explicit theory on 
which to base the estimation of expenditure needs. Auten (1972), Bradbury, et al., 
(1984) and Weist (1991 ), suggest more systematic applications of 111ultiple- regression in 
measuring expenditure needs through the use of economic models. In his estimation of 
expenditure needs, Auten referred to the aggregate consumption function used 111 
macroeconomic analysis, in which consumption is viewed primarily as a function of 
income. He expressed per capita local government expenditure as a function of various 
factors, which he classified as ability, perceived need, and taste variables. The ability 
factors reflected the revenue-raising capacity of local governments. The perceived need 
factors consist of various socioecono1nic characteristics which affect the expenditures of 
governments in general. Auten noted that perceived needs for public services are 
determined relative to the average expenditure behaviour of governments ( or reference 
com1nunities) . Taste factors consist of random elements which affect the demand of 
individual communities only. 
Auten's model, which was used to esti111ate expenditure needs of local 
governments in New York State, is presented as follows: 
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C1k = a+bAi+gNi+t1 
where ~k - co1nmunity j's demand for public service k 
Ai - vector of ability variables 
(5.7) 
N - vector of socioeconomic variables that affect perceived needs J 
ti - error tenn reflecting local taste factors 
Local government expenditure needs were calculated by substituting into the esti1nated 
regression equation the average values for revenue capacity factors, and the actual values 
for the socioeconomic variables. Thus, expenditure need differences are solely due to 
perceived need factors. The formula for the calculation of expenditure needs is expressed 
as: 
I\ 
I\ I\ - I\ 
C NJk = a + b A + g Ni (5.8) 
I\ 
where C NJk is esti1nated public expenditure needs, A is the vector of revenue capacity 
I\ I\ I\ 
variables pegged to the average values, and a, b, g are the estimated regression 
coefficients. 
The n1odel by Bradbury, et al. ( 1984) is 1nore representative of the -expenditure 
detenninants literature, and provides better insights to the various factors that affect local 
govermnent expenditures. It was used to assess expenditure needs for Massachusetts 
communities and school districts in connection with the allocation of state aid. It views 
local govermnent officials as trying to maxi1nise the utility of the decisive voter (the 
median voter) subject to budget constraints. The model can be expressed as : 
Maxinuse Ud(Zd,S) 
subject to yd = zd + r Ed 
E(S,P,C) = rB + A 
(5.9) 
(5.10) 
(5.11) 
Equation (5.9) represents the utility function of the decisive voter which is a 
function of his or her consumption of a composite private good (Zd) and level of local 
services (S). This representation of the utility function follows from Bradford, Malt and 
Oates ( 1969) which noted an i1nportant distinction between goverrunent expenditures 
and public service or output levels. Other studies model utility as a function of local 
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government expenditures. This results in ambiguities since expenditure depends on both 
price and quantity of public services. Individuals may derive satisfaction either from 
higher levels of public good consumption or price increases; they may be willing to trade 
away units of private goods for public good price increases (Bahl, Johnson and 
Wasylenko, 1980a). 
Equation (5 .10) represents the personal budget constraints of the decisive voter. 
His disposable income net of national taxes (Yd) is equal to his spending on private 
goods whose price is assu1ned to be unity plus his local tax. 
Equation (5 .11) shows the budget constraint of the local government. Local 
goverrunent expenditure (E) is equal to local tax revenues (rB) plus transfers fro1n the 
national government (A). The production function for local services shows up in the 
specification of the local government expenditure function, which is its inverse. Local 
goverrunent expenditures are specified as a function of the level of public output, prices 
of inputs and environmental costs. Local tax revenue is defined as the product of the 
. effective tax rate or revenue effort (r) and revenue base (B). In the short run, only the 
revenue base can be properly regarded as an exogenous variable; the effective tax rate 
which is a policy choice variable is an endogenous variable. 
The endogenous or choice variables in the model are Zd, S, and r. Since the 
functions in the 1nodel are expressed in general fonn, it is not possible to obtain explicit 
solution to the endogenous variable. By the implicit function theorem, however, the 
implicit solutions to the choice variables can be written as functions of the exogenous 
variables in the model, that is: 
zd =f(Yd,BdP,C,B,A) 
s = f(Yd,Bd,P,C,B,A) 
r = /(Yd, Bd,P, C, B, A) 
(5 .12) 
(5.13) 
(5 .14) 
The solution for the opti1nal level of local public good ( S) is substituted into the 
expenditure function . Thus, the expenditure function is expressed as a function of voters' 
incomes and preferences (labeled D d for demand), costs of factors of production, costs of 
environmental factors, local revenue bases and central govermnent transfers, 1. e.: 
E =f(DcPP,C,B,A) (5.15) 
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Specific key variables can be identified for each of the major categories of variables 
specified by equation (5 .15) and esti1nated in a simple linear relationship of the form : 
E = a0 + a1D + ~p + a3C + a4B +a5A + u (5.15a) 
Ideally, the local government expenditure model should be estimated as a system of 
equations (5 .9-.11); but due to the difficulty of obtaining measures of public output, the 
reduced form equation of local government expenditure (5 .15) is used in the estimation. 
The estimation results of equation (5 .15a) can be used to calculate a cost index. 
This can be done by substituting into the estimated regression equation the average 
values for all the variables, except for the cost variables which take their actual values. 
The predicted expenditure values, thus, reflect variation due to envirorunental cost 
factors alone. A cost index for each jurisdiction is derived by dividing its predicted 
expenditure by the average predicted expenditures of all jurisdictions. The expenditure 
need of a com1nunity is then measured by applying its cost index to a given expenditure 
standard ( e.g . average expenditure) . 
It is important to bear in 1nind that trus measure of cost disparities is likely to 
understate true cost disparities. Figure 5.2 shows the feasible consumption sets labeled 
(Z 1 S I and Z 1 Si) of two jurisdictions with the sa1ne resources but different cost of 
producing public goods (S). It is more costly to produce public goods in jurisdiction 2 
than in jurisdiction 1. With the same resources, jurisdiction 1 can produce a maxi1nu1n of 
S1 public goods but jurisdiction 2 can only produce S
2 
public goods. The preferences of 
the decisive voter are indicated by indifference curves (I
1
I
1 
and I
2
Ii) . Point A represents 
the chosen bundle of private goods ( zt) and public goods ( s;) in jurisdiction 1, and 
point B indicates the chosen bundle of private goods ( z;) and public goods ( S~) in 
jurisdiction 2. Based on observed government expenditures, the cost disparity between 
jurisdiction 1 and jurisdiction 2 is 1neasured by ( z; -zt ). This difference is less than the 
true cost disparity (Z2- zt ). The cost disparities measured on the basis of goverrunent 
expenditures do not take into account that the high cost jurisdiction has responded to 
higher cost by reducing its service level. It underestimates the true cost disparities 
whenever the price elasticity of demand is non-zero (Bradbury, et al., 1984). 
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Figure 5.2 Measuren1ent of cost disparities 
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Source: Bradbury, et al. , 1984. 'State aid to offset fiscal disparities across commw1ities', 
National Tax Journal, 37:151-70 
Another approach to measuring cost disparities is the public employ!Tient model 
used by Bahl, Johnson and Wasylenko (l 980b), and Weist (1991). Since the public 
sector 1nainly provides services and is very labour intensive, employment, rather than 
expenditures is used as the surrogate variable for public output. The public employment 
approach assumes a Leontief fixed factor relation between labour and non-labour inputs 
in the production of public services. Thus, instead of examining the variation in total 
goverrunent expenditures, it exa1nines the variation in labour expenditures. This makes 
analysis of cost disparities more tractable because variation in labour expenditures can be 
partitioned into wage (or price effect) and employment (or output effect) which are both 
measurable. 
The Leontief fixed factor production technology for public services which is the 
foundation of the public employment approach is, however, very restrictive. In a cross-
section analysis, this implies that the quality of the a unit of employment is everywhere 
the same (BaW, Johnson and Wasylenko, 1980a). It also pre-empts substitution between 
labour and non-labour inputs, barring the inclusion of environmental factors in the 
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analysis of cost disparities (Weist, 1991 ). The public employment approach may not also 
be as imple1nentable as the expenditure determinants approach because employ1nent and 
wage data of local goverrnnent sectors are not readily available. 
Other methods of measuring expenditure needs do not rely on regression 
technique, but on a more careful and detailed analysis of actual government budgets and 
expenditures by technical experts. In Australia expenditure needs of states and territories 
are assessed by the Commonwealth Grants Co1nn1ission with reference to different 
categories of expenditures. For each expenditure category, a state's expenditure need is 
defined as the difference between the state's per capita expenditure and a standard per 
capita expenditure, where the standardised per capita expenditure was the ainount the 
State would need to spend to provide a standard level, range and quality of services if it 
were to apply standard policies and operate at standard efficiency (Coirunonwealth 
Grants Co1n1nission, 1981 ) . For some expenditure categories, the per capita expenditures 
are adjusted to account for cost differences due to factors such as scale, population 
. dispersion, client groups, and physical and economic environment. The method of 
accounting for these factors involves subjective judgements. 
The Australian method of measuring expenditure need requires detailed and 
uniform budgetary data at the state/local government level, which are not available in 
many countries. An advantage of the regression approach is that it can be implemented 
with readily available data. In this study, local goverrnnent expenditure needs are 
measured folJowing the approach used by Bradbury, et al (1984). Rao and Aggarwal 
(1991) and Park (1989) respectively, used the same 1nodel to 1neasure expenditure needs 
of state governments in India and local governments in Korea. Systematic assessments of 
local government expenditure needs can be made with limited data. 
Assessment of the Equity of Central Government Transfers 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient. The equity of central government 
transfers is assessed by the Spearman rank correlation coefficients and the Schutz 
coefficient of inequality. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient provides a 
conservative indicator of the equity of revenue sharing. It 1neasures the correlation 
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between the fiscal capacities of goverrnnent units and the central goverrnnent transfers 
received . Since the 1neasure is based on rankings, it is not susceptible to extreme values 
or outliers. Valid tests of significance do not rely on restrictive assumptions regarding the 
population distribution (Newbold, 1990). The first step in calculating the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient ·is to rank fiscal capacities and central government transfers 
received by each local govenunent unit. When there are no ties in the rankings the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient (R) can be more simply computed using the 
following fonnula: 
n 
6Z:,d; 
i= l -I-
R - n(n2 -1) (5 .16) 
where the di are the differences in ranks. 
Schutz Coefficient of Inequality. The coefficient of inequality proposed by 
Schutz (1951) is used to compare the degree equity of fiscal capacities under various 
distributions of central government transfers. The Schutz coefficient of inequality is an 
extension of the Lorenz curve technique which is usually used in the measurement of 
income inequality. lt is computed on the basis of the slope of the Lorenz curve at various 
points. It provides a better measure of inequality than the Gini coefficient ratio ( which is 
also based on the Lorenz curve) when negative values are present. 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the method of measuring the Schutz coefficient of 
inequity. Figure 5.3 depicts the Lorenz curve when some values are negative; the Gini 
coefficient ratio is not computable in this case. The diagonal line AB depicts perfect 
equality and has a slope equal to one at various points. The Schutz coefficient of 
inequality is measured by the shaded area in Figure 5. 4 which is equivalent to the sum of 
the difference between the slope of the line of perfect equality and slope of the Lorenz 
curve at various points. Note that the areas on either side of line of equality (tangent 
equals l) are equal. This is because the Lorenz curve represents a cumulative 
distribution-any 1nember who receives less than his equal or proportionate share must 
be compensated for by one or 1nore members who receive as much more than their equal 
shares as he received less . Thus, the Schutz coefficient of inequality could be represented 
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Figure 5.3 Lorenz diagram of a hypothetical distribution of fiscal capacity with 
negative values % 
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by either shaded areas below or above the line of equality. The formula for the Schutz 
coefficient of inequity (S) can be expressed as : 
X I 
S = I(&-ty) (5 .17) x=O 
where x is the per cent of local goverrunents and y the per cent of aggregate fiscal . d h . . hi h fly l capacity, an x1 t e pomt at w c tu = 
Assess111ent of the stimulating effects of central governn1ent transfer~ 
The effects of central government transfers on revenue efforts of the recipient 
governments have usually been inferred from the latter1s expenditure behaviour. The 
recipient government 1s expenditure is generally postulated to be a linear function of 
grants (A), income generated in its jurisdiction (Y), and various socioeconomic 
characteristics (CJ The effects of these various factors on the recipients 1 expenditure are 
estimated through multiple regression which is specified as : 
Ei = ~O + ~ I Ai + ~2 Yi + ~3 Ci + E ( 5 .18) 
The coefficient of grants ~ 1 was used as the basis for assessing the effect of 
grants on the recipient1s revenue effort. A value of ~ 1 greater than 1 means that grants 
stimulate recipient goverrunents 1 spending and revenue efforts, that is, a dollar of grant 
induced a 1nore than one dollar increase in the recipient's outlay. A value of ~ 1 less than 
1 means that grants substituted for recipient's spending from their own revenue sources, 
and implies a lower revenue effort of the recipient. 
The early studies of state and local goverrunent expenditures in the United States 
reviewed by Gramlich (1969) show that grants were generally stimulating. However, 
there were some doubts about the results due to the data used and the specification of 
the regression model. The studies made no distinction between different types of grants . 
The generally stimulating effects of grants reported in these studies could be due to 
simultaneous equation bias. Note that matching grants depends on the recipients 
expenditure, and hence can not be treated as a purely exogenous variable. 
Many studies soon followed, using more sophisticated econometric models 
dealing with the peculiarities of different types of transfers in terms of their price and 
income effects . Gramlich ( 1977) and Inman (I 979) provided comprehensive reviews of 
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these studies. Gramlich (1977) noted that the results reported tended to support the 
traditional grant theory except for the findings that general grants appeared to be more 
sti1nulating to recipient government expenditure than an increase in recipient income. In 
the traditional view their effects should be equivalent. Hence the evolution of the 
flypaper effect discussed· in Chapter 4 . 
Schwallie (1989), in a survey of the recent empirical and theoretical literature 
attempting to explain the 'flypaper effect' phenomenon, noted that 1nost of these studies 
were mainly focused on the behaviour of recipient governments. Schwallie argued that 
the effects of grants should be evaluated with regard to the aggregate public sector. 
Using a general equilibrium framework that accounts for the effects of grants on both 
grantor and recipient behaviour, Schwallie noted that grants can be both stimulating and 
substituting. 
Many studies, particularly those dealing with developing countries (Local 
Development Assistance Program, 1994; Uddin, 1989; Bahl and Schroeder 1983d) adopt 
. a simple expenditure regression model because of data li1nitations, and the simplicity of 
the design of central government transfers ( which consist 1nostly of lump sum grants) in 
these countries. Furthennore, the major concern of developing countries is that central 
government grants could substitute for revenue efforts of local governments, and the 
si1nple expenditure regression approach seemed to be more attuned to this concern. The 
recent sophisticated 1nodels of grant analysis appear to be tailor made for the developed 
econo1nies which are concerned with excessive revenue collection and spending by 
government. 
The si1nple expenditure regression model, however, leads to some ambiguity with 
regard to the interpretation of the effect of grants on recipient governments' revenue 
efforts. A regression coefficient of central government transfers greater than one is 
interpreted as an indication of a stimulating effect, and less than one as an indication of a 
substituting effect. This interpretation can be deduced fro1n the following budget 
identity: 
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where: 
E = T+A 
E - local government expenditures 
T - local taxes 
A - central goverrnnent transfers 
( 5 .19) 
Taking the derivative of local government expenditures with respect to central 
govermnent transfers yields : 
dE dT 
-= l+ -
dA dA (5 .20) 
Equation (5 .20) shows that if central govermnent transfers are substituting (dT/dA < 0) 
then the change in local government expenditures must be less than the change in central 
govermnent transfers ( dE/dA < I), and vice versa. However, this correspondence 
between changes in expenditure and local taxes due to changes in central goverrnnent 
· transfers only holds if there are no savings or borrowings in the model. With savings (S) 
and borrowings (B), equation (5 .18) would be: 
dE dT dB dS 
- =l+ - +---
dA dA dA dA (5 .20a) 
Equation (5 .20a), shows that an increase in expenditures less than the increase in central 
government transfers (dE/dA < 1) does not necessarily mean that central goverrunent 
transfers were substituting because borrowing could have declined and/or saving could 
have increased as well. In such cases, the coefficient of central government transfers in 
the regression equation does not provide a sufficient basis for judging their effects on 
local government revenue efforts. 
Local government revenues, as noted earlier, are determined both by their 
revenue capacity and revenue effort. Thus, the effect of central govermnent grants on 
local goverrunent revenue effort cannot be inferred directly from the relationship between 
grants and local government revenues . 
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Only a li1nited number of local governments in the Philippines incurred 
borrowings, but savings or balances in local government accounts were widespread . Bahl 
(1983) and the Local Assistance Development Progra1n (1994) attributed this to poor 
planning and budgeting, which in turn could be partly blamed on the uncertainty in the 
releases of central government transfers . 
Noting the presence of borrowing and saving in local govermnent accounts, this 
study uses a different and more direct approach to assess the effects of grants on revenue 
efforts. The estimated revenue effort of the random coefficient model is regressed on 
central government transfer, and other factors that could affect revenue effort. The latter 
serve as control variables to avoid bias esti1nates. The i1nplicit solution to the effective 
tax rate (or revenue effort) represented by equation (5 .14) in the local govermnent 
expenditure model is used as the basis for specification of the revenue effort regression 
equation. The effects of central government transfers on local government revenue effort 
are assessed based on the sign of its estimated coefficient: positive for stimulative effects 
. and negative for substitutive effects . 
Data Sources and Scope of Study 
As the province, a geographic or territorial area, is the unit of analysis , the 
provincial, municipal and city governments in a province are treated as an aggregate 
unit as if they were a "jurisdiction" 2• This parallels 1nany studies , mostly of the 
United States, which use the state as the unit of analysis. Weist (1991) noted that this 
standard approach in the fiscal capacity literature has developed because fiscal 
capacity depends on the inherent resources of a geographic area and not a particular 
level of goverrnnent. It also provides a way of dealing with the problem of accounting 
for the variation in access to revenues and responsibility for providing public services 
by different levels of govermnent. 
Two major types of data are used in the study. The first type of data consists 
of local government financial statistics for 1991, before the new local govermnent 
2 The cities and municipalities would have been equally interesting units for analysis , however, most of the socioeconomic data were only available at the provincial level. There were no fi scal data at barangay level, hence they were excluded in the analysis. 
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took effect. It would have been preferable to use data reflecting the legislative 
changes, but the only data available are for 1992, the first year of imple1nentation. 
Given the confusion involved in the transition, the 1992 financial statistics would not 
accurately reflect local government behaviour. Thus, 1991 financial data was chosen 
as the base. 
The local goverrnnent financial data were derived from the working papers 
used to prepare the annual reports of the Commission on Audit. The working papers 
contain consolidated statements of revenues and expenditures of provinces and cities, 
based on audited trial balances submitted by local treasurers. The working papers of 
municipalities are reported by provincial aggregates. Sixty-seven out of 75 provincial 
working papers were available for all three local government levels. The consolidated 
working papers of the 85 municipalities in the five provinces of Region XI (Southern 
Mindanao), and the eight municipalities in the province of Tawi-tawi are missing. 
Extracting the data directly fro1n the trial balances of these municipalities entails a 
. tedious process, thus, they were excluded fro1n the study. The other two provinces 
which were excluded due to unavailability of data were Basilan, where the documents 
were burned in a provincial government fire, and Lanao del Sur which did not submit 
the pertinent reports. 
Two of the 67 provinces included in the study, namely Biliran and Guimaras, 
were former sub-provinces of Leyte and Iloilo, respectively. Most data available from 
govermnent agencies incorporated the sub-provinces with their respective mother 
provinces. Biliran and Guimaras were therefore treated as if they were still part of 
their mother provinces. Metro Manila, which consists of 4 cities and 13 
municipalities, was treated as another province. Thus there is a total of 66 sample 
observations, a number representative of the entire local government sector. 
The second type of data consists of socioeconomic and demographic data 
which are based on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, Census Facts and 
Figures, Census of Establish1nents and Population Census of the National Statistics 
Office. The specific data, referring mainly to 1990, their limitations and respective 
sources are reported in the subsequent chapters. 
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Sun11nary 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework and methodology for assessing whether 
central government transfers to local governments in the Philippines promote equity and 
local resource mobilisation. The equity of central transfers is evaluated in relation to local 
governn1ents' fiscal capacities, as measured by the expenditure need- revenue capacity 
gap, or fiscal gap. The fiscal gap, unlike the budget deficit, abstracts from fiscal choice 
variables since only those differences which arise fro1n factors outside the control of local 
authorities are regarded as causes of inequity. The fiscal gap is measured using a two-
stage approach, beginning with the 1neasurement of revenue capacity followed by that of 
expenditure needs. 
The study took note of the various methodologies used in the measurement of the 
revenue capacities- which include the income based approach, the representative 
revenue system approach used by the United States Advisory Council for 
IntergoverrnnentaI Relations, and the multiple regression approach- citing their 
. strengths and weaknesses. The study opted for a different approach based on the random 
coefficient regression model used in the estimation of firm potential output and 
efficiency. A survey of literature on the measurement of expenditure needs, consisting 
mostly of expenditure detenninants studies of state and local governments of the United 
States, was also 1nade. To measure expenditure needs, the study adopted the median 
voter model developed by Bradbury, et al. (1984), which provides a useful fra1nework 
for segregating the effects of 'cost factors' beyond government's control from other 
factors (e.g . revenue capacity, transfers, and preferences) affecting government 
expenditures. 
Based on the fiscal gap, the equity of central govermnent transfers were then 
assessed. The transfers were considered equitable if they reduce or minimise disparities in 
fiscal gaps among government units, notably, by giving greater amounts to those with 
lower tax bases (revenue disadvantage) and/or greater expenditure needs (cost 
disadvantage). Two summary measures of equity were used in this regard, namely: the 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient and the Schutz Coefficient ofinequality 
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In assessing whether central government transfers promote local govermnent 
revenue effort, the study regressed the revenue effort esti1nated from the random 
coefficient regression model on central government transfers and other socioeconomic 
factors acting as control variables. Central government transfers were deemed to be 
stimulative if its estimated coefficient is positive, and substitutive if its coefficient is 
negative. This approach is more direct than the expenditure detenninants approach which 
yields ambiguous results in the presence of local govermnent savings. 
The province, a geographic or territorial area, is used as the unit of analysis. As 
such, the provincial, 1nunicipal and city goverrnnents in a province are treated as an 
aggregate unit as if they were one jurisdiction. 
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Appendix 5.1 
The Rando1n Coefficient Regression Model 
The linear model most frequently used in statistical application may be expressed as 
I 
Y; = X;/3; + &; i=l, ... ,N (1) 
where: 
y; - an observed random variable called the dependent variable; 
X; - a K x I vector of known non-random values of the independent variables; 
/3; - a K x I vector of unknown constants or coefficients to be estimated; and 
&; - represents the error term which is generally assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed with mean zero and finite variance. 
As pointed out in several studies (Kalirajan and Obwona 1994a, 1994b; Kumbhakar, 
1988; Hildreth and Houck, 1968), the constancy of the /3 coefficients across all 
observations is questionable in certain situations. In the case of production functions, for 
example, it is noted that outputs may respond variably to the same level of inputs due to , 
different methods of input application, varying climatic conditions, and other factors 
which cannot be observed or readily quantified and explicitly incorporated in a model. 
Thus, in certain situations it may be more accurate to consider the coefficients as 
random or varying across observations, that is : 
/J; = /J + U; (2) 
The actual response rates /3 vary from their respective mean response rates /3 by a 
vector of random errors U;. It is assumed that the u/s are independently and identically 
distributed with: 
E (uJ = o 
{
akk 
E(uk;u,) = o 
if k = l and i = j 
othenvise 
(3) 
(4) 
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In more compact notation, Equations (I) and (2) can be written for all N observations as 
Y=X/J+w (5) 
where 
w =Xu= Dxu (6) 
and Y is a N x 1 vector; X is a N x K matrix of stacked X/; Dx is a N x NK diagonal 
matrix of X/; and u is an NK x 1 vector of u/s . 
Note that the additive equation error term £i drops out of the equation since when x 1i = 
1, £i cannot be distinguished from the randomly varying intercept. 
We now move into the estimation of the mean response vector /J . Ordinary least squares 
provides an estimate of /J given by 
/J = ( x' x)-
1 
x' Y (7) 
/J is an unbiased estimate of /J , however, it is generally inefficient. An estimator of /J 
- which is best, linear and unbiased (BLU) is given by 
A I fJ = ( x · 0 -1 x)- x·0-1Y 
(8) 
where 0 represents the variance matrix of w . Since 0 is unknown, it is necessary to first 
A 
estimate the individual elements of 0 to derive the estimator /J . 
Based on equation (6) the individual elements of w may be written as 
K 
Wi = L Xikllik 
k = I (6a) 
From equation ( 4) and (6a), the individual elements of 0 may be written as 
{ 
f a kk x ;k if k = I and i = j 0i- = E(wkiwu) = k=1 . (9) 1 
0 otherwise 
The values of the diagonal elements of 0 , thus, depends on the a 's which are also 
unknown. Hildreth and Houck (1968) suggested several ways of estimating the a 's, the 
basic procedure of which is as follows : 
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Let the vector of residuals of the ordinary least squares be: 
r = Y - X/3 = Mw (10) 
-1 where M = (I-X(X'X) X) is symmetric, idempotent and rank T-K. The variance matrix 
ofr is 
E (rr') = E (Jv[ww 'M) = M BM (11) 
For convenience, the following notational convention is used. If A is any matrix, A 
denotes the matrix obtained from A by squaring each element (a u= a!). Ai denotes the 
ith row of A . If P is any diagonal matrix, p denotes the column vector whose elements 
are the respective diagonal elements of P(p; = pi;). 
Following this notational convention, Equation (11) may be written as 
Er =M0 
Now, let 
17 = f - Er 
Then 
f =Er+ 1J 
= M0 + 17 
= MXa + 1J by Equation (11) 
or 
r = Ga+17 
where 
G = MX. 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
Equation (17) has the familiar form of a linear equation model, hence a can be 
esti1nated using least squares, and has the solution: 
~ ( I ) - ] I a = GG Gr (18) 
Hildreth and Houck ( 1968) showed that a is a consistent estimate of a . However, it 
has an undesirable feature as an estimator of variances; that is, its elements may be 
negative. This may not be a problem in the case of large samples, since a is a consistent 
estimator; the probability of getting negative estimates of the variances tends to zero as 
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the sample size increases . However, in small samples wherein the estimates obtained 
have larger standard errors, the probability of getting negative estimates becomes 
substantial. A remedy would be to assign a value of zero to the negative elements of a . 
~ 
This would lower its mean square error, however, it would bias a . 
A consistent and more efficient estimate of a is presented by Singh el al. ( 1976). They 
extended Hildreth and Houck' s procedure to derive estimates of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the residual 17 in equation ( 17). They noted that in the covariance matrix, 
E(1717'), the off diagonal elements are of lower magnitude than the diagonal elements, 
and that in general : 
I 
E 17 17 = 2111 ( 19) 
where vi is the NxN matrix of the squared elements of w = lv/0/\/[. 
Using a based on Equation ( 18) and E(1717') based on Equation ( 19), Singh el al. 
derived a generalized least square estimator of a given by 
a = (; (/I -I (; (; 1 1/f I / A ( f ) -1 (20) 
which rrnrnm1zes the probability of getting negative estimates of variances. Based on 
A A 
Equation 9, a can be used to obtain 0 an estimator of 0 , which can then be used to 
derive an estimate of the mean response coefficient: 
,8= (x'0x)-1 x'0-1 Y (21) 
Given /J, the following individual response coefficient estimates can then be obtained 
/J, = /J + /\ ,, x,' [ X, A,, xr ( Y, - X, /J) i= I, ... ,N (22) 
where /\_
11 
is a diagonal matrix consisting of the diagonal elements (; 11 , ... , ;;:,:) of the 
,, 
variance matrix 0 (Kalirajan and Obwona, 19946 ). 
As mentioned in Kalirajan and Obwona (1994b), the applicability of the random 
coefficient model to the data can be examined using the likelihood ratio test proposed by 
Swammy ( 1971 ). If the parameter coefficient are random, then ;\ 11 will contain non zero 
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ele111ents . Thus, the test for randomness is H0 : J\ 11 =O and H8 : A11 :;z::O . The test statistic is 
based on Swammy's test with one period only. 
Estimating the potential maximum output and firm's efficiency 
The rando111 coefficient regression model not only provides BLU esti111ates of the 
coefficients 0/s. More importantly, it provides a way of estimating production functions 
which i111ply a notion of maximality. 
The 111axi111u111 values of the individual coefficients: 
/J;. = 111 ax (/Jk, ) i= I , ... ,N ; k= 1, ... ,K (23) 
I 
111ay be viewed as representing the 111axi111um production response coefficients obtainable 
by following the 1best practice technique' of applying the inputs. The ratio of actual 
response coefficient to the 111axi111u111 response coefficient for each observation can be 
used as a 111easure of the input specific technical efficiency of a firm, that is, how efficient 
a firm is in utilizing a particular input (Kalirajan and Obwona, 1994a, 19946). 
Based on the maximu111 values of the coefficients ( /J: 's), the frontier production function 
can be esti111ated as follows : 
,._,. 
,;, /J >\< Y; = L k X ik i= l, ... ,N (24) 
k = l 
A 111easure of the overall production efficiency of each individual fir111 can be obtained by 
comparing its actual output Y; with its estimated potential output r:, that is, ~: . 
A 111easure of allocative efficiency, or the extent of under-utilization or over-utilization 
of the various inputs or factors of production can also be defined by the ratio ~ k;, 
X ki 
where the /y ki ' s represent the optimal input levels derived fro111 the first order condition 
of the profit 111axirnization proble111, given /J: 's (Kalirajan and Obwona, 19946 ). 
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Co111puter Progra111 TERAN 
The generalized least squares esti1nates of the parameters of the random coefficient 
regression model described above involves an iterative procedure which can be very ti1ne 
consuming. The TERAN program written by Zhang and Obwona ( 1993) was designed 
to make the estimation procedure easier. The program is written in standard Fortran 77 
for use in UNIX and VAX based 1nainframe computers and IBM compatible PC. 
TERAN Version 1.0 is designed to estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function in 
logarith1ns. It follows a six step procedure in estimating the firm specific random 
coefficients, the frontier coefficients, and the technical and allocative efficiencies. The six 
steps are: 
1. Estimation of the mean response coefficients. 
2. Estimation of the linear unbiased predictors of the residuals and the vanance 
1natrix. 
3. Estimation of the finn-specific response coefficient vectors . 
4. Calculation of the input-specific technical efficiencies. 
5. Calculation of the firm-specific frontier output, and firm specific technical 
efficiencies. 
6. Calculation of specific allocative efficiencies, which are optional, and can be 
calculated only for panel data. 
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Local governn1ent revenues 
Introduction 
Local governments derive their income from both local and external sources. This 
chapter focuses on local or own- source revenues. Its main objective is to assess revenue 
capacities and efforts of local governments . Section 2 presents the legal revenue raising 
powers of local governments. Section 3 analyses the growth and composition of local 
government revenues during the period 1986-92. Section 4 examines the variation in 
revenues across local goverrunent units using the province as the unit of analysis . Section 
5 looks into the socioeconomic characteristics of the various provinces, which are 
viewed a priori as being related to revenue capacities. Section 6 builds on the 
discussions in the preceding sections, and empirically exa1nines revenue capacities and 
efforts of local governments using the random coefficient regression model. The chapter 
.concludes with a swnmary of the significant results and findings on revenue capacity and 
efforts of local governments. 
Legal Framework of Revenue Raising Powers of Local Governments 
The revenue raising powers of local governments are defined by laws enacted by the 
central government. Until 1991 , Presidential Decree No . 464 (1974), also known as the 
Real Property Tax Code, provided the framework for local government taxation of real 
properties, their most important form of taxation. Tax on real property consists of: basic 
real property tax, special education tax, idle land tax, and special assessment tax. 
The basic real property tax is an ad valorem tax which is levied on land, 
machinery, and buildings and other improvements. The tax liability is computed on the 
assessed value of property, which is a fraction of fair market values . The Real Property 
Tax Code prescribes the range of assessment levels and tax rates that could be imposed 
by local governments . The assessment levels vary depending on the use of property. 
Residential properties carry the lowest assessment levels, followed by agricultural, and 
commercial and industrial properties. For buildings and other improvements, the 
assessment levels vary progressively with market values. Provinces and municipalities 
outside Metro Manila could impose tax rates not lower than 0.25 of l per cent, but not 
higher than 0. 5 of 1 per cent of the assessed property value. For cities, and municipalities 
in Metro Manila, the prescribed mini1num and maximum rates were 0.5 of I per cent and 
2 per cent, respectively. · 
The proceeds of the tax collected by provincial and municipal governments in 
each municipality were shared as follows : 45 per cent to the provincial goverrunent, 45 
per cent to the municipal government, and 10 per cent to component barangays. The 
taxes collected by the city government, which are administratively independent of the 
province, were shared with its component barangays; the former received 90 per cent 
and the latter received 10 per cent. 
The Special Education Tax, earmarked for educational expenditures, consisted of 
an additional one- per cent levy on the assessed value of real properties. It used to be a 
central government imposition collected by local governments . Twenty per cent of its 
_proceeds accrued to the national treasury. The rest went to the local government unit 
where the tax was collected . 
Local govermnents could impose an additional tax on idle lands at an annual rate 
not exceeding two per cent of the assessed value. They could also impose special levies 
on properties benefited by national government projects and public works . 
Presidential Decree No . 231 (1973), also known as the Local Tax Code, codified 
all the other tax and revenue raising powers of local governments. It provided a set of 
taxes exclusive to each local government level, and a set of charges and fees that could 
be imposed at all levels. 
For the province, the most significant taxes were: transfer tax on property 
ownership, occupation tax, printing and publication tax, franchise tax, sand and gravel 
tax, amusement tax on admission, tax on peddlers, and tax on delivery trucks and vans. 
The provincial governments were also authorised to charge fees for sealing and licensing 
of weights and measures, and rentals for the use of municipal waters and rivers . 
Municipal govermnents were assigned the business and license tax, which ranked 
second to the real property tax in terms of yield . Resembling a license paid for the 
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privilege of doing business in the locality, it consists of a gross receipt tax with rates 
varying according to type of business and total sales, and an annual fixed tax levied 
without regard to the volume of sales (Bahl and Schroeder, 1983c ) . In addition to the 
business and license tax, the Local Tax Code authorised municipal governments to 
collect a wide array of . fees and charges, for example, building permit fees, marriage 
fees, and cart and sledge registration fees, in relation to their regulatory functions . 
City governments have wider taxing powers than provincial and municipal 
goverrunents. Being administratively independent of the province, they do not share in 
taxes collected by the provincial goverrunent, and have to render the services provided 
by both provincial and municipal governments in their area. Thus, they are given taxing 
powers of provinces and municipalities . 
Barangays may tax stores or retailers with fixed business in the locality. It may 
collect fees in connection with barangay owned properties; commercial breeding of 
fighting cocks, cockfights and cockpits; places of recreation; and billboards, signboards, 
neon signs and advertisements. A barangay clearance is required before a city or 
municipality can issue any business license or permit. 
In addition to the above taxes, the Local Tax Code authorised all local 
government levels to i1npose the following fees and charges : market fees , slaughter fees, 
public utility charges, tuition fees on locally operated schools, toll fees, and other charges 
on services rendered . Local governments were also deputised by the central government 
to collect a residence tax . The proceeds of the residence tax accrued to local 
goverrunents, except for five per cent remitted to the national treasury to defray the costs 
of printing residence certificates. 
Republic Act No. 7160 or Local Goverrunent Code of 1991 modified and 
incorporated the provisions of the Real Property Tax Code and the Local Tax Code. The 
power to impose real property tax was li1nited to provincial, city, and municipal 
goverrunents within Metro Manila. Municipal governments outside Metro Manila which 
serve as collection agents of the provincial government, would nonetheless still receive a 
share of real property tax collected in their jurisdiction. Of the real property tax collected 
in the municipality, 3 5 per cent went to the provincial government, 40 per cent to the 
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municipal government, and 25 per cent to the component barangays. In the cities which 
are ad1ninistratively independent of the province, the city govermnent retained 70 per 
cent of the revenues, and its component barangays received 30 per cent. The same 
applied to municipalities in Metro Manila. The Special Education Tax, which used to be 
a national tax whose · proceeds were shared with the central government, was 
transformed into a purely local tax. 
The Local Government Code of 1991 amended the tax rates and assessment 
levels for real properties. For the province, the tax rate ceiling was increased to one per 
cent of assessed property value, that is, the equivalent of the combined rate ceilings of 
provinces and municipalities under the previous law. For cities and n1unicipalities 111 
Metro Manila, the maxi1num rate was increased to two per cent. The increase 111 
allowable rates, however, was not accompanied by similar changes in the assessment 
levels . In general, the assessment levels were decreased, particularly for properties used 
for residential purposes. 
Table 6.1 Comparison of prescribed assessment levels for basic real property tax, 
Presidential Decree No. 464 (1974) and Republic Act. No. 7160 (1991), 
Philippines (per cent of fair market value) 
Type/Use of property Real Property Tax Code 
(Presidential Decree No. 464) 
New Local Government Code 
(Re_Qublic Act No. 7160) Land 
Residential 
Agricultural 
Commercial/Industrial 
Timberland 
Machineries 
Residential 
Agricultural 
Commercia I/Industrial 
Buildings and other structures 
Residential 
Agricultural 
Conunercial/Industrial 
30 
40 
50 
n.a. 
70 
60 
80 
15-80 
40- 80 
50- 80 
Timberland n.a. 
Sources: Philippines, 1974. Presidential Decree No. 464 (1974) 
Philippines, 1991. Republic Act No. 7160 (1991) 
20 
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40 
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The Local Governn1ent Code of 1991 introduced minor modifications to the tax 
assigmnents prescribed by the Local Tax Code. The list of provincial taxes and charges 
was maintained except for fees for the licensing of weights and measures, and rentals for 
the use of municipal waters which were transferred to municipal goverrunents. Provincial 
governments lost their share in the proceeds of residence/community taxes which were 
transformed from a central government tax to a purely municipal/city tax . Municipal 
goverrunents maintained control over all taxes previously assigned to the1n. In addition 
they would receive a share in provinces' sand and gravel tax, but would lose their share in 
the occupation tax whose proceeds now accrue solely to provincial govermnents. As in 
previous laws, city governments were authorised to i1npose both provincial and 
1nunicipal taxes. 
In general, the prescribed tax rate ceilings under the new Local Government 
Code were higher. Furthermore, local goverrunents were authorised to increase the 
prescribed rates, provided that increases were made not 1nore often than once every five 
_years and did not exceed 10 per cent of previous rates . In the case of fees and charges, 
-all the prescribed ceilings were removed, giving local goverrunents greater flexibility . 
Local Government Revenues: trends and patterns 
Total local government income, excluding borrowing and extraordinary receipts 1, had 
grown at an average annual n01ninal growth rate of 20 per cent from P8 .6 billion in 1986 
to P27 billion in 1992. However, this growth was mainly accounted for by transfers from 
the central government. Transfers were around one-half of local goverrunent income. 
Central govermnent transfers had an average growth rate of 24 per cent, exceeding the 
growth rate of total inco1ne. Inco1ne from local sources increased by an average rate of 
only 17 per cent. 
1
Extraordinary receipts consist of irregular advances, loans and transfers from other local government 
units and government corporations. 
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Table 6.2 Regular sources of local government revenues, Philippines, 1986-92 
Average 
Current amount (billion pesos) annual growth 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 rate 1 (%2 Local sources 4.6 4.9 5.5 7.8 9.3 10.5 11.0 . 16.7 . External sources 4.0 4.0 7.8 7.4 9.7 12.9 16.0 24.0 Total income 8.6 8.9 13.3 15.2 19.0 23.4 27.0 20.4 
Distribution (per cent) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Average Local sources 53.7 55.0 41.3 51. l 48.9 45 .0 40.9 48.0 External sources 46.3 45 .0 58.7 48.9 51. l 55 .0 59.l 52.0 Total income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 100.0 Note: 1Estimated using ordinary least squares regression 
Source of basic data: Philippines, Commission on Audit, 1986-92, Annual Reports 1986-92. 
Real property taxes were the major sources of locally generated revenues. In 
1986 real property taxes accounted for 45 per cent of local source revenues, and 24 per 
cent of total inco1ne. However, there was a general downward trend in their share of 
local government income. From 1986 to 1992, while real property taxes grew annually at 
only an average rate of 15 per cent; their share in locally generated revenues and total 
·inco1ne plummeted to 39 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively in 1992. 
Table 6.3 Tax and non-tax sources of local government revenues, Philippines, 1986-92 1 
Average 
Current amount (billion pesos) annual growth 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 rate2 (%) Tax income 3.4 3.9 4.7 6.0 7.0 7.7 15.8 Property taxes 2.1 2.3 2.7 3.7 4.3 4.3 14.6 Taxes on goods and services 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.4 3.0 17.3 Other taxes 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 18.7 Non- tax income 1.5 1.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.4 18.7 Operating and service income 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.6 2.9 2.8 16.5 Income from public enterprises - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 45. l Others 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.4 30.1 Total 4.9 5.5 7.8 9.3 10.5 11.0 16.7 
Distribution (per cent) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 /\.verage Tax income 70 70 60 65 66 70 67 Property taxes 43 41 35 40 41 39 41 Taxes on goods and services 23 25 22 22 23 27 24 OU1er taxes 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 Non-tax income 30 30 40 35 34 30 33 Operating and service income 27 26 26 27 27 25 26 Income from public enterprises 0 0 l 1 1 2 l Others 3 3 13 6 6 4 5 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Note: 1See Appendix 6.1 for more details. 
2Estimated using ordinary least squares. 
Source: Basic data from Philieeines, Conunission on Audit, 1986-92, Annual Rep_orts, 1986- 92. 
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A maJor reason for the poor growth of property tax revenues is the 
undervaluation of real properties. Being an ad valoren1 tax, its effectiveness depends on 
the accuracy of va~uation (Tan, 1993). As pointed out in several studies (Tan, 1993; Bahl 
and Schroeder, 1983 b; and National Tax Research Center, 1976) property value in the 
Philippines is grossly understated. 
Many local governments do not have basic tools like tax maps which are 
necessary to establish a complete inventory of real properties. Records management are 
poor, and local assessors are inadequately trained (Lamberte, Manasan and Llanto, 1993 ; 
National Tax Research Center 1976). 
Under- assessment of property values by local goverrunents is aggravated by 
central goverrunent orders postponing reassessment and/or revaluation of properties, 
which should have been undertaken once every three years under the Real Property Tax 
Code. The last general revision of land values was in 1983 (Lamberte, Manasan and 
Lian to, 1993 ). This is critical to the growth of property tax revenue. Since tax rates 
. cannot be increased beyond the ceilings prescribed in the Code, the principal source of 
revenue growth is in the tax base which come about through the reassessment of real 
properties (Bahl and Schroeder, 1983 b ) . 
The real property tax base is also eroded by central government- mandated 
exemptions. The Real Property Tax Code exempts goverrunent owned and controlled 
corporations, and certain private properties ( classified as religious and charitable 
institutions, preferred invest1nents, and low income individuals) from payment of 
property taxes. Assessed value of exempted properties averaged 19 per cent of total 
assessed value during the period 1986-92. 
The growth of real property tax revenue has also been hampered by poor 
collection. The collection rate, that is, the ratio of actual collections to estimated 
collectibles, averaged 50 per cent. Such mediocre performance is attributed to inefficient 
record keeping, tax payers' low consciousness of their obligation, and failure to impose 
penalties on delinquent tax payers. 
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Table 6.4 Collection efficiency of local governments for basic real property tax, 
Philippines, 1986-92 (per cent) 
1986a 1987b 1988 1989c 1990c 1991c 
Province and 49 .8 49 .6 49.4 55.9 53 .6 54 .1 
municipality 
City 53.4 56.7 60.7 61.0 63 .3 65 .1 All local 51.4 52.8 54 .3 58 .2 57.7 58.9 _government levels 
Note: a Provinces of northern Samar and Tawi-tawi not included due to lack of data 
b Provinces of Sulu and Tawi-tawi not included due to lack of data. 
c Province of Lanao de! Sur not included due to lack of data. 
Source: Philippines, Comnussion on Audit, 1986-92, Annual Reports, 1986- 92. 
1992c Average 
44 .3 50.9 
56 .4 59.5 
49 .7 54 .7 
Tan (1993) notes that the success of decentralisation depends heavily on the 
effectiveness of the real property tax ad1nirustration. Property tax represents a sigruficant 
revenue base whose potential has not been utilised on a par with other countries . 
Increasing revenue from property taxes is essential. Tax on land, for instance, is 
one of a very few taxes which has a potentially desirable effect both on equity and 
efficiency. Given a fixed supply of land, the full burden of a land tax is borne by the 
owner-the opti1nal use of the land remains unchanged though its value falls . 
Furthermore, the reduction in the capitalised value of land resulting from the_tax tends to 
discourage wealth holding in an idle form (Tan, 1993). 
Because the structure of the real property tax is defined under various laws, 
particularly the new Local Government Code, greater revenue collection efficiency and 
equity suffer. Assessment rates on all types of properties used for residential purposes 
were reduced under the Code. In 1992, when the new Code first took effect, property 
tax revenues increased by less than 1 per cent compared to their annual average growth 
rate of 15 per cent during 1986-1992. Thus, pending a general revision of the schedule 
of fair market values of properties and/or new local ordinances levying higher tax rates, 
there could be a reduction in property tax revenues . Moreover, the lower assessment 
levels on properties used for residential purposes, relative to properties used for 
agricultural, con1mercial and industrial purposes, could encourage their shift to the 
former uses and discourage their use for the latter uses, resulting in productivity loses 
(Tan, 1993). 
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Taxes on goods and services represent the second category of local taxes. This 
category includes business taxes and licenses, which are the second most important local 
govermnent taxes, and a number of1ninor local taxes (See Appendix 6.1). From 1986 to 
1992, taxes on goods and services performed only marginally better than real property 
taxes with an average annual growth rate of 17 per cent. Their share in total local income 
also stagnated, decreasing by one per cent during the period. 
Like real property taxes, the taxes on goods and services are highly regulated . 
The central goverrnnent prescribes the rates that can be i1nposed by local governments. 
Thus, revenue growth depends mainly on increases in the revenue bases and collection 
efficiency. However, the detennination of the tax liabilities of business establislunents is 
proble1natic due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate estimates of annual gross receipts. 
Local treasurers depend mainly on business owners' sworn state1nents of gross receipts 
which can be severely under-reported (Bahl and Schroeder, 1983c). 
The revenue growth of business taxes and licenses is also hainpered by low 
.elasticity resulting fro1n the use of unit tax rates instead of ad valoren1 rates (Manasan, 
1992), and the regressive structure of tax rates (Bahl and Schroeder, 1983 c ) . The 
amount of tax liability is fixed. For exa1nple it is Pl50 a year for establislunents with 
gross sales less than P 10,000 and P200 a year for those with gross receipts more than 
Pl0,000 but less than Pl5,000. This makes the taxes less responsive to changes in gross 
receipts than those based on percentage of receipts. Effectively, the tax structure also 
charges lower rates for businesses with higher levels of gross receipts . Revenue growth 
would have been 1nore responsive to growth in gross receipts if the effective tax rates 
were progressive or simply flat. 
Non- tax revenues accounted for an average annual share of 33 per cent of locally 
generated revenues during the period 1986-1992. Their growth was higher than tax 
revenues during this period, and in previous years. Manasan (I 992a) noted that the 
contribution of operating and service income was only 16 per cent in 1976. Although its 
growth stagnated in 1991 and 1992, an average share of around 26 per cent during the 
period 1986-1992 was still an improvement. She explained that this could be attributed 
to fewer central goverrunent restrictions on service or user charges. In principle, it is 
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politically and administratively easier to increase these rates and collect the revenues, 
because of the closer link to the services provided . 
The cities generated the highest share in revenue followed by municipalities and 
provinces. There were no corresponding data for the barangays. The cities generated an 
average of 43 per cent of local government income from 1986 to 1992, while the 
municipalities and the · ·provinces accounted for 3 8 and 19 per cent, respectively. The 
municipalities, however, had the highest growth rate in revenues. Their share in local 
govermnent revenues grew from 3 7 per cent in 1986 to 42 per cent in 1992. The share of 
municipal governments in total local revenues in 1992 surpassed the share of cities, albeit 
by a marginal a1nount. 
Table 6.5 Revenue breakdown by local government level, Philippines, 1986-92 
Average 
Current amount (billion pesos) annual growth 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 rate 1 (2er cent) All levels 4.6 4.9 5.5 7.8 9.3 10.5 11. l 16.7 Province 0.8 0.9 0.9 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 16.7 Municipality 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.7 18.4 · City 2.1 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.9 4.5 4.6 15 .2 
Distribution (per cent) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Average All levels 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Province 18 18 17 27 20 18 17 19 Municipality 37 38 39 34 38 39 42 38 Cit~ 45 45 44 39 42 43 41 43 Note: 1Estimated using ordinary least squares. 
Source: Ph.ili22ines, Commission on Audit, 1986-92. Annual ReE_orts 1986- 92. 
The cities' domination of locally generated revenues is not surprising; they have 
greater taxing powers and more productive revenue bases than either provinces or 
n1u1licipalities. It is widely held that the revenue base of a govermnent unit is directly 
related to the level of econo1nic development in its area. Cities are by definition centres 
of economic and commercial activities. Most municipalities are rural, and their economic 
activities are largely informal and agricultural. As economic developtnent becomes more 
evenly spread, it is expected that the cities' dominance is likely to di1ninish. This is 
indicated by the growing contribution of municipalities to local government income. 
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Variations in Local Governrnent Revenues 
Per capita own- source revenues of local governments varied considerably, and 
were distributed unequally across provinces. As Figure 6.1 illustrates, 14 provinces 
belonging to the highest quintile accounted for 48 per cent, almost half of total per capita 
local government revenues, while the remaining 52 provinces accounted for 52 per cent. 
The group of provinces in the lowest quintile generated only seven per cent of per capita 
local government revenues2. 
Figure 6.1 Provincial distribution of local government own-source revenue 
by quintile1, 1991 
7% 
11 % 
48% 
14% 
Note: 
Source: 
1 
Quintiles are arranged from poorest to richest. 
Basic data based on Philippines, Commission on Audit working papers ( 199 1) 
Table 6.6 further illustrates the variability in per capita local goverrnnent revenues 
across provinces. Metro Manila had the highest per capita tax revenue amounting to 
P407, while Sulu had the lowest at only P6. In terms of non- tax revenues, Zambales 
ranked first with P379 per capita, and Masbate ranked last with PS per capita. Manila 
had PI 07 per capita, ranking fifth in this revenue source. Overall, Metro Manila had the 
highest per capita revenue, amounting to PS 14. This was 5 times the mean per capita 
2
See Appendix 6.2 for the list of provinces. 
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revenue of PI 05, and 40 ti1nes the lowest per capita revenue generated in Sulu, which 
a1nounted to only Pl3 . 
Table 6.6 shows the different sources of local goverrnnent revenues and their 
variability across provinces. The coefficient of variation, the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean, ·provides a relative measure of the variability of the different 
sources of local govermnent income across provinces. Non-tax income varies more than 
tax inco1ne. Income fro1n public enterprises, which consists of interest and dividend 
earnings fro1n local governments' investments in treasury notes, stocks and bonds, had 
the highest variability. This revenue source is accessible mainly to local governments in 
urban and COffilnercial centres; most local governments in far-flung areas have virtually 
no inco1ne from this source. 
Aside from interest income earned from planned investments, local governments 
also earn interest from cash balances deposited in banks to meet current expenditures, 
and as reserves. The local governn1ent accounting syste1n maintain a separate account for 
. tl-us interest earning under operating and service income. This is netted out of local 
goverrunent revenue in the measurement of revenue capacity because it is not necessarily 
related to a local government's ability to generate income. Bahl and Schroeder (1983a) 
note that the most possible reason for the considerable a1nount of cash balances of most 
local goverrunents is that they may not be enough to 1neet the budget requirements for 
the kinds of public services demanded by residents. Substantial cash balances can also 
arise from poor budget program1ning and the absence of invest1nent opportunities. 
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Table 6.6 Variability in per capita locally generated revenues, provincial level, Phili11pines, 1991 
Revenue sources Maximum Minimum Mean Standard Coefficient 
(2esos) (2esos) (2esos) deviation of variation 
Tax income 406 .63 6.48 58.18 54.88 0.94 Property taxes 239.10 l.33 34.97 34.87 1.00 Taxes on goods & services 143 .33 2.21 18.78 18.56 0.99 Other taxes 27.27 0.36 4.43 4.63 1.05 Non- tax income 378.95 5.03 47.04 52.82 1.12 Operating and service income 1 361.27 3.76 31.08 44 .16 1.42 Interests 62.84 0.00 8.22 10.31 1.25 Income from public enterprises 53.41 0.00 1.18 6.61 5.60 Others2 98.93 0.00 6.56 15.81 2.41 Total local revenues 513.63 12.85 105.22 89.99 0.86 Net local revenue3 483 .04 12.81 90.44 79.72 0.88 
Note: 1 Without interest 
2Others consists of income earned from sale of scrap materials and fixed assets 3Net local revenue equals total local revenue less interest and 0U1ers. Source: Author's calculations 
Provinces with high tax revenues tended to have high non-tax revenues as well. 
Table 6. 7 shows a positive correlation among the major categories of local government 
, revenues . The only exception are the non-tax inco1ne categories of operating and service, 
· and public enterprises, but this is insignificant. The correlation was most significant in the 
two major categories of tax revenues (property taxes and taxes on goods and services). 
Table 6.7 Correlation matrix, local government revenue sources, Phili11pines, 1991 
Tax revenue Property Taxes on goods Non- tax Operating and Income from taxes and services revenue service mcomc public (TR) (PT) (TGS) (NTR) (OSI) enterprises 
(IPE) TR 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.40 0.24 0.24 PT 1.00 0.89 0.38 0.21 0.26 TGS 1.00 0.43 0.30 0.19 NTR 1.00 0.87 0.31 OSI 
1.00 -0.01 IPE 
1.00 Source: Author's calculations 
Variation in Socioeconon1ic Conditions 
As discussed in Chapter 5, govermnent revenues are determined by the interaction of 
their revenue capacities and revenue efforts. This section analyses the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the various provinces, which are regarded a priori to be related to 
114 
.......111111 
revenue capacities. This analysis provides the basis for the empirical investigation in the 
next section, which provides estimates of revenue capacities and revenue efforts of each 
province. 
Per capita personal income, is probably the 1nost commonly used indicator of the 
revenue base of a jurisdiction. In several studies, per capita personal inco1ne is taken as a 
proxy for the revenue capacity of a jurisdiction. This, however, seems inappropriate in 
the Philippines because the jurisdictions do not have access to inco1ne taxes . Per capita 
personal income, moreover, excludes other potential taxable resources, such as real 
property which is the largest revenue base of local government in the Philippines. This 
underscores that per capita personal income cannot be taken as a proxy _for the revenue 
capacity of local goverrunent. Nevertheless, per capita personal income is regarded as a 
major detenninant of the local goverrunents' revenue capacities, for the most obvious 
reason that people pay taxes out of their income (Akin, 1973). It also provides a general 
indicator of the level of potentially taxable economic activities in a jurisdiction. 
The average fa1nily inco1ne and average per capita income are the statistics 
-available on per capita personal income with a provincial breakdown. These statistics are 
based on the 1991 Family Inco1ne and Expenditure Survey of the National Statistics 
Office. The survey interviewed a national sample of about 26,000 households-dee1ned 
sufficient to provide reliable estimates of income and expenditure levels for each 
province, key cities and key 1nunicipalities. 3 The estimates included both cash and in kind 
inco1ne, using either market prices or farm gate prices to impute value to the latter. As 
with other surveys of this nature, the accuracy of these statistics may be affected by 
sampling and non-sampling biases. The selection of the sample may be affected by 
sampling variations. Respondents may not accurately remember their inco1ne for the past 
6 months, 4 or 1nay not have full infonnation of the income earned by all members of the 
household. They may also deliberately under or over report their income, or they may be 
reluctant to reveal their true income. 
3There were 23 key cities out of 60 cities and 7 key municipalities out of 1,532 municipalities. Such data limitations are a major reason for choosing the province as the unit of analysis. 4The survey adopts the "shuttle type" of data colJection wherein the samples are interviewed twice, using the half-year period preceding U1e interview as the reference period. This is designed to minimise the memory bias and to capture the seasonally of income pattern. 
115 ,..... 
The aforementioned limitations of average family income ( or per capita personal 
income) suggest the importance of considering other socioeconomic factors, particularly 
those directly related to the tax or revenue bases of local governments . 
Because of its impo11ance in tax revenue, the market value of real properties is an 
important detenninant of revenue capacities of local governments. The revenue capacity 
of an area, for example, the province, in relation to this important tax would ideally be 
represented by the aggregated market value of properties, with different weights 
assigned to each type or use of property, given that each type carries different 
assessment levels. Furthermore, different types of properties vary in their taxability, 
because of the potential exportability of the tax levied (Auten, 1972a; Ladd, 1975). The 
burden of property tax on co1nn1ercial or industrial properties, for example, could be 
passed on to residents of other jurisdictions through the pricing of their produce. 
·unfortunately, the only data available on property values are the assessed values 
which are published in the Annual Report of the Commission on Audit. The assessed 
. property values are updated annually to account for the addition of new buildings, 
-machinery and other properties. However, they are likely to be grossly undervalued due 
to postpone1nents in the reassessment of property values; the last general reassessment 
of land values was in 1983. The accuracy of assess1nent also depends on the capability 
and/or integrity of local assessors. Although the law provides a highly systematised set 
of guidelines for the valuation of properties, a considerable amount of subjectivity can 
enter into the detennination of assessed valuation (Bahl and Schroeder, 1983 b ). 
The gross receipts of business establishments could be another i1nportant 
indicator of local revenue capacity. The business license tax and fees of local 
goverrunents are levied on the basis of gross receipts. These data, however, are not 
available. The only data that are available are the nu1nber of establishments. It is 
important to note that business entities with 20 or few employees, and assets not 
exceeding PS00,000, are exempted from business license tax and fees, and other national 
and local taxes5 by Republic Act No. 6810 (Magna Carta for Countryside and Barangay 
5This is with the exception of real property and capital gains taxes, import duties and other taxes on imported articles. 
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Business Enterprises) . The available data allows segregation of establishments with more 
than 20 employees. The li1nitation of using the nu1nber of establish1nents as a proxy for 
the base of the business and license tax is that it i1nplies that all establishments generate 
the same an1ount of gross receipts. 
The other socioeconomic characteristics that could affect local revenue capacities 
include: degree of urbanisation, industrial develop1nent, road density, number of 
registered vehicles, population density, population growth rate, land area, and percentage 
of renter households. 
Urbanisation and industrial development (represented by the percentage of 
population in urban areas and non-agricultural occupations, respectively) are two 
conunonly used indicators of revenue capacity, in conjunction with per capita personal 
inco1ne. Urbanisation and industrial development are generally associated with higher 
property values, and more potentially taxable econo1nic and co1n1nercial activities 
belonging to the formal sector, where tax administration is easier. Thus, the higher the 
degree of urbanisation and industrial development of the province, the higher its revenue 
capacity. 
Road density represents a general indicator of the level of infrastructure 
development in a province. Infrastructure develop1nent could significantly enhance the 
value of real properties. Cognisant of this, local governments are autho~ised to levy a 
special assessment tax on properties that benefit from public works. Infrastructure 
develop1nent could also be a catalyst of economic development. In a study of regional 
growth in the Philippines, Lamberte, Manasan and Llanto (1993) noted a significant 
positive relationship between the level of econotnic develop1nent and infrastructure 
development of the regions. Thus, it is expected that provinces with high infrastructure 
development, as indicated by road densities, would have greater revenue capacity. 
The number of registered vehicles, particularly trucks, utility vans and tricycles, is 
another indicator of the level of economic activities in the province. It could not be 
expected, however, to have the same degree of importance in determining the revenue 
capacity of local governments as in other countries where vehicle registration is a state or 
provincial imposition . In the Philippines, vehicle registration except for tricycles, remains 
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a national govermnent tax. Local govermnents can only i1npose an annual fixed tax on 
trucks, vans and other vehicles used by businesses. 
Population density and population growth rate are de1nographic factors that 
provide complementary indicators of economic development. It is generally assumed that 
areas with a high population density and population growth rate are wealthier and have a 
faster rate of econo1nic growth, thereby attracting investors and job-seekers. Therefore, 
it is expected that these factors would vary positively with local government revenue 
capacities. 
The ratio of renter-households to total number of households in the province is a 
proxy variable designed to capture the exportability of local taxes. It is assumed that 
many of these renter-households are 1nigrants. The 1990 Census of Population and 
Housing indicates that 6.8 per cent of 52 million household members had changed 
residence in the last 5 years: 1. 7 per cent had resided in another city or municipality of 
the sa1ne province; 4. 4 per cent, in another province and O. 1 per cent, in a foreign 
. country. In view of the close family ties and highly personal nature of local politics in the 
-Philippines, tnost of these migrants maintain their voter's registration in their original 
place of residence. Thus, it is expected that locally elected government officials would be 
more inclined to collect taxes and fees on these residents. The existence of renter-
households also diffuses the burden of taxation. In the case of real property tax for 
example, owners and renters are likely to share in the burden, thereby, rendering them 
more disposed to pay their obligation. 
The statistics for these socioeconomic characteristics, except for roads, registered 
vehicles and land area were based on Census Facts and Figures: 1990 published by the 
National Statistics Office (1993). The statistics on roads and registered vehicles were 
derived from the 1991 adtninistrative reports of the Department of Public Works and 
Highways, and the Land Transportation Office, respectively. The statistics on land area 
were based on the reports of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. To 
enhance comparability, the socioecono1nic statistics for each province were standardised, 
1nostly by converting them into per capita tenns, which is consistent with the expression 
used for revenues in the preceding section. 
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Metro Manila exhibited the highest statistics in all socioeconomic and 
demographjc characteristics, except for population growth rate and land area. The 
average family income in Metro Manila was P 138,256, twice the average income of all 
families in the Philippines, which was estimated at P65, 186. Its taxable per capita 
assessed property value· of P 14,196 was 5 times the mean per capita assessed value of 
P2, 772, and 40 times the lowest taxable per capita assessed property value in Sulu, 
which amounted to only P349 (see Appendix 6.3). 
The considerable variations in the socioeconomic conditions of the provinces. are 
illustrated in Table 6.8 by the range (indicated by the maximum and minimum values) and 
the standard deviation of some selected statistics. The provinces differed most 
significantly in population density as indicated by the coefficient of variation, which is 
equal to 3. 7. There were relatively fewer differences in average fa1nily income, with the 
coefficient of variation of 0.4, being half the variation in taxable assessed property value 
of0.8. 
Table 6.8 Variation in socioeconomic characteristics, provincial level, Phili))pines, 1990 and 1991 
Characteristic Maximum Minimum Mean Standard 
deviation 
Ave. family incomea 138256.40 27386 .70 52112.70 20690.00 
Assessed property valueb 14196.30 348.61 2771.90 2219.90 
Total road densityC 4.80 0.16 0.70 0.60 
Population in urban areasd 100.00 9.00 36.64 20.18 
Renter householdse 0.30 0.01 0.04 0.05 
Population densityf 12497.00 30.00 409.00 1522.00 
Population growth rateg 5.81 0.13 2.09 1.08 
Land areah 14896.30 209 .28 3970.00 2763 .30 
Notes: a in peso units; btaxable property value, in pesos per capita; 
Ctotal road length per square kilometers dper cent of total population; 
eper cent of total households; fpopulation per square kilometer 
Coefficient 
of variation 
0.40 
0.80 
0.86 
0.55 
1.11 
3.72 
0.52 
0.70 
gamma! geometric growth rate between 1980 and 1990; h in square kilometers 
Sou recs: Basic data for assessed property based on Philippines, Commission on Audit, 1991. 
Annual Report J 99 J. 
Basic data for roads from the Department of Public Works and Highways. 
All other data based on Philippines, National Statistics Office, 1990 Census of 
Population and !lousing; and Philippines, National Statistics Office, 1993, Census 
Facts and Fig_ures 1990. 
Revenue Capacity and Revenue Effort 
Local government revenues, net of interest income from cash balances deposited in 
banks and irregular income from the sale of scrap materials and fixed assets, are used as 
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the basis for estimating the revenue capacities of provinces. Per capita net revenues of provmces were regressed on various socioecono1nic characteristics under different functional forms using ordinary least squares. The log linear form of the regression equation yielded the best result. Of the various independent variables, only per capita assessed value, percentage of renter households, registered vehicles per capita, and business establishments per capita, appeared to have coefficients which were significant at the five per cent level (Appendix 6.4). These characteristics are the closest to the revenue bases assigned to local goverrunents, emphasising that the importance of the assigrnnent of revenue raising powers or access to the revenue bases. The coefficients of the significant explanatory variables were then tested if they were fixed across observations using the Random Coefficient Regression Model. The Breusch- Pagan test statistic was calculated to be 23. 78 (with 4 degrees of freedo1n). This rejected the null hypothesis that the coefficients were fixed at the 5 per cent level of significance, justifying the use of the rando1n coefficient regression 1nodel in lieu of ordinary least . squares. 
The estimated response coefficients of per capita revenue to the socioeconomic characteristics, except for the number of establish1nent per capita, vary for each province. Table 6.9 shows the range of estimates of the actual coefficients and mean coefficients. As the estimated revenue function is in Cobb-Douglas fonn, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as either the partial elasticities of revenue to each characteristic, or the share of each characteristic in the revenue generated. On average, per capita assessed value appeared to account for the highest share of per capita revenue at 34 per cent, confinning its position as the major local govermnent revenue source . 
Table 6.9 Range of estimates of the actual coefficients and mean response coefficients Variable Range of actual coefficients Mean coefficients Constant 5.8369 - 6.4999 6.0204 Per capita assessed value 0.3298 - 0.3782 0.3440 Percentage of renter-households 0.1187 - 0.1248 0.1217 Registered vehicles per capita 0.2447 - 0.3338 0.3097 Establishtnents per capita 0.2902 - 0.2902 0.2902 Number of observations : 66 
Source: Author's calculations 
120 
The range of actual coefficients show that Zambales was the most efficient in 
generating revenues out of its assessed property values with a regression coefficient of 
0.38 . For a percentage point increase in per capita assessed value, its per capita revenue 
increased by 0.3 8 percentage points. Aklan was the least efficient in exploiting this 
revenue base with a regression coefficient of 0.32 . Abra extracted the most revenue out 
its renter-households as indicated by its highest regression coefficient; Zambales did not 
capitalise so much on this aspect, registering the lowest coefficient. As regards registered 
vehicles per capita, the Mountain Province had the highest coefficient, while Bohol had 
the lowest. The number of establishments per capita was utilised to generate revenues at 
the sa1ne extent in all provinces. 
The highest estimated coefficients indicate the 1naxi1num contribution of each 
socioecono1nic characteristic to the revenues of local governments, based on their best 
efforts or practices. These coefficients were used to calculate the revenue capacity or 
l)laximum revenue that could be generated in each province. The revenue effort was then 
calculated by dividing the actual revenue with the estimated revenue capacity. Figure 6.2 
and Table 6.10-11 provides a comparative sum1nary of the actual revenues, and 
estimated revenue capacities and revenue efforts of the various provinces, which are 
reported in Appendix 6.5. 
Table 6.10 
Maximum 
Mini1num 
Mean 
Con1parison of actual revenues, revenue capacity and rev_enue effort Actual revenue Revenue capacity Revenue effort (pesos per capita) (pesos per capita) (per cent) 483 1115 100 13 
91 
26 
171 
35 
54 Source: Author's calculation 
Metro Manila had the highest actual revenue of P483 per capita. This was 
attributed mainly to its high revenue capacity of P 1,115 per capita, the highest among the 
provinces. Its revenue effort was very low at 43 per cent, which was in the lowest 
quintile, and only 8 percentage points higher than the province of Pampanga with the 
lowest revenue effort of 3 5 per cent. Bohol and Zambales ranked first in revenue effort 
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at 100 per cent. With its high revenue effort Bohol, managed to be in the fourth quintile 
in actual revenues in spite of being only in the second quintile in revenue capacity. 
Zambales had one of the highest revenue capacities, second only to Metro Manila. As 
expected, Zambales also ranked second to Metro Manila in tenns of actual revenue per 
capita. 
Table 6.11 Spearman's rank correlation coefficients of actual revenue, revenue capacity 
and revenue effort 
Actual revenue Revenue capacity Revenue effort 
Actual revenue 
Revenue capacity 
Revenue effort 
Source: Author's calculation 
1.00 0.93 
1.00 
0.13 
-0 .17 
1.00 
The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient shows that there was a highly 
significant positive correlation between actual revenue and esti1nated revenue capacity. 
Estimated revenue effort also appeared to be positively related to actual revenue but this 
was not statistically significant. As shown in Metro Manila, Cavite, Laguna and some 
other provinces, actual revenue could be high even with low revenue effort so long as 
revenue capacity was high. The provinces with high revenue capacity tended to have low 
revenue effort, as indicated by their negative correlation but this was not statistically 
significant. 
Sununary 
The revenue raising powers of local governments are defined by laws enacted by the 
central government. The real property tax, the most significant of all local taxes, is 
shared by all local govermnent units. The other local taxes are assigned exclusively to 
specific local goverrunent levels. The major provincial goverrunent taxes are transfer tax 
on propetiy ownership, occupation tax, printing and publication tax, franchise tax, sand 
and gravel tax, amusement tax, and tax on delivery trucks and vans. Municipal 
govermnents are assigned the business and license tax and a wide array of fees and 
charges such as sealing and licensing of weights, fishery rentals, etc. City governments 
are given taxing powers of provinces and municipalities . Barangays may collect taxes and 
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fees in connection with the properties they owned; commercial breeding of fighting 
cocks; billboards, neon signs and adve1iisements; and barangay clearance for the issuance 
of business licenses or permits. 
From 1986 to 1992, income from local sources increased by an average rate of 
17 per cent annually. Real property taxes which account for approximately 41 percent of 
locally sourced revenues grew annually at only an average rate of 15 per cent. The poor 
performance of real property taxes could be attributed to undervaluation of real 
properties, central goverrunent-1nandated exemptions, and poor collection. Taxes on 
goods and services performed only marginally better than real property taxes with an 
average annual growth rate of 17 per cent. Si1nilar to real property taxes, the taxes on 
goods and services suffer from under-reporting of gross receipts, and are highly 
regulated by the national government which prescribes the allowable rates. Unit tax rates 
instead of ad valorem rates are used, resulting in low growth elasticity. Non- tax 
revenues which accounted for an average annual share of 33 per cent of locally generated 
revenues, had grown at a faster rate of around 19 per cent. This could be attributed to 
fewer central government restrictions on service or user charges. In principle, it is easier 
to increase these rates and collect the revenues, because of the closer link to the services 
provided. 
Using the province as the unit of analysis, the study examined the variations in 
per capita revenues of local governments in relation to various socioeconomic 
characteristics which are regarded a priori to be related to revenue capacities. Only per 
capita assessed value, percentage of renter households, registered vehicles per capita, 
and business establishments per capita, appeared to be significantly related to per capita 
revenue. The estimated response coefficients of per capita revenue to these factors, 
except for the number of business establishments per capita, varied across observations. 
This implies that the different provinces exploit their revenue bases to varying degrees. 
The highest estimated coefficients were used to calculate the revenue capacity or 
maximum revenue that could be generated in each province. Revenue effort was 
calculated as the ratio of actual revenue to estimated revenue capacity. The analysis 
revealed a highly significant positive correlation between actual revenue and revenue 
124 
capacity. Revenue effort also appeared to be positively related to actual revenue, albeit 
statistically insignificant . Local governments could have high revenues even with low 
revenue efforts so long as their revenue capacities were high. Revenue capacity and 
revenue effo1i tended to be negatively related, but this was not statistically significant 
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Appendix 6.1 Consolidated income of local governments 
(In Peso Thousands) 
Sources of income 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Local Sou
rces 
4,615,872 4,887,381 5,499,197 7,765,842 9,268,082 10,533,439 11,043,377 Pro
perty Taxes 
2,080,112 2,123,302 2,275,902 2,736,142 3,728,184 4,293 ,251 4,320,757 Taxes on Goods & Services 1,074,350 1,146,110 1,398,622 1,719,969 2,014,726 2,370,901 2,954,867 Business Taxes & Liens. 827,635 881,965 1,063,322 1,312,163 1,594,418 1,903,544 2,291 ,280 Occupation
 Tax 
10,315 11,041 12,203 13,230 14,495 15,293 17,343 Franchise
 Tax 
5,522 5,629 4,526 8,385 10,685 7,561 100,744 Amusem
ents 
200,157 209,867 266,020 303,367 303,516 365,647 "459,091 Sand & 
Gravel 
4,962 6,579 9,549 18,715 10,517 9,922 12,972 Fines &Penalti
es 
11,154 16,770 19,917 24,319 30,724 37,625 19,695 Miscellan
eous 
14,605 14,259 23,085 39,790 50,371 31,309 53,742 
Other Taxes 
133,632 148,610 175,993 212,073 267,089 315,905 401,403 Residen
ce Tax 
108,712 116,092 133,005 160,170 193,429 226,865 288,594 
Others 
24,920 32,518 42,988 51,903 73,660 89,040 112,809 Operating & Service Income 1,225,446 1,304,183 1,445,401 1,995,536 2,545,623 2,876,363 2,788,110 Income from Public Enterprises 14,041 16,891 26,476 69,078 137,945 82,996 187,774 Miscellaneo
us 
83,332 139,729 162,475 379,583 355,452 35 I ,071 78,113 Capital
 Revenue 
4,959 8,556 14,328 653,461 219,063 242,952 312,353 External Sou
rces 
3,983,376 3,992,251 7,806,063 7,442,790 9,687,164 12,900,372 15,952,982 Share in IRA
 1 
3,249,201 3,359,350 4,202,151 4,985,669 6,994,654 9,504,040 15,378,502 Share in Nat'l Wealth 
30,626 Grants 
& Aids 
734,175 632,901 3,603,912 2,457,121 2,692,510 3,396,332 543,854 Total Income 8,599,248 8,879,632 13 ,305,260 15,208,632 18,955,246 23,433,811 26,996,359 Extraordinary Receipts 12,096 30,432 20,217 23,987 9,747 17,296 16,224 Borrowi
ngs 
49,699 13 ,413 33,382 48,032 97,419 448 ,366 420,915 Total Income & Ext. Rects. & Bor. 8,661 ,043 8,923,477 13 ,358,859 15,280,651 19,062,412 23,899,473 27,433,498 
Note: 1 
Includes inlema] revenue allotment, specific tax allolmenJ and the local government revenue stabilisation fund 
j Source: 
Basic data form Phi Ii ppines, Commission on Audi I, 19 86- 92, Annual Reports I 986-92, Quezon Ci ly 
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Appendix 6.2 Distribution of per capita local revenues, by provinces 
Provincial aggregate Local Percent Provincial aggregate Local Percent revenues share 
revenues share 
First quintile 489.03 7.04 Surigao de! Norte 74.25 1.07 Sulu 12.85 0.19 Aklan 75.09 1.08 Mountain Province 25 .03 0.36 Nueva Viscaya 76.25 1.10 Masbate 29.40 0.42 Agusan del Sur 77.15 1.11 Eastern Sarnar 36.26 0 .52 Carniguin 79.63 1.15 Sarnar (Western) 36.64 0.53 Negros Oriental 85.68 1.23 Northern Samar 38.39 0.55 Fourth quintile 1412.54 20.34 Abra 39.84 0.57 Misamis Occidental 89.93 l.~0 Ifugao 40.00 0.58 Tarlac 92.16 1.33 Southern Leyte 40.64 0.59 Palawan 93.90 1.35 Zamboanga del Norte 44.78 0.64 Aurora 95.98 1.38 Kalinga-Apayao 45 .03 0.65 Isabela 97 .50 1.40 Romblon 47.71 0.69 Pampanga 99.51 1.43 Sorsogon 52.45 0.76 La Union 113.42 1.63 Second quintile 779.60 11.23 Leyte 116.75 1.68 Maguindanao 53.87 0.78 Marinduque 117.46 1.69 Oriental Mindoro 54.74 0.79 Bohol 120.67 1.74 Antique 56.24 0.81 Agusan de! Norte 122.57 1.77 Cotabato (North) 57.59 0.83 Iloilo 124.25 1.79 Siquijor 58 .82 0.85 !locos Norte 128.45 1.85 Albay 59.93 0.86 Fifth quintile 3305.56 47.60 Catanduanes 60.60 0.87 Bulacan 133. 11 1.92 Bukidnon 60.91 0.88 Negros Occidental 145.15 2.09 Carnarines Norte 61.68 0.89 Cavite 149.95 2.16 Cagayan 61.82 0.89 Laguna 160.52 2.31 Quirino 63 .36 0.91 Lanao de! Norte 171.98 2.48 Occidental Mindoro 64.63 0.93 Batangas 172.61 2.49 Zamboanga de! Sur 65.42 0.94 Misamis Oriental 179.36 2.58 Third quintile 957.62 13.79 Bataan 189.62 2.73 Quezon 66.78 0.96 Benguet 215.93 3.11 Sultan Kudarat 66.94 0.96 Batanes 224.74 3.24 Nueva Ecija 67 .25 0.97 Cebu 255.02 3.67 Capiz 69 .72 1.00 Rizal 333.47 4.80 Pangasinan 71.82 1.03 Zambales 460.45 6.63 Ilocos Sur 73.08 1.05 ' Metro Manila 513.63 7.40 Camarines Sur 73 .97 1.07 Total 6944.34 100.00 
Source of basic data: Commission on Audit, 199 I. Working Papers 
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Appendix 6.3 Provincial socioeconomic characteristics 
Region/province AFI PAV RTD PUTM PES20 PURB PNAG PRTR AREA PDEN PGRO Metro Manila 138256.39 14196.27 4.80 0.049907 0.001216 100.00 68.40 0.30 636.00 12497.47 2.98 Cordillera Administrative Region 
Abra 30575.20 2077.48 0.59 0.01239 8.66E-05 23.90 27.30 0.01 3975.55 46.52 1.44 Benguet 85321.74 5324.03 0.67 0.021517 0.000325 53 .20 47.80 0.12 2655.38 183.00 3.19 lfugao 33497.78 690.52 0.39 0.007394 8.15E-05 10.80 23.00 0.02 2517.78 58.50 2.83 Kalinga-Apayao 51742.69 1638.42 0.19 0.005237 9.44E-05 14.50 15.00 0.01 7047.64 30.00 1.36 Mountain Province 40650.60 687.69 0.39 0.003836 7.72E-05 9.00 19.50 0.02 2097 .33 55.60 1.24 I. Ilocos Region 
Ilocos Norte 58329.30 2773 .24 0.98 0.034055 0.000158 28.30 40.70 0.02 3399.34 135.80 1.68 Ilocos Sur 58758.50 1605.25 1.12 0.015414 9.62E-05 24.10 42.40 0.01 2579.58 201.60 1.60 La Union 65797.29 1887.17 0.78 0.020685 0.000226 28.70 55.00 0.04 1493.09 367.50 1.95 Pangasinan 52874.90 1403.82 0.95 0.016342 0.000112 45.90 48.40 0.02 5368.18 376.30 2.13 II. Cagayan Valley 
Batanes 93171.54 2419.11 1.33 0.01331 0.000266 33.60 44.90 0.09 209.28 71.80 2.20 Cagayan 53453.34 1892.44 0.40 0.015607 0.000107 23.60 37.70 0.01 9002.67 92.20 1.55 Isabe!a 48784.57 2094.85 0.38 0.014085 0.000132 22.90 47.90 0.02 10664.56 101.30 2.18 Nueva Viscaya 52960.82 1369.79 0.64 0.027017 0.0001 l 23.90 56.90 0.03 3903 .87 77.10 2.22 Quirino 40508.66 1291.49 0.24 0.009016 0.000131 25.50 30.00 0.01 3057.20 37.30 3.21 III. Central Luzon 
Bataan 83048.02 5437.55 0.75 0.028361 0.000225 74.80 62.60 0.10 1372.96 310.10 2.79 Bulacan 94436.90 3108.91 1.00 0.028901 0.0003 79.90 70.70 0.10 2625 .00 573.40 3.22 Nueva Ecija 54652.51 2420.44 0.62 0.016977 9.14E-05 39.00 44.60 0.02 5284.33 248.40 2.07 Pampanga 89921.74 2658.79 1.11 0.025611 0.000209 70.60 70.60 0.06 2180.68 702.80 2.64 Tarlac 51890.73 1733.27 0.80 0.026709 0.000129 29.90 45.00 0.01 3053.45 281.60 2.25 Zambales 74678.47 4621.84 0.35 0.026816 0.000226 65.30 52.80 0.18 3714.40 151.60 2.40 IV. Southern Tagalog 
Aurora 49548.42 2291.45 0.20 0.009594 0.000165 43 .60 34.50 0.03 3239.54 43 .10 2.68 Batangas 74108.78 6905.42 1.16 0.02053 ' 0.000196 27.00 61.70 0.04 3165.81 466.50 2.32 Cavite 85416.09 4525.49 1.25 0.02626 0.000251 76.20 68.40 0.11 1287.55 895.10 4.10 Laguna 87029.35 5480.09 0.85 0.033716 0.000315 74.40 71.60 0.11 1759.73 778.70 3.48 Marinduque 67760.49 3733 .60 0.71 0.00871 0.00014 17.30 47.60 0.03 959.25 193.40 0.66 
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REGION/PROVINCE 
Occidental Mindoro 
Oriental Mindoro 
Palawan 
Quezon 
Rizal 
Romblon 
V. Bicol 
Albay 
Camarines Norte 
Camarines Sur 
Catanduanes 
Masbate 
Sorsogon 
VI. Wes tern Visayas 
Aklan 
Antique 
Capiz 
Iloilo 
Negros Occidental 
VII. Central Visayas 
Bohol 
Cebu 
Negros Oriental 
Siquijor 
VIII. Eastern Visayas 
Eastern Samar 
Leyte 
Northern Samar 
Samar (Western) 
Southern Leyte 
AFI PAV 
61131.93 1476.14 
51725.17 1142.20 
41415.19 2122.36 
47324.67 2519.19 
93046.12 7187 .28 
27386.70 893 .75 
39323.13 1334.25 
38181.76 1745.90 
45590.95 2799.86 
50965.33 1014.81 
30533 .79 1316.38 
36766.00 834.08 
48640.64 4425.01 
36182.42 2344.88 
35911.37 2850.44 
54810.48 4160.31 
47675.77 5823 .77 
31265.87 930.95 
51034.27 3957.83 
44591.08 2414.66 
28397.41 1194.19 
45972.60 1356.99 
36943.35 3969.46 
43133.33 1113.38 
31385.95 1379.51 
41028.57 1190.84 
RTD PUTM PES20 
0.27 0.009845 0.000117 
0.33 0.008367 9.09E-05 
0.17 0.011041 0.000146 
0.23 0.008242 0.000132 
0.95 0.015227 0.000358 
1.06 0.004964 8.79E-05 
0.64 0.010763 0.000148 
0.34 0.012036 9.21E-05 
0.71 0.009189 0.00011 
0.51 0.010984 0.000118 
0.25 0.003187 5.34E-05 
0.49 0.006412 8.22E-05 
0.64 0.014657 0.000124 
0.52 0.008054 7.38E-05 
0.63 0.010873 0.000116 
0.79 0.01333 0.000187 
0.74 0.014574 0.000231 
1.08 0.010458 9.28E-05 
0.74 0.025116 0.000381 
0.40 0.014069 0.000138 
0.86 0.018882 5.41E-05 
0.42 0.005964 8.81E-05 
0.61 0.010578 0.00012 
0.21 0.003665 f 7.3E-05 
0.16 0.003736 5.25E-05 
0.75 0.009222 8.7E-05 
PURB PNAG PRTR AREA PDEN PGRO 
33 .00 43.40 0.04 5879.85 48 .10 2.42 
25 .50 41.90 0.02 4364.72 126.00 2.10 
31.40 29.40 0.03 14896.26 35.50 3.58 
33.00 48.70 0.05 8706.60 157.60 1.97 
95 .50 77.30 0.13 1308.92 746.80 1.65 
22.10 50.10 0.02 1355.93 167.90 5.81 
31 .70 59.90 0.03 2552.57 354.10 1.11 
33.90 50.10 0.05 2112.49 185,10 2.41 
35.20 63.40 0.04 5266.82 248.00 1.74 
27.90 54.00 0.03 1511.48 123.70 0.65 
25.00 42.40 0.03 4047.69 148.10 0.25 
26.80 37.30 0.02 2141.44 244.20 0.44 
24.30 56.50 0.02 1817.89 209.30 1.60 
28.90 44.70 0.01 2522.01 161.10 1.65 
28.20 57.10 0.02 2633.17 221.80 1.73 
29.79 56.40 0.02 5323.97 331.61 2.10 
45.60 69.20 0.04 7926.07 284.70 1.58 
25.30 34.40 0.01 4117.26 230.30 1.64 
52.40 50.50 0.06 5088.39 520.10 2.38 
23 .90 38.20 0.01 5402.27 171.30 1.22 
12.10 27.90 0.02 343 .50 215.20 0.50 
75.90 32.80 0.01 4339.65 75.90 0.27 
32.73 48.70 0.03 6268.26 237.04 1.32 
35.40 35.70 0.02 3497.98 109.70 0.13 
25.60 39.20 0.03 5591.00 95.50 0.63 
20.50 40.50 0.01 1734.80 185.60 0.83 
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REGION/PROVINCE AFI PAV RTD PUTM PES20 PURB PNAG 
IX. Western Mindanao 
Sulu 33601.55 348.61 0.64 0.002304 5.32E-05 17.30 14.80 
Zamboanga de! Norte 33827.34 1155.71 0.54 0 .00909 7.68E-05 21.70 27.50 
Zamboanga del Sur 48281.37 1188.85 0.61 0.015152 0.000171 42.50 37.40 
X. Northern Mindanao 
Agusan del Norte 41720.85 2148.54 0.46 0.015507 0.00026 47.40 52.40 
Agusan del Sur 38389.76 2829.30 0.17 0 .00607 8.32E-05 24.40 24.30 
Bukidnon 45809.65 4309.47 0.58 0.007198 0.000108 31.40 36.10 
Camiguin 32311.72 1443.18 1.48 0.012327 0.000265 33.90 43 .20 
Misamis Occidental 34566.85 1969.01 1.21 0.016088 0.000146 31 .90 43.80 
Misamis Oriental 58507.79 3760.94 0.83 0.021481 0.000307 66.30 46.70 
Surigao de! Norte 38614.38 3309.66 0.68 0.008526 0.000101 48.00 37.60 
XII. Central Mindanao 
Cotabato (North) 34768.76 1677.90 0.27 0.013046 5.76E-05 18.10 41.90 
Lanao del Norte 41239.45 8381.25 0.61 0.011243 0.000213 24.30 38.60 
Maguindanao 50073.58 2638.75 0.36 0.005791 0.000102 32.20 38.70 
Sultan Kudarat 50185.78 2018.66 0.46 0.010706 9.41E-05 31.00 34.30 
Note: AFI - Average family income 
PAV - Per capita taxable assessed property value 
RTD - Road density 
PUTM - Registered trucks, utitlity van and motorcycles per capita 
PES20 - Establishments per capita 
PURB - Percentage of population in urban areas 
PNAG - Percentage of population in non-agricultural occupation 
PRTR - Percentage of renter-households to total households 
PDEN - Population density 
PGRO - Population growth rate 
Sources: 
Data on average family income based on Philippines, National Statistics Office, 1994. 1991 Family Income and Expenditure Survey 
Data on assessed property based on Philippines, Commission on Audit, 1991 . Annual Report 1991, Quezon City. 
Data on roads from the Department of Public Works and Highways . 
Data on registered vehicles from the Land Transportation Office, 1991 . Annual Report 1991 
Data on establishments based on National Statistics Office, 1991. Establishments survey. 
All other data based on Philippines, National Statistics Office, 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Manila; and Philippines, 
National Statistics Office, 1993, Census Facts and Figures 1990, Manila .. 
PRTR AREA PDEN PGRO 
0.01 1600.40 293.70 2.68 
0 .02 6618.11 102.30 1.42 
0.03 8052.00 191.80 2.70 
0.07 2590.29 179.70 2.45 
0.02 8965.50 46.90 4.73 
0.03 8293 .78 101.70 2.94 
0.02 229.80 279.60 1.18 
0.04 1939.32 218.80 0.94 
0 .09 3570.03 242.30 2.29 
0.02 2739.02 155.50 1.60 
0.02 6725.90 116.40 3.07 
0.08 3092.04 198.60 2.91 
0.04 4887.60 150.10 3.51 
0.02 4714.80 92.50 3.68 
Appendix 6.4 Ordinary least squares regression results of local government 
revenue 111odel 
Dependent variable: Per capita regular local government revenue 
No. of observations 66 66 66 66 66 
Regression coefficients and t-values: 
Regressors: Eq 1 Eq 2 Eq 3 
Constant 7.59*** 7.78*** 4.81 * 
3.13 3.32 1.90 
Assessed property value per capita 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.38*** 
4.33 4.72 4.71 
Average family income -0.10 -0.10 0.06 
-0.65 -0.68 0.38 
Registered vehicles per capita 0.32*** 0.35*** 
3.60 4.13 
No. establishments per capita 0.34** 0.34** 0.54*** 
2.63 2.77 4.36 
Percentage of renter-households 0.13* 0.13* 
1.80 1.88 
Total road density -0.01 -0.06 -0.008 
-0.05 -0.81 -0.12 
Population in urban areas(%) 0.10 0.003 -0.009 
0.10 0.03 -0.08 
Population in non-agriculture(%) 0.01 -0.02 0.18 
0.10 -0.13 1.20 
Population density -0.03 
-0.50 
Population growth 0.03 
0.47 
Land area 0.02 
0.28 
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.82 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.80 
Heteroscedasticity: Chi-squared (1) 0.08 0.03 0.004 
Note: 1 Preferred model specification 
*** Significantly different from zero at the I per cent level (2-tailed test) 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level (2-tailed test) 
* Significantly different from zero at the IO per cent level (2-tailed test) 
Source: author's calculation 
Eq 4 Eq 5 
4.44*** 7.31*** 
-2.81 3.31 
0.53*** 0.35*** 
6.17 5.04 
0.34** -0.10 
2.00 -0.68 
0.32*** 
4.29 
0.31 *** 
2.83 
0.13** 
2.12 
0.12 
1.57 
0.16 
1.28 
0.14 
0.78 
0.76 0.86 
0.74 0.85 
0.002 0.12 
66 
Eq 61 
6.02*** 
5.44 
0.34*** 
5.02 
0.31 *** 
4.27 
0.29*** 
2.77 
0.12** 
2.03 
0.86 
0.85 
0.09 
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Appendix 6.5 Actual revenue, revenue cafacity and revenue effort, by province 
Province Actual Revenue Province Revenue Capacity Province Revenue Effort 
(Pesos per capita) (Pesos per capita) (Percent) 
First Quintile First Quintile First Quintile 
Sulu 12.81 Sulu 25.94 Pampanga 35.3 
Mountain Province 18.78 Mountain Province 48 .28 Aldan 37.6 
Northern Samar 28.51 Masbate 54.83 Laguna 37.9 
Mas bate 29.23 Northern Samar 56.12 Cavite 38.3 
Samar (Western) 33. 13 Samar (Western) 58.53 Bukidnon 38.3 
Eastern Samar 33 .68 Romblon 60.30 Abra 38.4 
Zamboanga del Norte 36.44 lfugao 61.20 Mountain Province 38.9 
lfugao 36.72 Sorsogon 62.79 Bulacan 39.7 
Kalinga-Apayao 38.85 Eastern Samar 68 .87 Camarines Sur 42.8 
Southern Leyte 39.37 Kalinga-Apayao 72.36 Metro Manila 43 .3 
Abra 39.48 Southern Leyte 75 .56 Nueva Ecija 43 .6 
Siquijor 42.29 Zamboanga del Norte 78 .20 Camiguin 43.7 
Sorsogon 42.63 Oriental Mindoro 79 .51 Capiz 44.6 
Second Quintile Second Quintile Second Quintile 
Romblon 45 .34 Quirino 87 .15 Negros Occidental 46 . l 
Antique 46.82 Antique 89.01 Cebu 46.2 
Cotabato (North) 49.07 Siquijor 91.34 Siquijor 46.3 
Oriental Mindoro 51.92 Cotabato (North) 93.47 Zamboanga de! Norte 46 .6 
Bukidnon 52.92 Catanduanes 94.60 Quezon 46.8 
Catanduanes 53 .07 Agusan del Sur 98 .21 Isabela 47 .8 
Albay 54.05 Abra 102.80 Albay 48 .6 
Camarines Sur 56 .83 Ilocos Sur 103.53 Eastern Samar 48 .9 
Quirino 57.43 Sultan Kudarat 108.25 Sulu 49.4 
Occidental Mindoro 57.47 Occidental Mindoro 108.64 Camarines Norte 49.8 
Cagayan 58.35 Maguindanao 108.99 Zamboanga del Sur 49.8 
Nueva Ecija 58.51 Albay l I 1.22 Negros Oriental 50.2 
Capiz 58.81 Bohol 111.75 Benguet 50.6 
Third Quintile Third Quintile Third Quintile 
Camiguin 58.96 Cagayan 113.97 Northern Sarnar 50.8 
Camarines Norte 59.14 Pangasinan 114.21 Cagayan 51.2 
Maguindanao 59.73 Camarines Norte I 18 .75 Bataan 51.5 
Zamboanga del Sur 61 .93 Surigao del Norte 123.48 Nueva Viscaya 51.6 
Quezon 62.39 Zamboanga del Sur 124.36 Batanes 51.6 
lsabela 63.48 Negros Oriental 130. 11 Misamis Occidental 51.8 
Sultan Kudarat 63 .76 Capiz 131.87 Southern Leyte 52.1 
Negros Oriental 65 .32 Camarines Sur 132.79 Cotabato (North) - 52.5 
Aldan 65.92 lsabela 132.81 Antique 52.6 
Jlocos Sur 67 .92 Palawan 133. 10 Occidental Mindoro 52.9 
Pangasinan 68.76 Quezon 133.31 Masbate 53 .3 
Surigao del Norte 71.12 Nueva Ecija 134.20 Ilocos Norte 53 .5 
Nueva Viscaya 72.29 Camiguin 134.91 Kalinga-Apayao 53.7 
Fourth Quintile Fourth Quintile Fourth Quintile 
Agusan def Sur 73 .26 Aurora 135.64 Maguindanao 54.8 
Misamis Occidental 78 .84 Bukidnon 138.18 Catanduanes 56.1 
Palawan 79.73 Tarlac l 39.28 Misamis Oriental 56.1 
Aurora 80.03 Nueva Viscaya 140.11 Batangas 56.6 
Pampanga 82.04 Marinduque 150.58 Samar (Western) 56 .6 
Tarlac 84.55 Misamis Occidental 152.21 Surigao def Norte 57 .6 
Marinduque 98 .03 Leyte 157.18 La Union 58 .7 
Leyte 101.07 Aldan 175.32 Agusan del Norte 58 .7 
Batanes 105.01 La Union 184.81 Sultan Kudarat 58.9 
La Union 108.48 lloilo 186.94 Aurora 59 
Bohol 111.75 Agusan de! Norte 196.83 Palawan 59.9 
Ilocos Norte 111.75 Batanes 203 .51 Ifugao 60 
lloilo 115.34 Ilocos Norte 208 .88 Pangasinan 60.2 
Fifth Quintile Fifth Quintile Fifth Quintile 
Agusan del Norte 115.54 Pampanga 232.40 Tarlac 60.7 
Negros Occidental 116.92 Negros Occidental 253 .63 IJoilo 61.7 Bulacan 120.53 Lanao del Norte 283 .95 Lanao del Norte 62.8 Cavite 124.96 Batangas 288.96 Rizal 63 .8 Cebu 147.64 Misamis Oriental 293 .82 Leyte 64 .3 
Laguna 153.99 Bulacan 303 .61 Marinduque 65 .1 
Batangas 163.55 Cebu 319.56 Oriental Mindoro 65.3 
Misamis Oriental 164.83 Cavite 326.27 Ilocos Sur 65.6 Bataan 176.86 Bataan 343.41 Quirino 65 .9 Lanao def Norte 178.32 Benguet 353.03 Sorsogon 67 .9 Benguet 178.63 Rizal 366.35 Agusan def Sur 74.6 Rizal 233.73 Laguna 406 .29 Romblon 75 .2 Zambales 442.78 Zambales 442 .78 Zambales 100 Metro Manila 483 .04 Metro Manila 1115.56 Bohol 100 
Note: 
1 Net per capita local government revenue 
Source: Author's calculation 
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Local govern1nent expenditures 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the expenditures of local governments. The major objective is to 
come up with a measure of expenditure needs of local governments based on their actual 
behaviour. Section 2 discusses the legal aspects of local government budgets, through 
which the central goverrnnent influences local goverrnnent expenditures. Section 3 
analyses the trends and patterns of local government expenditures during the period I 986-
1992. Section 4 examines the variability in local government expenditures using the 
province as the unit of analysis. Section 5 looks into the socioeconomic factors that are 
regarded a priori to affect local government expenditures. Using multi- variate regression 
analysis, Section 6 attempts to segregate the effects of each factor, which are broadly 
classified into: capacity or preference, and cost or need. The results are used to calculate 
local government expenditure needs by province. The chapter concludes with an 
evaluation of the relative expenditure need position of the provinces, and its implications. 
Legal framework of local government expenditures 
Central government control over local government fiscal affairs extends to the 
disbursements or expenditures of local government funds through the national laws that 
govern local budgeting, imbuing local budgets with certain uniformity and regularity. Until 
199 I, Presidential Decree 4 77 ( I 97 4) defined the budgeting process, fund structure and 
handling of local government funds . 
Local governments were required to maintain four major funds : the general fund, 
the infrastructure fund, the special education fund, and trust funds . The general fund 
consisted of monies and resources which could be used to pay all expenditures and 
obligations except those which were chargeable to the other funds established for specific 
purposes. It was financed by locally generated revenues, and internal revenue allotments 
from the central government. The infrastructure fund was established to finance 
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expenditures related to construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, other public works 
projects, and public utilities. Its sources were the local governinent's share in the petroleum 
excise tax of the central governinent and transfers from the general fund . Local 
governments were required to transfer 8 to 12 per cent of the general fund to the 
infrastructure fund for direct local government spending on capital investments. The 
special education fund consisted of proceeds fro1n the special education tax which were 
earmarked for educational expenditures. Trust funds were private and public monies which 
had been received as a guaranty for the fulfillment of some obligations. Some local 
governments maintained a fifth fund-the national allotment to local government units 
fund-consisting of central governinent aid designated for certain projects and programs. 
The central government influenced local government expenditures more directly 
through the requirements imposed on local government budgets. Presidential Decree No. 
477 required local governments to maintain a balanced budget; the aggregate amount , 
appropriated annually was not to exceed the estimated annual income certified by the local 
treasurer. The decree, however, allowed one supplemental budget per month -and in 
exceptional circumstances additional supplementals could be prepared. The supplemental 
budgets reduced the necessity to prepare realistic revenue and expenditure estimates. 
Local governments knew that the annual budget need only be a crude first approximation 
(Bahl, 1983). They could always make budget realignments through the supplemental 
budgets. Together with the limited revenues and restrictive conditions imposed on local 
government borrowing, this stunted long term capital planning by local gover111nents. 
Local government budgets were also required to provide for certain statutory and 
contractual obligations. These included: setting aside 2 per cent of estimated revenues 
from regular sources as reserve for unforeseen circumstances; from 5 to 7 per cent of net 
income depending on the class of the jurisdiction to be provided as aid to hospitals; an 
amount not exceeding P500 per barangay to be contributed to the barangay development 
fund; 20 per cent of internal revenue allotment from the central government to be 
appropriated for development expenditures approved by the Department of Local 
Governments; 18 per cent of the general fund income to be contributed to the integrated 
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national police (Presidential Decree No.632); and 6) 25 per cent of the costs of the 
previous election to be set aside as election reserves to cover local government 
contributions to election expenses (Presidential Decree No. 1939). Local governments 
were not allowed to spend more than 45 to 55 per cent of their income, depending on their 
income classification, on salaries and wages without prior approval of the Department of 
Budget and Management. 1 
Ursal (1987) esti1nated that an average local government unit had around 46 per 
cent of its budget tied to central govermnent mandated expenditures. Many of these 
expenditures were legitimate local concerns which local govermnents could have 
unde1iaken on their initiative, without central goverrunent intervention. Instead, the 
presence of central government requirements li1nited the discretion of local governments 
over the size and composition of their budgets, and made them feel less accountable for 
their budgetary decisions (Bahl, 1983). 
In response to the clamor of local officials for greater control of their budget and in 
accordance with the avowed decentralisation policy of the central govermnent, the 
mandatory contributions of local governments to integrated national police and hospital 
services were removed, beginning in 1990 (Republic Act No. 6831 ). This freed up to 25 
per cent of local government budgets to the discretion of local authorities . In 1990, the 
local governments also regained operational control of police units in their jurisdiction; but 
police personnel remained central goverrunent employees whose promotions were 
determined by the Philippine National Police, and whose salaries were funded by the 
central goverrunent (Republic Act No.6975). 
The Local Goverrunent Code of 1991 maintained the same budgetary requirements 
imposed under Presidential Decree No. 477, except for some minor amendments. The 
required contribution for each barangay was increased fro1n P500 to Pl,000 and the 
reserve requirement for unforeseen circumstances were raised from 2 to 5 per cent. The 
infrastructure fund and other special funds was abolished, leaving only the general fund 
1
Expenditures for salaries and wages of officials and employees of public schools, hospitals, healt11 and 
agricultural services, public utilities, markets and slaughterhouses, and other economic enterprises are 
exempted from this requirement. 
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and the special education fund. The Local Government Code also imposed stringent 
requirements on supplemental budgets. Budgetary realignment could only be allowed m 
times of calamity. 
The major effect of the Local Government Code on the local goverrunent budget 
lies in the devolution of ce1iain functions carried out by field offices of the central 
goverrunent and the increase in central govermnent transfers to local goverrunents. Central 
govermnent field offices providing agricultural extension, health services, social welfare 
services, tourism, natural resource management, and 1ninor infrastructures were abolished. 
Their personnel, property, and equip1nent were transferred to the local governments. 2 To 
insure that there would be no disruption in the delivery of these services, the Code 
instructed local governments to give them priority in their budgets. 3 The Code also 
increased the number of mandatory local govermnent staff in line with the additional 
responsibilities. 
2
Executive Order No. 503 (1992) provided the guidelines for the transfer of persoru1el, assets and 
liabilities to local govenunents. 
3
Executive Order No. 507 (I 992) outlined the specific functions, programs, projects and responsibilities 
devolved to the local governments. This is Sunllllarized in Appendix 7 .1. 
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Table 7.1 Local govenunent prescribed staffing require1nent, new Local 
Govenunent Code, Philippines 
Position Province Municipality Highly City 
urbanised 
cit 
Secretary E E E E Treasurer E E E E Assessor E E E E Accountant N N N N Budget Officer E E E E Planning and Develop1nent Coordinator E E E E Engineer E N E E Health Officer N N N N Civil Registrar - N E N Ad1ninistrator N 0 E N Legal Officer N 0 E N Agriculturist E - 0 0 Social Services and Development Officer N 0 E N Enviromnent and Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 Officer 
Architect 0 0 0 0 Information Officer 0 0 0 0 Cooperatives Officer 0 0 0 -o Population Officer 0 0 0 0 Veterinarian N - E N General Services Officer N - E N Note: E - existing mandatory position 
N - new mandatory position 
0 - new optional position 
Source: The World Bank, 1993 . The Philippines Gscal decentrali sation study, Report No. 1071 6-PII, p. 64 . 
Local govern1nent expenditures: trends and patterns 
Total local govermnent expenditures (net of interfund transfers) rose fro1n P8 . 72 
Inillion in 1986 to 26 .21 Inillion in 1992, registering an average nominal annual growth rate 
of around 20 per cent. General public services was the biggest item in the expenditures of 
local governn1ents with an average annual no1ninal growth rate of around 24 per cent. 
From P3 . 46 1nillion ( or around 40 per cent of total expenditures) in 1986, it increased to 
P 12.92 million ( or altnost half of the total expenditures) in 1992. General public services 
petiain to expenditures which do not yield any direct benefits to the residents, but are 
critical to the delivery of local government services. General public services consist of 
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expenses incurred by the offices of the local executives and legislatures, and the 
ad1ninistrative support staff consisting of treasurers, auditors, and assessors. They also 
include the expenditures incurred for the general ad1ninistration of local courts and 
maintenance of prisons, and some of the mandated budgetary requirements ( e.g., 
contributions to integrated national police and election reserves). 
Table 7.2 Local government expenditures by function, Philippines, 1986-92 
Average annual 
Current amount (billion pesos) growth rate 1 Functional category 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 (%) General Public Services 3.5 3.8 4.6 6.0 8.5 10.6 12.9 23 .6 Education and Manpower Dev't. 1.2 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8 2.1 2.1 \ Hea!U1, Nutrition & Pop. Control 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 14.4 Social Security, Labor & Welfare 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 29.2 Housing and Community Development 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.5 14.2 Economic Services 2.4 2.7 3.9 4.6 5.8 8.5 6.7 20.3 OU1cr Purposes 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.4 27.8 Tola! 8.7 9.6 11.2 13.9 18.0 23 .7 26.2 19.9 
Per cent Distribution Average Functional calcgo11 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 share General Public Services 39.7 39.9 40.9 43 .2 47.3 44.5 49.3 43 .6 Education and Manpower Dev't. 14 .0 13.5 8.0 6.8 3.9 3.6 8.1 8.3 I-Jeallh, Nutrition & Pop. Control 5.4 6.0 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.2 4.3 5.0 Social Security, Labor & Welfare 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.8- 0.9 Housing and Community Development 8.7 8.2 7.0 7.2 6.8 7.0 5.8 7.2 Economic Services 28.1 28.2 35 .0 32.8 32.2 35 .8 25 .5 31. l OU1er Purposes 3.4 3.3 2.8 4.4 4.4 4.3 5.2 4.00 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: 1Eslimaled using ordinary least squares. 
Source: PhiliQQines, Commission on Audit, 1986-92. Annual ReE._orts 1986- 92 . 
Econo1nic services represented the second largest ite1n in the expenditures of local 
governments. This item grew annually at an average rate of around 20 per cent and 
accounted for an average share of 31 per cent of total annual local government 
expenditures from 1986 to 1992. It consisted of expenditures related to the operation of 
markets and slaughterhouses, construction and maintenance of local roads, bridges, 
waterworks and other infrastructure, and provision of agricultural services. The central 
goverrunent constantly emphasised the importance of this expenditure item, and promoted 
its growth through some of the requirements i1nposed on the local budget such as the 
mandatory transfers of 8 to 12 per cent of the general fund to the infrastructure fund, and 
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the required allocation of 20 per cent of internal revenue allot1nent to develop1nent 
expenditures. 
The ite1ns whjch could be broadly classified as social services, accounted for a 
combined average share of 21 per cent of local government expenditures. They include: 
education and manpower development; health, nutrition and population control; social 
security, labour and welfare; and housing and com1nunity develop1nent. 
Education and 1nanpower development expenditures of local governments 
consisted mainly of contributions to the construction and maintenance of public school 
!>uildings and procurement of school supplies. Public education is primarily ·a national 
government function . The national government finances the salaries of teachers and the 
procurement of textbooks, although financially co1nfortable local governments can 
aug1nent the salaries and wages of school personnel in their jurisdiction. S01ne local 
goverrnnents operated secondary and vocational schools in the past. They charged fees to 
their students. But many of these schools had been assumed by the central government 
under the provision of the constitution which provided free public elementary and 
secondary school education. Educational services registered the lowest annual average 
growth in the expenditures of local governments. Their share in total local expenditures 
dropped markedly from 14 per cent in 1986 to less than 4 per cent in 199 I. They 
recovered slightly in 1992, rising to 8 per cent of expenditures. 
Health services are another function wruch is a joint responsibility of the national 
and local governments. Until 1991, the role of local governments was mainly supportive. 
Most local health personnel were under the administrative control of the Department of 
Health, and received their salaries from the national government. However, local 
governments could run their own health programs and hire their own health personnel. The 
health services of local governments consisted primarily of preventive medicine such as 
immunisation, health education, and operation of day care clinics and family planning 
centres. From 1986 to 1992 local government health expenditures only grew by 14 per 
cent; their share in local government expenditures stagnated between 4 to 5 per cent. This 
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trend is likely to change in the future with the devolution of the field services of the 
Department of Health . 
Social security and welfare expenditures of local goverrnnents consisted 1nainly of 
caring for the aged, and provi9ing ad1ninistrative support to the programs and projects of 
the Department of Social Welfare and Develop1nent. It appeared to be the lowest priority 
of local governments, accounting for less than 1 per cent of their expenditures. But it 
registered the highest growth rate, reflecting improvement in health and hence in longevity, 
at the margin. This is another item of the local government budget that is likely to 
experience a dramatic increase with the implementation of the new local goverrnnent code. 
Housing and community development consisted of expenditures for street cleaning, 
street lighting, garbage collection, sewerage and drainage, and the maintenance of parks, 
sport centres, and libraries. These were the traditional services of local governments. Table 
7.2 shows that as total local goverrunent expenditure increased, the share for these items , 
tended to diminish. Their growth rate was lower than that of total expenditures, and their 
share in total expenditures fell from around 9 per cent in 1986 to less than 6 per- cent in 
1992. 
The last item- other purposes- comprised miscellaneous expenditures for 
unforeseen circrnnstances such as disasters and cala1nities, aid to other government units, 
budgetary reserves, and other expenditures not classified under 'other items'. They 
averaged around 4 per cent of total expenditures. 
The expenditure pattern shows that the first priority was simply to run local 
governments. They then concentrated on services which would i1nprove their economic 
bases. They allocated least to social services. Local governments also appeared to spend 
little on functions in which both local and national governments were jointly responsible, as 
in the case of social services. 
140 
Figure 7.1 Average share of local goven11nent expenditures by major functional 
categories, Philippines, 1986-92 
Source: 
Social services 
21% 
Economic services 
31% 
Others 
4% 
General public services 
44% 
Philippines, Commission on Audit, 1986-92. Annual Reports 1986-92. 
Local governments tended to devote altnost half of their budget to personal 
services, which consisted of salaries, wages, allowances, and insurance and medicare 
premiums Exp en di ture rose from P3 .48 mi IJ ion in 1986 to P 8. 3 8 in 1992, registering an 
average annual nominal growth rate of around 19 per cent. The share in total expenditures 
fluctuated from about 44 per cent in 1989 and 199 I, to around 5 0 per cent in 19 8 6 and 
1992. The high percentage of personal services in local government expenditures had 
raised concern, particularly from the central government, about its crowding-out effect on 
other goverrunent expenditures. 
141 
Table 7.3 Local government expenditures by type, Philippines, 1986- 92 
Average annual 
Current amount (billion pesos) growth rate 1 Expenditure type 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199 1 1992 (%) Personal services 4.4 4 .8 5.2 6.1 8.7 10.6 13 .1 19.3 Maint. & Other Oper. Exp. 3.5 3.6 4.7 5.4 6. l 7.8 8.3 15.7 Capital Outlays 0.9 l. l 1.3 2.4 3.2 5.3 4.7 32.3 Total 8.7 9.6 11.2 13 .9 18.0 23 .7 26.2 19.9 
Per cent Distribution Average Expenditure type 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199 1 1992 Share Personal services 49.9 50.3 46.3 44 .2 48.5 44.7 49.9 47.7 Maint. & Other Oper. Exp. 40. 0 38. l 42 .0 38.8 33. 9 32.8 32.0 36.8 Capital Outlays l 0.1 11.6 11. 7 17.0 17.5 22.4 18.1 15.5 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100.0 
Note: 1 Estimated using ordinary least squares. 
Source: Phili22ines, Commission on Audit, 1986- 92. Annual Rep__orts 1986- 92 . 
Maintenance and operating expenses, which include repair and maintenance of 
govermnent facilities, travel , transportation and corrununication, and supplies, accounted 
for an average share of 3 7 per cent of the local govermnents' annual expenditures. They 
registered the lowest growth rate (16 per cent) among the three classes of expenditures, 
and their share in total expenditures declined fro1n 40 per cent in 1986 to 32 per cent in 
1992. This has been a major reason for the severe deterioration of local infrastructure 
during the last 20 years. 
As Table 7.3 shows, capital outlays had the lowest share in local government 
expenditures. They averaged only around 16 per cent of the annual expenditures of local 
governments. With their li1nited income, local goverrunents were preoccupied with current 
operations, and had very low expenditures on construction and the acquisition of physical 
facilities that would produce long-term beneficial effects. However, local govermnents had 
been giving increasing attention to this expenditure item as indicated by its growth rate and 
rising share of total expenditures. From 1986 to 1992, capital outlays registered the 
highest growth rate among the three expenditure classes. Their share in local expenditures 
rose from 10 per cent to 18 per cent. 
The municipalities had the highest share in total local government expenditures, 
followed by cities and provinces. The municipalities accounted for an average of 39 per 
cent of total local expenditures from 1986 to 1992, while cities and provinces accounted 
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for 32 and 28 per cent, respectively. The municipalities also had the highest growth rate in 
expenditures at 23 per cent, followed by cities (19 per cent) and provinces (18 per cent). 
Table 7.4 Local government expenditures by government levels, Philippines, 1986-92 
Average Annual Current amount (billion pesos) Growth Rate 1 Government level 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 (%) Province 2.6 2.8 2.9 4.4 5.0 6.9 6.2 17.8 MLUucipality 3.0 3.4 4.7 5.3 7.2 9.5 11.0 22.7 City 3.1 3.4 3.6 4.2 5.7 7.3 8.9 18.5 Total 8.7 9.6 11.2 13 .9 18.0 23 .7 26 .2 19.9 
Per cent Distribution Average Government level 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Share Province 30.1 28 .9 25 .5 31.5 28.0 29.0 23 .8 28. l , Mw1icipality 34.2 36.0 42 .3 38.4 40 .1 40 .2 42 .0 39.0 City 35 .7 35 . l 32.2 30. l 31. 9 30.8 34.2 32.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: 1Estimated using ordinary least squares. 
Source: Philippines, Commission on Audit, 1986-92. Annual Reporls 1986-92, Quezon City. 
Variations in local govern1nent expenditures 
. Per capita local government expenditures across provinces varied relatively less 
than per capita loc_al income. The coefficient of variation of the former was only half that 
of the latter. Batanes, which had the fourth highest per capita inco1ne, emerged as the 
province with the highest per capita expenditures. This was made possible by the transfers 
it received from the central govermnent and its small population. 4 Manila which had the 
highest per capita income was only third in per capita expenditures although it had the 
highest absolute expenditures. The lowest per capita local expenditure was recorded in the 
province of Sulu, which also had the lowest recorded per capita local revenue. 5 
4Twenty-five percent of the internal revenue allotment from the central government was allocated to local governments based on equal sharing, which favored local governments with small population. (See Chapter 8 for an in-depth discussion on this matter.) 5See Appendix 7 .2 for the list of per capita expenditures by province. 
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Table 7.5 Variation in per capita local government expenditures, by province, 1991 
Expenditure Type Maximum Minimum Mean Standard Coefficient of 
(Pesos) (Pesos) (Pesos) Deviation Variation Personal Services 719.21 91.48 178.44 79.66 0.45 Maint. & Opcr. Exp . 495.50 40.56 106.74 62.48 0.59 Capital Outlay 209.38 7.83 67 .85 47 .99 0.71 Current Opcr. Exp. 1214.70 162.14 285 .18 132.67 0.47 Total Expenditures 1290.60 195 .15 353 .03 152.09 0.43 
Source: Author's calculations 
Table 7.5 shows the different classes of local goverrnnent expenditures and their 
rariation across provinces. The coefficient of variation shows that capital outlay was the 
1nost variable, followed by maintenance and operating expenditures. Expenditures on 
personal services exhibited the least variation . This was not unexpected, in view of the 
limited income of local governments and their expenditure pattern. Capital expenditures 
seemed to be a residual item in the budget. With their limited income and borrowing , 
capacity, many local governments tended to postpone expenditures for capital outlays, 
until they had enough savings or surplus funds . This, and the "lmnpiness" of- capital 
expenditures, contributed to their variability. 
A breakdown of the expenditures of local govermnents by functions across 
provmces could have provided interesting insights about the fiscal behaviour of local 
governments. However, the lack of uniformity in their accounting practices complicated 
this. For example, some local goverrnnents classified some health expenditures which were 
special projects of the mayor under general public services ( office of the mayor), and 
expenditures on repairs of school buildings were either classified as education expenditures 
or economic expenditures ( engineering services) . S01ne local governments ite1nised the 20 
per cent internal revenue allottnent earmarked for develop1nent expenditures into specific 
functions ( economic services, health, etc.), but some simply categorised it under other 
purposes. Thus, the expenditures reported for some functions were understated in so1ne 
provinces and overstated in others. 
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Variations in socioecono111ic conditions 
As pointed out earlier, variations in local government expenditures could be explained by 
their varying socioeconomic characteristics, and their residents' preferences. This section 
examines the socioeconomic characteristics of the provinces, which are viewed as being 
related to government expenditures. These characteristics were based on the literature 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
With the assumption that local services are normal goods, it is expected that the 
revenue capacity, or the local government's ability to collect revenues, would have a 
,<;ignificant effect on local government expenditures. Per capita assessed property value 
and/or personal income are often used as proxy variables for revenue capacities. However, 
the results in the previous chapter showed that revenues of local governments in the 
Philippines were only partly determined by per capita assessed property value; while 
personal income did not have a significant effect at all . In lieu of these variables, the · 
revenue capacity estimates in the previous chapter are used in the empirical investigation 
that follows. It is expected that, as the theory predicts, revenue capacity would have a 
positive effect on local goverrunent expenditures. 
The other socioeconomic variables that have been found to be important 
determinants of government expenditures include: population density, per cent of 
population below 14 and above 65 years old, per cent of population in agriculture and 
services, land area, urbanisation, road density, poverty incidence, and the consumer price 
index of non-food items. 
Population density 1s expected to be positively related to local government 
expenditures. Overcrowding is usually associated with higher expenditures for police and 
fire protection, maintenance of sewers, and sanitation. Population density is measured as 
the ratio of total population to total area of alienable and disposable lands of the province. 
This measure is a better indicator of overcrowding than one that uses total land area, 
which includes uninhabited lands. 
High percentages of population below 14 and above 65 years old represent higher 
demand for health, education and social welfare services, which entail greater government 
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expenditures. Higher per capita government expenditures are also expect~d in those 
provinces, where a high proportion of the population is in the agricultural and services 
sector. This is because the majority of local governments cater to rural areas, and most of 
them are involved in the pro~ision of agricultural extension services, assistance to small 
livelihood projects, and maintenance and operation of local public markets . 
The land area of the province is also postulated to be related to per capita 
govermnent expenditures. A larger area entails greater transportation and administrative 
costs. It could also mean a 1nore spread-out population, rendering the delivery of 
govermnent services more difficult and expensive. 
Local road density is used as a proxy variable for local infrastructure. Since local 
govermnents are primarily responsible for infrastructure maintenance, it is expected that 
high local road density, measured by kilometres of road per land area, would be positively 
related to local government expenditures. 
The degree of urbanisation, represented by the proportion of the population living 
m urban areas is another factor that could affect local government expenditures. The 
demand for public services is higher in highly urbanised than in rural areas. Parks and 
recreational facilities, for example, have to be publicly provided in urban areas whereas in 
rural areas they are left to the natural enviromnent. More social problems such as crime 
and squatting have to be dealt with in urban areas than in rural areas. 
Poverty incidence, 1neasured by the proportion of families with income below the 
amount necessary to purchase the basic minimum food and non-food requirements, could 
also affect local government expenditures. High poverty incidence means more demand for 
social and welfare services. Local governments in provinces with high poverty incidence, 
however, may not have the capacity to meet these demands. 
The consumer price index for non-food items, is a proxy variable for the cost of the 
production or delivery of local government services. It is a composite price index for 
clothing, fuel, light, water, house repairs, and services. It is expected that the price of 
labour, capital and materials used for the production of public services and running 
governn1ents would vary with the consumer price index for non-food items. 
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The degree of political fragmentation is another variable which could affect per 
capita government expenditures (Weicher, 1970). The ratio of the number of 
municipalities and cities to the population of a province, indicates the degree of political 
fragmentation. It is expected to be positively related to per capita government expenditure. 
This is because there are fixed costs in running local governments; the higher the degree of 
political fragmentation, the higher the total fixed costs. 
The variations in the socioeconomic characteristics of the provinces are illustrated 
in Table 6. The provinces differed most significantly in population density, as indicated by 
lhe coefficient of variation. Population density ranged from a maximum 16,480 people per 
square kilometre in Metro Manila to a minimum of 106 people per square kilometre in 
Kalinga-Apayao. There was also considerable variations in land area, urbanisation and 
road density with coefficients of variation around 0. 7. Pala wan had the largest land area of 
14, 8 96 square kilometres, about 7 I times the size of Batanes. Metro Manila had I 00 per 
cent urban population in contrast to Mountain Province with only 9 per cent. Metro 
Manila also had the highest local road density at 4.4 kilometres of road per square 
kilometre; 4 times the average, and 22 times that of Western Samar, which had only 0.2 
kilometres of road per square kilometre. 
Poverty was most severe in Romblon, where 80 per cent of the population were 
below the poverty line. The lowest incidence was in Batanes with only around 5 per cent 
of the total number of families in the poor category. Siquijor had the highest ratio of 
population aged 65 years old and over at 8 per cent, while Sulu had the lowest at only 1.3 
per cent. 
The differences in the consumer price index and percentage of population I 4 years 
old and below, were small, with coefficients of variation equal to 0. I. Bohol had the 
highest consumer price index for non-food items and Zambales had the lowest. Batanes 
had no data on the consumer price index. As regards proportion of population 14 years old 
and below, Masbate had the highest and Metro Manila had the lowest. More detailed 
statistics are in Appendix 7.3. 
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Table 7.6 Variations in selected socioeconomic characteristics, by province, Philippines, 
1990 and 1991 
Characteristics Maximum Minimum Mean Standard Coefficient 
deviation of variation 
Population densitya 16479.5 105.7 650.4 1994.9 3.1 
Population 65 yrs. & ovcrb 8.0 1.3 3.9 1.4 0.4 
Population 14 yrs. & belowb 45.4 33 .5 40.5 2.7 0.1 
Road dcnsityc 4.4 0.2 I.I 0.7 0.6 
Land aread 14896 .3 209 .3 3970.0 2763.3 0.7 
Population in urban arcasb 100.0 9.0 36 .6 20.2 0.6 
Pop'n . in agriculture & scrvicesb 85 .2 22 .7 54.8 14.0 0.2 
Poverty incidcncee 80.6 4.9 45.5 14.5 0.3 
Consumer price index 206.2 123.0 155 .8 15.4 0.1 
Notes: aPopulation per square kilometer o[ alienable and disposable land; 0Per cent of total population; cK.ilometres of local roads per square kilometre of alienable and disposable land; dTotal area in square kilometre; ePer cent of total number o[ families 
Source: Basic data for roads were obtained from U1e Department of Public Works and Highways; 
Basic data for land area were obtained from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Basic data for poverty incidence were obtained from the National Statistics Coordination Board; All other data were based on various National Statistics Office publications (See Bibliography). 
Actu~l expenditures and expenditure needs 
The median voter model discussed in Chapter 5 identifies the factors, other than 
socioeconomic characteristics discussed above, that could affect local government 
expenditures. These are expressed by the reduced form expenditure equation, formally 
derived in the model, that is : 
E = f (V, A, D, P, C) 
where: 
E - local government expenditures 
V - revenue capacity factors 
A - central government transfers 
D - voter's income and preferences 
P - price of factors of production 
(5.7) 
C - environmental or socioeconomic cost factors 
Note the inclusion of central government transfers in the expenditure equation. 
Central government transfers increase the amount of local government resources . Like 
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revenue capacity, they are expected to have a positive effect on local govermnent 
expenditures. Equation (5. 7) is estimated as a log linear function using ordinary least 
squares. The dependent variable is represented by per capita current operating 
expenditures of the provinc~s, which consist of personal services, maintenance and 
operating expenses. Current operating expenditures are used instead of total expenditures, 
because the lumpiness of capital spending is likely to make total expenditures for any 
single year non-representative. 
The per capita revenue capacity estimated in Chapter 6 is used as the 1neasure of 
,revenue capacity. Central government transfers are represented by the sum of per capita 
internal revenue allotment, specific tax allotment, local government revenue stabilisation 
funds and other grants which accrue to the budget of local governments. 
The consumer price index of non-food items is used as a proxy for the price of the 
factors of production. Voters' income and preferences are respectively represented by 
average per capita income and political fragmentation . The degree of political 
fragmentation could be interpreted as representing residents' demand for more 
differentiated government services that better match their varying preferences. The higher 
the number of local government units, the more differentiated are the quantity, quality and 
mix of public services. Bradbury et al. (I 984) identified certain population characteristics 
(e.g. proportion of elderly and population growth) under tastes and preferences. However, 
these population characteristics together with other socioeconomic characteristics 
presented in the previous section, are classified under environmental or socioeconomic 
cost factors. Auten ( I 972) considered them in general, as perceived need factors, which 
affect government expenditures through the size of the client groups 
The expenditure model was estimated from general to specific using Microfit 3. O's 
(Pesaran and Pesaran, 199 I) variable deletion facility which enables testing for the 
statistical significance of deleting one or more variables from the regression equation 
AJternative specifications of the expenditure model using all possible subsets of regressors 
were also estimated and compared. The estimation results show that most of the 
explanatory variables-except for land area, percentages of the population 65 years old 
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,t • 
and over, and 14 years old and below-had the expected signs. They were all positively 
related to local government expenditures. However, many of these coefficients were not 
significantly different from zero (Appendix 7.4). 
Table 7. 7 shows the E:Stimation results of the most preferred specification. All the 
explanatory variables in this specification of the expenditure model had estimated 
coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
Together these variables explained 76 per cent of the variances in per capita local 
government expenditures. The adjusted R-squared statistic was higher than in all other 
\alternative specifications indicating it was a 1nore parsimonious model6. 
Table 7. 7 Regression estimates of the local government expenditure model 
Dependent variable: Per capita current local goven1ment expenditures Number of observations : 65 
Explanatory variables 
Constant 
Revenue capacity 
Per capita transfers 
Population density 
Population in agriculture & services 
Political fragmentation 
Consumer price index (non-food) 
R- squared : 0.76 
Adjusted R- squared : 0.74 
Diagnostic test statistics 
Functional form 
Normality 
Hcteroscedasticity 
Source: Author's calculation 
Estimated coefficients 
-0.48 
0.32 
0.52 
0.10 
0.22 
0.11 . 
0.27 
t- values 
-0.40 
8.67-
7.55 -
2.90 
2.85 
2.26 
1.65 
LM Version 
Chi- squared(l) = 0.33 l0.57] 
Chi- squared(l) = 12.69 [0 .00] 
Chi- squared(l) = 0.92 [0 .34] 
The estimated equations were also tested for functional form (Ramsey's test), 
normality (Jarque- Bera's test), and heteroscedasticity (Glejser's test) . Only the normality 
assumption appeared to be violated. The non-normality problem may not be too serious, as 
the deletion of the outliers (such as Manila and Batanes) did not significantly affect the 
regression results. Note also that the assumption of normality is almost always arbitrary 
6Appendix 4 presents the estimation results of some alternative specifications of the expenditure model. 
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and the central limit theorem assures that inferences based on the least squares estimator 
are approxi111ately valid in all but small samples (Fox, 1991 ; p.40) . 
Tests of linear relationship among the explanatory variables were also made. The 
measurement of expenditure needs based on regression analysis assumes that there are no 
serious multicollinearity problems especially between capacity and cost variables . 
Multicollinearity can cause least squares regression esti111ation to be unstable and imprecise 
through its effects on the variance of the estimated coefficients. 7 The i111pact of 
multicollinearity on the precision of estimation is captured by 1/( 1- R;- ), called the variance 
, inflation factor (VIF) . Note that it is not the pairwise correlations among the explanatory 
variables that appear in the variance inflation factor, but the multiple correlation for the 
regression (R2) of a particular explanatory variable (j) on the others . Table 7.8 presents the 
coefficients of multiple correlation of the explanatory variables in table 7. 7 and their 
corresponding variance inflation factors. 
Table 7.8 Coefficients of multiple correlation of explanatory variables and their 
variance inflation factors 
Explanatory variables R- sguared Variance inflation factor 
Revenue capacity 
Per capita transfers 
Population density 
Population in agriculture & services 
Political frag111entation 
Consumer price index (non-food) 
Source: Author's calculation 
0.60 
0.43 
0.58 
0.58 
0.69 
0.07 
2.50 
1.75 
2 .38 
2 .38 
3.23 
1.08 
The results show that there were multicollinearities a111ong the explanatory 
variables, but the multicollinearities were not so severe as to seriously affect the precision 
of the estimates. Fox (1991, p.11) noted that the linear relationship among the explanatory 
variables must be very strong before multicollinearity seriously degrades the precision of 
7The estimated variance of tlle least squares regression coefficient bj is calculated as: 
(
" ) s
2 
1 Vb =-- -x--
1 (n - 1) s; 1 - R; 
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estimation; for example, it is not until R; approaches 0.81 that the precision of estimation 
is halved. 
Following the 1nethod used by Bradbury, et al. (1984), the esti1nation results of 
equation 3 are used to calcul_ate a cost index. It is used to predict what a province would 
have spent if it had average resources and average demand, but its own set of cost factors . 
This is done by substituting the average values for revenue capacity, central government 
transfers, and political fragmentation into the estimated regression equation, but retaining 
the actual values of the socioecono1nic cost variables. Thus, the variation in the predicted 
, expenditures would be solely due the variation in socioeconomic cost factors . 
A cost index for each province is computed by dividing its predicted expenditure 
by the average predicted expenditures of all provinces. As Bradbury, et al. (1984, p.160) 
noted, the value of this index for a particular cominunity can be interpreted as one, plus the 
proportionate increase in spending in that c01nmunity that is due to that community's 
socioecono1nic cost factors compared to the average. 
Table 7.9 Estimated cost indices of selected provinces 
Provinces Cost index 
High cost 
Metro Manila 1.32 
Sulu 1.25 
Ifugao 1.14 
Average cost 
Quirino 1.00 
Bukidnon 1.00 
Low cost 
Pampanga 0.92 
Nueva Viscaya 0.91 
Negros Occidental 0.86 
Source: Author's calculation 
Table 7.9 presents the estimated cost index of some provinces (Appendix 7.5 
provides a co1nplete list of the estimated cost index) . The estimated cost index suggests 
that provision of a given set of public services would cost 32 per cent 1nore per capita in 
Metro Manila than in Quirino or Bukidnon. Negros Occidental which has a cost index of 
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0. 86 would spend 14 per cent less per capita than the average cost provinces in providing 
the same services. Sulu would have to spend.25 per cent more per capita than Quirino, and 
34 per cent per capita more than Nueva Viscaya. 
Given the estimated cost index, the next step in estimating a measure of 
expenditure need is the choice of a standard level of public service. The level of public 
service is a policy choice variable. It is standardised so that expenditure needs reflect 
differences that are solely due to cost factors which are beyond the control of local 
governments. Several studies Bradbury, et al. , 1984; Park, 1989; Rao and Aggarwal, 
, 1991) have used average expenditure as the standard . 
The expenditure need of each province is computed by multiplying its respective 
cost index by the average per capita expenditures of all provinces (which is used as the 
standard). A comparison of the estimated expenditure need and actual expenditures, shows 
the provinces with high actual expenditures do not necessarily have high expenditure 
needs. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient, which is equal to 0.04 suggests there 
was no significant positive relation between actual expenditures and expenditure iieed. Out 
of 65 provinces, 34 provinces had higher ranking in actual expenditures than in 
expenditure needs. Palawan, for example which ranked 65th (highest) in actual per capita 
expenditures, ranked only 20th in expenditure need (see Appendix 7.5 for details). 
The estimated expenditure need and the actual expenditure of each province are 
plotted in Figure 7.3. It shows that there was considerably less variability in expenditure 
needs than actual expenditures. This is because expenditure needs reflect variations 
attributed to differences in costs alone. This feature of expenditure needs is important in 
the design of central government transfers, as the next chapter will show. 
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Sun1mary 
Central government control over local govermnent fiscal affairs extends to the 
expenditures of local gover01nent funds . It was esti1nated that an average local government 
unit had around 46 per cent_ of its budget tied to certain statutory and contractual 
obligations mandated by the central govermnent. Local governments are also required to 
maintain a balanced budget. These impositions have restricted the discretion of local 
governments over the size and composition of their budgets, making them feel Jess 
accountable for their budgetary decisions. Thus, part of the recent decentralisation refonns 
have been to remove some of these mandatory budgetary requirements, although it 
appears that these are merely being replaced by new ones. The tendency of the central 
government to dictate on the local budgets is difficult to resist considering the dependence 
of local gover01nents on central govermnent transfers. 
From 1986 to 1992, total local govermnent expenditures registered an average 
nominal annual growth rate of around 20 per cent. The expenditure pattern shows that the 
first priority was simply to run local governments, as 1nanifested in the share of-general 
public services which accounted for 40 per cent of the total expenditures. They then 
concentrated on econo1nic services which got an average share of 31 per cent of the 
budget. They allocated least to social services (21 percent) . Local governments appeared 
to spend little on functions in which both local and national govermnents were jointly 
responsible. By type of expenditures, personal services accounted for ahnost half of total 
local govermnent expenditures, raising concern about its crowding-out effect on other 
government expenditures. The share of maintenance and operating expenses had declined 
to 32 per cent- one reason for the severe deterioration of local infrastructure. Capital 
outlays accounted for only 16 per cent. With their limited income, local governments were 
preoccupied with current operations, and had very low expenditures on construction and 
acquisition of physical facilities that would produce long- tenn benefits. 
The variation in per capita local government expenditures across provinces was 
exa1nined using the 1nedian voter utility maxitnisation model. Per capita local government 
expenditures were regressed on revenue capacity, central govermnent transfers, and the 
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political and socioecono1nic characteristics of the provinces. The regression results showed 
that revenue capacities and per capita transfers (representing available financial resources), 
and the number of local government units per capita ( representing political preferences) 
were significantly positively ~elated to per capita expenditures. Among the various 
socioecono1nic characteristics, only population density, consumer price index, and 
percentage of the population in agriculture and services appeared to be the significant 
detenninants. These socioecono1nic characteristics were referred to as expenditure need or 
cost disability factors beyond the control of local goverrnnents. The regression result 
provided a way of segregating the effects of each factor on local government expenditures, 
and was used to calculate a cost index for each province which abstracts from preferences 
and resource effects. The different provincial cost indices were then multiplied to the 
average per capita expenditures of all provinces to arrive at a measure of the expenditure 
needs of each province. The expenditure need so measured, thus reflects variations , 
attributable to cost factors alone. A comparison of the estimated expenditure needs and 
actual expenditures shows that provinces with high actual expenditures do not necessarily 
have high expenditure needs. This fact should be considered in the design of an equitable 
system of central goverrunent transfers . 
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Appendix 7.1 
Agriculture 
and fisheries 
Industrial 
development 
Forestry and 
natural resources 
Health 
services 
Social welfare 
services 
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Basic services to be provided by local government 
Barangay 
Support services which include 
distribution system of planting materials 
and operation of buying stations 
Maintenance of barangay health centre. 
Maintenance of barangay day care 
centre. 
Municipality 
Extension and on site research services 
which include dispersal of livestock, poultry 
fingerlings and seeding materials for 
aquaculture; seed farms and nurseries; 
inter-barangay irrigation systems, wastes 
and soil resource utilisation projects; 
enforcement of fishery laws 
Implementation of community based forestry 
projects which include integrated social 
forestry programs; control of communal 
forests with an area not exceeding 50 sq. 
km.; tree parks, green belts, and other 
similar forest development projects. 
Province 
Extension and on site research including 
prevention and control of plant and animal 
pests and diseases; dairy farms, livestock 
markets, animal breeding stations; 
assistance in organising cooperatives. 
Industrial research and development 
services, as well as transfer of appropriate 
technology 
Enforcement of forestry laws limited to 
community based forestry projects, 
pollution control law, small scale mining 
law, and other laws protecting the 
environment; mini-hydro electric projects 
for local purposes. 
Implementation of programs and projects on Hospital and tertiary health services. 
primary health care, maternal and child care, 
and communicable and non-communicable 
disease control services; purchase of 
medicines, medical supplies and equipment. 
Welfare programs and projects for the 
children, youth, family, women, elderly and 
disabled; community based rehabilitation 
programs for vagrants, beggars, street 
J 
children, juvenile delinquents, drug victims; 
livelihood and poverty alleviation projects; 
nutrition services; family planning services. 
Programs and projects on rebel returnees 
and evacuees; relief operations; population 
development services. 
City 
All services and facilities of 
the municipality and province 
All services and facilities of 
the municipality and province 
All services and facilities of 
the municipality and province 
All services and facilities of 
the municipality and province 
All services and facilities of 
the municipality and province 
-VI 
00 
Information 
services 
General hygiene 
and sanitation 
Public facilities 
Infrastructure 
Municipal 
enterprises 
Tourism 
Information and reading centre. 
Services and facilities to general hygiene 
and sanitation, beautification and solid 
waste collection. 
Multi-purpose hall, plaza, sports centre. 
Maintenance of barangay roads and 
bridges and water supply systems; 
multi-purpose pavement. 
Investment and job placement information 
system, tax and marketing information 
systems, maintenance of a public library 
Solid waste disposal or environmental 
management system and services or facilities 
related to general hygiene and sanitation. 
Municipal buildings, cultural centres, public 
parks including freedom parks, playgrounds 
and sports facilities and equipment; sites for 
police and fire stations and municipal jails. 
Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to 
service the needs of residents and which are 
funded out of municipal funds including, 
municipal roads and bridges; school 
buildings and other facilities for primary and 
secondary schools; clinics, health centres, 
and other health facilities; communal 
irrigation, small water impounding projects; 
fish ports; artesian wells and water supply 
system; seawalls, dikes, drainage, sewerage 
and flood control; traffic signals and road 
signs. 
Satellite or public market, where viable. Public markets, slaughterhouses; public 
cemetery 
Tourism facilities and other tourist 
attractions, including the acquisition of 
equipment, regulation and supervision of 
business concessions and' security 
Upgrading and modernisation of a tax All services and facilities of 
information and collection services through the municipality and province 
the use of computer and other means. 
Provincial buildings, jails, freedom parks 
and other public assembly areas. 
Infrastructure facilities intended to service 
the needs of residents of the province and 
which are funded out of provincial funds 
including but not limited to provincial roads 
and bridges; inter-municipal waterworks, 
drainage and sewerage, flood control, and 
irrigation systems; reclamation projects. 
Tourism development and promotion 
programs. 
All services and facilities of 
the municipality and province 
All services and facilities of 
the municipality and province 
All services and facilities of 
the municipality and province 
All services and facilities of 
the municipality and province 
All services and facilities of 
the municipality and province 
...... 
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Housing 
Communications 
Others Barangay justice system 
Programs and projects for low cost housing All services and facilities of 
and other mass dwellings, except those the municipality and province 
funded by Social Security System, and the 
Housing Development Mutual Fund. 
Inter-municipal telecommunication 
services, subject to national guidelines 
Investment support services, including 
access to credit. 
Communication and transport 
facilities 
Support for education, police 
and fire services and facilities. 
Source: World Bank, 1993. The Philippines Fiscal Decentralization Study, Report No. 10716-PH, Washington . 
Appendix 7.2 Per capita expenditures by province, 1991 
Total Current Personal Maintenance and Capital 
Province expenditure expenditure services operating outlay 
Sulu 195.15 163.34 91.48 71.85 31.82 
Masbate 198.59 162.14 109.16 52.97 36.46 
Sorsogon 214.49 188.73 128.09 60.64 25.76 
Cotabato (No11h) 218.95 193.72 115.76 77 .96 25.23 
Quezon 233 .17 212.13 139.82 72.31 21.04 
Maguindanao 234.28 203.63 119.73 83.90 30.65 
Mindoro Or. 237 .18 176.64 124.23 52.41 60.54 
Carmines Norte 238.67 193.46 128.29 65 .17 45.21 
Bukidnon 238 .96 203 .20 135.96 67.23 35.76 
Cagayan 239.76 212.41 147.93 64.48 27 .35 
Capiz 251.19 219.67 125.82 93 .84 31 .52 
Antique 251.99 229.33 152.07 77.26 22.66 
Pangasinan 256.31 233.94 122.63 111.31 22.37 
Sultan Kudarat 258.54 219.95 135.11 84.84 38 .59 
Zamboanga del Sur 269.45 199.18 141.92 57 .27 70.27 
Camarines Sur 272.27 223 .83 136.10 87.73 48.44 
Pampanga 272.35 232.39 122.05 110.34 39.96 
Bulacan 275.62 239.22 124.27 114.95 36.40 
Eastern Samar 281 .59 239.06 181.07 57.99 42.53 
Southern Leyte 283.08 233.45 142.95 90.49 49.64 
Albay 286.84 223 .67 133.45 90.22 63 .17 
Nueva Ecija 287.62 256.22 152.80 103.42 31 .40 
Northern Leyte 287.89 244.37 164.00 80.37 43.52 
Northern Samar 288.18 219.21 143.06 76.15 68.98 
lloilo 292.91 237.51 150.46 87 .05 55 .39 
Zamboanga de! Norte 299.55 238 .27 182.25 56.02 61 .28 
Negros Or. 308 .23 245 .80 170.86 74.93 62.43 
Western Samar 311.37 249.18 168.18 81.01 62.18 
Mindoro 0cc. 313.72 267.16 175.38 91.78 46.57 
Bohol 315 .64 272.88 166.33 106.55 42.76 
Camiguin 317.39 309.57 222.60 86.97 7.83 
Cavite 320.47 261 .22 137.96 123.26 59.25 
Romblon 321.79 238.58 164.48 74.10 83.21 
Laguna 324.96 249.98 133.25 116.74 74.98 
llocos Norte 328.86 318 .85 210.74 108.11 10.01 
Mountain Province 329.32 299.74 222.02 77.72 - 29.59 
Batangas 330.14 271 .65 167.95 103.70 58.49 
Agusan del Sur 333.41 252.25 168.42 83 .83 81.16 
Negros 0cc. 334.94 261.06 158.85 102.22 73 .88 
Surigao del Norte 340.20 293 .54 198.83 94.71 46.66 
Lanao del Norte 343.49 251.60 182.20 69.40 91.89 
Zambales 345 .03 311.29 211.08 l00.21 33 .74 
Misamis 0cc. 347.22 313.90 239.77 74.13 33 .32 
Jlocos Sur 349.98 286.66 161.38 125.28 63 .32 
Siquijor 353 .66 285.53 244.97 40.56 68. 13 
Catanduanes 358 .89 269.60 171.63 97.97 89.30 
Aklan 359.05 215 .15 149.17 65.98 143.91 
Marinduque 371 .86 307.64 210.26 97.37 64.23 
Agusan de! Norte 377.43 303 .25 222.61 80.63 74.19 
Kalinga-Apayao 387.95 368 .88 216.17 152.70 19.07 
Quirino 397.34 314.59 230.77 83 .82 82.76 
Bataan 401.66 310.70 178.17 132.54 90.96 
lsabela 408 .54 298.61 133.96 164.64 109.94 
Misamis Or. 411.09 362.65 257 .99 104.67 48.43 
lfugao 416.79 299.43 182.53 116.90 117.35 
Aurora 423.71 340.19 252.63 87 .56 83 .52 
Tarlac 428.66 254.69 113.15 141.54 173.97 
Abra 429.37 406.53 215.81 190.72 22.84 
Nueva Yiscaya 455.43 377.79 183.27 194.52 77.63 
Benguet 534.30 378 .23 253 .15 125.08 156.07 
Rizal 537.31 327.94 19 J.37 136.57 209.38 
La Union 560.56 373 .86 149.74 224.12 186.70 
Cebu 578.23 380.80 193.38 187.42 197.43 
Metro Manila 608.47 414.42 233 .81 180.60 194.06 
Palawan 628.38 463 .37 262.84 200.53 165.01 
Batanes 1290.59 1214.71 719.21 495.50 75.89 
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Appendix 7.3 Socioeconomic characteristics of provinces 
Province PTR API CPI PDEN PAS PURB P65 P14 POV AREA LRD NCM POP 
Metro Manila 129.56 29271.00 162.20 16479.50 31.60 100.00 2.40 33.50 13.23 636.00 4.35 17 7948392 
Abra 334.88 6168.00 145.83 187.71 72.70 23.90 6.00 38.30 66.24 3975.55 2.20 27 184743 
Benguet 218.69 19839.43 147.77 552.76 52.20 53.20 2.50 39.10 11.47 2655.38 1.50 14 485857 
Ifugao 352.27 6659.00 158.77 579.64 77.00 10.80 3.40 43.60 62.42 2517.78 2.87 10 147281 
Kalinga-Apayao 355.10 9498.00 153.53 262.49 85.00 14.50 3.00 42.00 40.40 7047.64 1.15 15 211775 
Mountain Province 271.14 8159.00 157.98 241.52 80.50 9.00 5.20 39.50 51.35 2097.33 1.95 10 116535 
Ilocos Norte 236.06 12836.00 157.50 318.50 59.30 28.30 7.10 35.00 46.93 3399.34 2.01 23 461661 
Ilocos Sur 221.71 13304.00 148.90 375.67 57.60 24.10 7.00 35.60 48.08 2579.58 1.82 34 519966 
La Union 543.78 13824.00 148.90 456.12 45.00 28.70 5.70 37.40 40.83 1493.09 0.79 20 548742 
Pangasinan 197.70 11349.00 157.80 497.12 51.60 45.90 4.80 39.50 51.21 5368.18 1.14 48 2020273 
Cagayan 193.10 11624.00 146.30 234.96 62.30 23.60 4.30 39.90 49.30 9002.67 0.83 29 829867 
Isabela 329.98 11799.00 157.10 235.03 52.10 22.90 3.10 40.70 36.77 10664.56 0.78 37 1080341 
Nueva Viscaya 434.98 10609.00 137.30 338.70 43.10 23.90 3.60 40.20 45.45 3903.87 2.45 15 301179 
Quirino 363.42 8118.00 150.40 224.44 70.00 25.50 3.10 41.70 58.85 3057.20 0.91 6 114132 
Bataan 252.28 17274.00 139.90 614.21 37.40 74.80 3.00 39.10 32.09 1372.96 1.05 12 425803 
Bulacan 152.75 19836.00 169.10 812.17 29.30 79.90 3.50 37.40 16.16 2625.00 1.29 24 1505219 
Nueva Ecija 192.65 11033.08 155.20 396.60 55.40 39.00 4.00 38.40 41.36 5284.33 0.86 32 1312680 
Pampanga 190.55 16679.52 132.70 929.35 29.40 70.60 3.40 38.20 26.83 2180.68 1.30 22 1532615 
Tarlac 199.31 10892.35 143.70 464.77 55.00 29.90 4.10 38.30 44.55 3053.45 1.21 18 859708 
Zambales 212.29 17382.48 123.00 483.76 47.20 65.30 3.30 36.80 35.97 3714.40 0.92 14 562992 
Aurora 281.90 10658.00 165.00 105.73 65.50 43.60 2.80 43.00 44.31 3239.54 0.31 8 139573 
Batangas 181.54 15160.32 154.10 556.40 38.30 27.00 4.50 38.30 33.92 3165.81 1.19 34 1476783 
Cavite 167.43 18600.00 202.30 1146.23 31.60 76.20 3.50 36.50 19.02 1287.55 1.30 23 1152534 
Laguna 151.17 18231.04 156.90 1017.10 28.40 74.40 3.20 37.60 23.86 1759.73 0.85 30 1370232 
Marinduque 242.92 16028.00 157.90 251.66 52.40 , 17.30 4.40 42.70 61.81 959.25 0.61 6 185524 
Occidental Mindoro 253.73 11852.00 144.60 181.14 56.60 33.00 2.70 43.70 45.21 5879.85 0.80 11 282593 
Oriental Mindoro 187.70 12297.00 150.40 247.13 58.10 25.50 2.90 44.60 56.05 4364.72 0.52 15 550049 
Palawan 409.64 10436.00 167.60 117.98 70.60 31.40 2.50 43.10 52.53 14896.26 0.46 22 528287 
...... 
0\ ...... 
Province PTR API CPI PDEN PAS PURB P65 P14 POV AREA LRD NCM POP 
Quezon 165.97 10598.91 164.10 290.55 51.30 33.00 3.30 41.40 50.94 8706.60 0.29 41 1372455 
Rizal 118.65 20655.00 147.80 1529.92 22.70 95.50 2.40 38.20 27.52 1308.92 1.55 14 977448 
Romblon 294.47 6871.00 144.40 246.76 49.90 22.10 4.10 42.30 80.56 1355.93 1.24 17 227621 
Albay 200.53 7827.00 161.00 438.29 40.10 31.70 4.00 42.80 54.90 2552.57 0.61 18 903785 
Carnarines Norte 162.66 7989.00 173.60 279.21 49.90 33.90 3.10 43.00 56.18 2112.49 0.38 12 390982 
Camarines Sur 198.51 9361.00 173.60 357.25 36.60 35.20 3.60 44.10 50.93 5266.82 0.88 37 1305919 
Catanduanes 284.37 10439.00 194.30 255.03 46.00 27.90 5.50 41.80 37.08 1511.48 0.72 11 187000 
Masbate 174.69 6094.00 158.80 227.56 57.60 25.00 3.20 45.40 66.59 4047.69 0.25 21 599355 
Sorsogon 161.29 7633.00 178.90 301.30 62.70 26.80 4.10 43.80 54.93 2141.44 0.43 16 522960 
Aldan 223.45 11413.00 141.50 370.14 43.50 24.30 5.70 39.50 35.44 1817.89 0.99 17 380497 
Antique 193.52 8777.00 153.70 280.78 55.30 28.90 5.40 40.70 57.60 2522.01 0.65 18 406361 
Capiz 222.39 7514.00 146.40 344.57 42.90 28.20 4.10 41.00 56.30 2633.17 0.80 17 584091 
Iloilo 209.35 11450.07 167.80 445.16 43.60 29.79 5.10 38.50 43.59 5323.97 0.83 47 1765476 
Negros Occidental 208.90 9883.05 139.60 378.94 30.80 45.60 3.20 40.70 43.06 7926.07 0.83 32 2256908 
Bohol 187.34 7096.00 206.20 305.49 65.60 25.30 6.00 38.70 56.63 4117.26 1.24 48 948403 
Cebu 186.87 11192.07 189.50 719.66 49.50 52.40 4.00 39.00 33.55 5088.39 0.87 53 2646517 
Negros Oriental 209.82 9753.00 142.20 357.47 61.80 23.90 3.70 40.60 47.96 5402.27 0.64 25 925272 
Siquijor 280.54 6067.00 145.50 333.34 72.10 12.10 8.00 37.00 55.19 343.50 1.29 6 73932 
Eastern Samar 236.57 10039.00 143.70 230.33 67.20 75.90 5.10 41.10 32.07 4339.65 1.07 23 329335 
Leyte 186.67 8620.00 144.60 362.24 51.30 32.73 4.00 42.30 45.37 6268.26 0.68 51 1485828 
Northern Samar 238.16 9077.00 158.50 258.99 64.30 35.40 3.90 44.10 29.79 3497.98 0.37 24 383654 
Samar CW es tern) 270.68 6943.00 136.60 271.68 60.80 25.60 3.90 43.10 46.20 5591.00 0.30 26 533733 
Southern Leyte 261.33 9457.00 153.30 255.59 59.50 20.50 5.50 39.90 30.90 1734.80 0.80 19 321940 
Zamboanga del Norte 260.03 7005.00 145.00 257.97 72.50 21.70 2.80 41.80 57.97 6618.11 1.26 27 676862 c( Zamboanga del Sur 240.04 10002.54 155.10 372.81 62.60 42.50 2.50 42.70 40.80 8052.00 1.06 41 1544520 
Agusan del Norte 244.46 8578.84 158.70 698.57 47.60 47.40 2.80 41.60 49.95 2590.29 1.49 12 465458 
Agusan del Sur 227.79 7962.00 152.80 189.85 75.70 24.40 1.90 45.10 61.09 8965.50 0.54 14 420763 
Bukidnon 173.86 8200.00 156.00 251.16 63.90 I 31.40 2.00 45.20 53.77 8293.78 1.22 22 843891 
Camiguin 221.36 6644.00 148.30 309.31 56.80 33.90 5.60 38.80 63.62 229.80 1.33 5 64247 
Misamis Occidental 257.27 7793.00 154.20 338.48 56.20 31.90 4.20 38.30 63.51 1939.32 1.71 17 424365 
Misamis Oriental 222.54 11558.38 172.90 494.43 53.30 66.30 2.90 40.40 44.70 3570.03 1.47 26 865051 -0\ 
N 
-0\ 
w 
Province PTR API CPI PDEN PAS fURB Surigao del Norte 255.21 8064.00 160.20 350.39 62.40 48.00 Cotabato (North) 172.84 7321.00 147.30 509.43 58.10 18.10 Lanao del Norte 172.36 8469.44 168.20 387.51 61.40 24.30 Sultan Kudarat 229.85 10235.00 132.10 182.86 65.70 31.00 Sulu 179.02 6581.00 167.10 985.53 85.20 17.30 Maguindanao 170.93 10332.94 151.60 247.12 61.30 32.20 Batanes 1587.35 23563.00 0.00 202.18 55.10 33.60 
Note: PTR - per capita transfers (pesos per capita) 
API - average per capita income (pesos per capita) 
CPI - consumer price index, non-food items (pesos) 
PDEN - population density (population per square kilometer of alienable and disposable land 
PAS - population in agriculture and services 
PURB - population in urban areas 
P65 - proportion of population 65 years old and over 
P14 - proportion of population 14 years old and below 
POV - poverty incidence 
P65 
3.70 
2.60 
2.10 
2.30 
1.30 
1.40 
7.10 
LRD - road density (kilometers of local roads per square kilometer of alienable and disposable land 
NCM - number of cities and municipalities 
P14 
40.90 
43.60 
42.40 
43.60 
39.40 
43.60 
35.80 
POP - population 
Sources: Data on transfers based on Philippines, Commission on Audit, 1991. Working Papers, 1991, Quezon City. 
POV AREA 
52.93 2739.02 
60.38 6725.90 
57.17 3092.04 
48.01 4714.80 
50.97 1600.40 
43.36 4887.60 
4.86 209.28 
Data on average per capita income, National Statistics Office, 1994. 1991Family Income and Expenditure Survey. 
Data on poverty incidence from the National Statistics Office, 1994. Letter from Mr. Tomas Africa (27 January 1994) 
Data on roads from the Department of Public Works and Highways 
All other data based on Philippines, National Statistics Office, 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Manila; and Philippines, 
National Statistics Office, 1993, Census Facts and Figures 1990, Manila .. 
LRD NCM POP 
1.24 28 425978 
0.87 17 763995 
1.05 23 614092 
0.84 12 435905 
1.87 19 469971 
0.50 19 757739 
2.84 6 15026 
Appendix 7.4 Ordinary least squares regression results of local governn1ent 
expenditure model 
Dependent variable: Per capita cun-ent local government expenditures 
No. of observations 65 65 65 65 65 
Regression coefficients and t-values: 
Regressors: Eq 1 Eq 2 Eq 3 
Constant -0.71 -1.69 -0.65 
(-0.25) (-1.00) (-0.51) 
Revenue capacity 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 
(5.42) (5.99) (6.77) 
Per capita transfers 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.51 *** 
(6.84) (7 .01) (6.96) 
Average per capita income 0.08 0.10 
(0.79) (1.01) 
Consumer price index 0.31 * 0.30* 0.34** 
(1.76) (1.78) (2.04) 
Population density 0.07 0.09* 
(1.08) (1.67) 
Pop'n. in agriculture & services 0.25** 0.25*** 0.20** 
(2.44) (2.83) (2.35) 
Pop'n in urban areas 0.04 0.04 0.04 
(0.73) (0.72) (0.76) 
Population 65 yrs. & over -0.007 
(-0.10) 
Population 14 yrs. & below -0.24 
(-0.49) 
Poverty incidence 0.05 0.05 
(0.59) (0.63) 
Land area -0.003 
(-0.10) 
Local road density 0.01 0.02 0.07** 
(0.32) (0.45) (2.42) 
Political fragmentation 0.10 0.12** 0.06 
(1.42) (2.17) ( 1.32) 
R-squared 0.77 0.77 0.75 
Adjusted R-squared 0.71 0.72 0.72 
Heteroscedasticity: Chi-squared (1) 1.18 1.20 0.16 
Note: 1 Preferred model specification 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed test) 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level (2-tailed test) 
* Signjficantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level (2-tailed test) 
Source: author's calculation 
Eq 4 Eq 5 
-0.63 -0.46 
(-0.51) (-0.38) 
0.31 *** 0.32*** 
(7.58) (8.10) 
0.53*** 0.52*** 
(7.50) (7.25) 
0.27 0.28* 
(1.64) (1.69) 
0.10*** 0.8* 
(2.92) (1.68) 
0.24*** 0.22** 
(2.91) (2.64) 
0.03 
(0.66) 
0.02 
(0.44) 
0.12** 0.10** 
(2.56) (2.06) 
0.76 0.76 
0.73 0.73 
0.84 0.76 
65 
Eq 6 1 
-0.48 
(-0.40) 
0.32*** 
(8.67) 
0.52*** 
(7.55) 
0.27* 
(1.65) 
0.10*** 
(2.90) 
0.22*** 
(2.85) 
0.11 ** 
(2.26) 
0.76 
0.74 
0.92 
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Appendix 7.5 Actual expenditures, cost indices and expenditure needs of provinces 
Province Actual expenditure Cost Index Expenditure need 
(Pesos per capita) (Pesos per capita) 
Metro Manila 608.47 1.32 445.60 
Abra 429.37 0.98 332.45 
Benguet 534.30 J.02 345.56 
lfugao 416.79 l.l4 385.61 
Kalinga-Apayao 387.95 1.07 360.80 
Mountain Province 329.32 1.05 356.29 
!locos Norte 328.86 1.01 342.18 
llocos Sur 349.98 1.01 340.45 . 
La Union 560.56 0.97 328.78 
Pangasinan 256.31 l .03 347.15 
Cagayan 239.76 0.97 328 .93 
Isabel a 408.54 0.95 322.39 
Nueva Viscaya 455.43 0.91 309.27 
Quirino 397.34 1.00 338.45 
Bataan 401 .66 0.94 319.77 
Bulacan 275.62 0.97 328 .00 
Nueva Ecija 287.62 1.01 343.20 
Pampanga 272.35 0.92 31 l.63 
Tarlac 428.66 I.OJ 340.97 
Zambales 345.03 0.94 317.40 
Aurora 423 .71 0.94 317.19 
Batangas 330.14 0.96 326.70 
Cavite 320.47 1.07 362.31 
Laguna 324.96 0.96 326.50 
Marinduque 371 .86 0.96 325.46 
Occidental Mindoro 313 .72 0.92 312.80 
Oriental Mindoro 237.18 0.97 328.00 
Palawan 628.38 0.97 327.40 
Quezon 233.17 0.98 332.07 
Rizal 537.31 0.94 318.57 
Romblon 321.79 0.93 313 .69 
Albay 286.84 0.96 326.07 
Camarines Norte 238.67 0.99 333.78 
Camarines Sur 272.27 0.94 319.55 
Catanduanes 358 .89 0.99 334.93 
Masbate 198.59 0.97 329.48 
Sorsogon 214.49 1.05 356.54 Aklan 359.05 0.93 315.22 Antique 251.99 0.98 330.55 Capiz 251.19 0.93 314.90 Iloilo 292.91 0.99 336.38 Negros Occidental 334.94 0.86 291 .78 Bohol 315.64 l.1 I 374.70 Cebu 578.23 1.11 375.04 Negros Oriental 308.23 1.00 339.80 Siquijor 353.66 1.04 351 .25 Eastern Samar 281 .59 0.98 332.18 Leyte 287 .89 0.97 328.08 Northern Samar 288.18 1.01 341.78 Samar (Western) 311.37 0.96 325.87 Southern Leyte 283 .08 0.98 332.54 
Zamboanga del Norte 299.55 I.OJ 342.45 Zamboanga del Sur 269.45 1.03 350.32 Agusan del Norte 377.43 1.04 353 .39 Agusan del Sur 333.41 1.00 340.06 Bukidnon 238.96 1.00 338 .81 Camiguin 317.39 0.98 332.51 Misamis Occidental 347.22 1.00 338.28 Misamis Oriental 411.09 1.06 358.18 Surigao del Norte 340.20 1.04 350.96 Cotabato (North) 218.95 1.04 350.63 Lanao del Norte 343.49 1.06 357.93 Sultan Kudarat 258 .54 0.93 315.73 Sulu 195. 15 1.25 421 .57 Maguindanao 234.28 0.98 332.60 
Source: Auhtor's calculation 
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8 
Central government transfers 
Intr·oduction 
This chapter analyses the system of central government transfers to local 
goverrunents. Its main objective is to assess whether central govermnent transfers 
particularly, revenue sharing promote equity and/or encourage local goverrunent revenue 
efforts. Section 2 discusses the system of central goverrunent transfers and their role in 
local government finance. Section 3 brings together the results of the previous two 
chapters to construct a tneasure of the fiscal gap of each province. This is used to 
evaluate the equity of central government transfers. Section 4 exa1nines the effect of 
central government transfers on revenue efforts of local goverrunents, and the possible 
trade-off between the two objectives of pro1noting equity and revenue effort. The 
chapter concludes with suggestions for the revenue sharing system in the Philippines 
. based on the system of central govermnent transfers in selected countries. 
The syste1n of central government transfers 
Central government transfers are traditional sources of local government finance. 
Broadly, they can be classified into two categories : revenue sharing and grants. Revenue 
sharing entails the allocation of fixed proportions of central goverrunent tax collections 
to local goverrunents on the basis of formulas prescribe by law. Grants consist of monies 
given to local goverrunents, usually under the discretion of the President, to finance 
specific projects. 
Before 1992, there were three types of revenue sharing: internal revenue 
allot1nent, specific tax allotment, and the local goverrunent revenue stabilization fund . 
The internal revenue allotment was based on Presidential Decree No. 144 (1973), which 
entitled local govermnents to an annual share of 20 per cent of the national internal 
revenue tax collections of the third preceding year.1 This provided local governments 
1
For example, in 1991 the internal revenue allotment to local governments should be equal to 20 percent 
of the national tax revenues collected by U1e Bureau of Internal Revenue (not earmarked for special 
funds and special accounts) in 1988. 
with a source of predictable and sizable income which could be integrated into the local 
budgeting process (Bahl and Schroeder, 1983 d) . 
However, Presidential Decree No. 144 was not fully implemented . It was 
amended by a series of decrees which made the distribution of the 20 per cent share in 
internal revenue tax collection of local governments virtually impossible. Presidential 
Decree No . 937 (1976) restricted the increase in the allotment of individual local 
government units to a maximum of 25 per cent of the preceding year's allotment. 
Presidential Decree No . 1231 (1977) pegged the amount of internal revenue allotment to 
the 1977 level from 1978 to 1980. In 1981 the cap was removed, and the 25 per cent 
ceiling on allot1nent increases was lifted for low income local governments. However, 
because of the budgetary constraints experienced by the central government, the internal 
revenue allotinent appropriated to local governments remained considerably below the 
20 per cent share prescribed under Presidential Decree No . 144. Worse, the 
appropriations were not fully released to local governments . From 1980 to 1990, the 
.amount appropriated averaged 12.8 per cent of the internal revenue of the third 
preceding year, while the actual amounts released averaged only 8.5 per cent. This 
resulted in uncertainty in local government finances, and hampered local government 
planning (World Bank, 1993). 
Presidential Decree No . 144 also prescribed the method of allocating the internal 
revenue allotments among local government units . Initially, only provinces, municipalities 
and cities were entitled to the allotments . In 1974, the barangays were included among 
the recipients of the allotments (Presidential Decree 559, 1974). Ten per cent of the 
internal revenue allotment was allocated to barangays. The remainder was then 
distributed as follows : 
Provinces - 30 % 
Municipalities - 45 % 
Cities 25% 
At each level, except for barangays, the allotments were allocated to individual 
local government units based on a formula : 10 per cent of the allotments was distributed 
equally among the individual units, 20 per cent was distributed proportionally to their 
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land area, and 70 per cent was distributed proportionally to their population size. The 
first factor was related to the fixed costs of running governments. The second and third 
were meant to account for the differences in expenditure needs. 
The specific tax allotment established in 1974, consisted of fixed shares of local 
governments in the proceeds of specific taxes on a variety of petroleum products. 
Presidential Decree 436 (1974) earmarked to local governments, based on the second 
preceding year's collection: P 0.20 per liter of lubricating oil ( or 40 per cent of the 
national tax); P 0.005 per liter of bunker fuel oil (or 33 per cent of the national tax; P 
0.40 per liter of naphtha, gasoline, and other distilled oil products ( or 14 per cent of 
national tax), and P 0. 005 per liter of diesel fuel ( or 5 per cent of the national tax). 
Twenty-five per cent of the specific tax allotments was set aside for the 
barangays. It accrued to a special fund ad1ninistered by the President, which was used 
for the 1naintenance and construction of barangay roads. The re1nainder was distributed 
as follows: 
Provinces - 20 % 
Municipalities - 30 % 
Cities - 50 % 
The horizontal distribution to individual local government units in each level 
followed the formula for the distribution of internal revenue allotments. The proceeds 
went to the local governments' infrastructure funds, which were earmarked for the 
maintenance and repair of local roads and bridges, as well as for the construction of new 
projects. 
The local government revenue stabilization fund was initiated under the General 
Appropriations Act of 1987 to cover the shortfalls in specific tax allotments. It became 
part of the succeeding annual appropriations Acts, to insure that specific tax allotments 
did not fall below the 1986 level. The amount was based on the difference between the 
current year's specific tax allotment and that of 1986. 
In addition to the 20 per cent internal revenue allotment of local governments, 
Presidential Decree 144 set aside 5 per cent of internal revenue tax collection (not 
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earmarked for special funds and accounts) into a local government fund, known as the 
Budgetary Aid to Local Government Units. This fund was used for specific project 
grants. Local goverrunents could tap this fund by sub1nitting project proposals to a 
committee consisting of the Secretaries of Finance, Budget and Local G9vernment. The 
com1nittee was responsible for evaluating local goverrunent project proposals, and giving 
technical advice to the President, who administered the fund. Funding for approved 
projects was released directly to the local govermnents, which implemented the projects. 
Table 8.1 shows the amount of central govermnent transfers to local goverrunents 
in the period 1986- 92. Revenue sharing consisting of internal revenue allotment, specific 
tax allottnent and local goverrunent revenue stabilisation fund had grown from P3 .2 
billion in 1986 to P 15 .4 billion in 1992 registering an average annual nominal growth rate 
of 26 per cent, Revenue sharing almost doubled in 1992 with the new local government 
code. Revenue sharing during the period accounted for an average of 76 per cent of 
central government transfers . Grants accounted for an average share of 24 per cent, but 
.they were very uncertain; their a1nounts fluctuated over the years. They were to be 
phased out beginning in 1992. 
Table 8.1 Central government transfers to local government revenues, Philippines, 1986-92 
Average 
Current amount (billion pesos) annual growth 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 rate 1 (%) Revenue sharing 3.2 3.4 4.2 5.0 7.0 9.5 15.4 25 .9 Grants 0.7 0.6 3.6 2.5 2.7 3.4 0.5 7.7 Share in resource n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. revenue 
Total transfers2 4.0 4.0 7.8 7.5 9.7 12.9 16.0 24.0 
Distribution (per cent) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Average Revenue sharing 81.6 84.2 53 .8 67.0 72.2 73.7 96.4 75.6 Grants 18.4 15.8 46.2 33.0 27.8 26.3 3.4 24.4 Share in resource n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.2 n.a. revenue 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 100.0 Note: 
1
Estimated using ordinary least squares regression 
2Totals do not tally due to rounding. 
Source of basic data: Philippines, Commission on Audit, 1986-92, Annual Reports 1986-92. 
Aside from revenue sharing and specific project grants, other forms of central 
government assistance to local goverrunents were collectively referred to as National 
Assistance to Local Goverrunent Units. These included: the Barangay Administration 
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Fund, the Concrete Barangay Roads/Multi-purpose Pavements Construction and 
Improvement Program, and the Local Roads Itnprovement, Repair and Maintenance 
Program. In contrast to the revenue sharing and specific project grants, these programs 
were carried out by central government agencies. Funding for these infrastructure 
projects was given to · the Department of Public Works and Highways, which 
imple1nented the projects through its district offices. The Barangay Administration Fund, 
which was used to pay the salaries of some barangay officials, was administered by the 
Department of Local Government. 
Table 8.2 Budgetary allocations for national assistance to local government units, 
1991 
Item 
Revenue sharing3 
Budgetary aid to local government units 
Concrete barangay roads/ 
multipurpose pavement construction program 
Local road construction, repair and maintenance 
Barangay administration fund 
Others 
Total national assistance to local government units 
An1ount 
{Billion Pesos 2 
10.2 
1.5 
1.5 
1.3 
1.5 
0.6 
16.4 
Share 
{Percent2 
62 
9 
9 
8 
9 
- 4 
100 
Note: 3Co1nbined internal revenue allot1nent, specific tax allotment and local government 
revenue stabilization fund 
Source: Republic of the Philippines, Department of Budget and Management 1992. 
Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Finance. 
Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) changed the system of 
national assistance to local goverrunents in conjunction with refonns in their expenditure 
functions and revenue raising powers. The internal revenue allotment was increased and 
other forms of national assistance to local govermnent units were abolished . The Act 
raised the share of local governments in the internal revenue tax collection to 30 per cent 
in the first year of its implementation, then to 3 5 in the second year, and finally to 40 per 
cent thereafter. The share of local governments is computed on the basis of the gross 
collections of national internal revenue taxes of the third year preceding the current year. 
In the first year, local governments receive an additional amount corresponding to the 
salaries of central govermnent personnel transferred to them. Each local government unit 
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automatically receives its allotment without preconditions. However, in cases where the 
central government experiences an urunanageable public sector deficit, the President 
(upon the reco1nmendation of the Secretaries of Finance, Interior and Local Government, 
and Budget, and in consultation with the officers of the two Houses of Congress, and the 
presidents of the leagues of local goverrunents) can reduce the allotment to local 
governments. Such reduction should not be so great that local goverrunents receive less 
than 3 0 per cent of the national internal revenues. 
The Local Goverrunent Code of 1991 also 1nodified the allocation of the 
allotment a1nong local governments. It increased the share of the barangays, and 
correspondingly, reduced the share of provinces, cities and municipalities. 
Presidential Decree No. 144, Republic Act 7160 
as amended 
Provinces 25 % 23 % 
Municipalities 40% 34% 
Cities 25% 23 % 
Baran gays 10 % 20% 
The distribution formula at each local goverrunent level was also changed, giving 
less weight to population and more weight to land area and equal shares. The reasons 
for this were "to decongest the urban centres and develop the countryside", and "to 
effect a 1nore equitable distribution of the internal revenue allotment" (Local 
Development Assistance Progra1n, 1994, citing the "Transcript of the deliberations of the 
Lower House on the Local Goverrunent Code", 15 August 1990). 
Population 
Land area 
Equal share 
Presidential Decree No. 
144, as amended 
70% 
20% 
10 % 
Republic Act 7160 
50% 
25 % 
25 % 
In 1992, the first year that Republic Act 7160 went into effect, the local 
goverrunent received P28 .1 billion. This consisted of P 18. l billion representing the 
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internal revenue allotment appropriated under the General Appropriations Act of 1992, 
and P 10 billion representing the costs of devolved functions, which included the salaries 
of central government personnel transferred to local govermnents. Executive Order No. 
507 directed that Pl.6 billion of the amount corresponding to the costs of devolved 
functions be added to the internal revenue allot1nent. Therefore, in 1992 the internal 
revenue allot1nent of local governments rose to P 19. 7 billion, an increase of 13 2 per cent 
over the previous year's allotment of P8 . 5 billion. In 1993, the internal revenue allotment 
amounted to P36. 7 billion, representing a 332 per cent increase over the 1991 allotment 
(Local Development Assistance Progra1n, 1994). 
Aside fro1n the internal revenue allotment, Republic Act No. 7160 entitled local 
governments to a share in the gross collection of the national government from taxes and 
fees, and proceeds derived by any government agency or government-owned corporation 
in connection with the utilisation and development of natural resources in their respective 
territorial jurisdictions. The share of local govermnents is computed on the basis of the 
. collection or proceeds of the preceding fiscal year. The local governments receive either 
40 per cent of central government collection or 1 per cent of the gross receipt of 
govermnent-owned or controlled corporations, whichever is higher. 
The share in the utilisation or develop1nent of natural resources is not expected to 
equally benefit all local governments since only those where the national resource is 
located are entitled to the share. When the natural resource is located in the province the 
share is distributed as follows : barangays (35 per cent), cities and municipalities ( 45 per 
cent), and the province (20 per cent). When the natural resource is located in an 
independent city, the share is divided between the city (65 per cent) and its component 
barangays (35 per cent). If the natural resource is located in more than one local 
government unit ( e.g. two or 1nore provinces or cities, etc.) the share is divided on the 
basis of population (70 per cent) and land area (30 per cent) . The are no available data to 
estimate how much share local governments will receive from natural resource related 
collections and proceeds. 
Other forms of central government assistance to local government were, 
however, abolished. If the total amount of national assistance to local government units 
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m 1991 is used as the basis of comparison, the net increments to the resources of local 
governments was modest. The total transfers in 1992 atnounted to only a 71 per cent 
increase over the P 16.4 billion total national assistance to local governments in 1991, 
while the allotment for 1993 constituted only a 124 per cent increase. 
The internal revenue -allotment and vertical fiscal irnbalance 
A major purpose of central government transfers is to enable local governments 
to carry out their expenditure functions . Local governments in the Philippines are given 
very limited revenue raising powers so that they are very dependent on transfers from the 
central goverrnnent. Republic Act 7160 widened the gap between the expenditure 
requirements and revenue raising powers of local gover11JTients. It devolved to local 
gover11JTients the responsibility for the administration and provision of several 
goverrnnent services previously held by central goverrnnent agencies, but it added very 
little to their revenue raising powers. 
Manasan (1992b) enquired whether the internal revenue allotment prescribed in 
Republic Act 7160 would be sufficient to match the new expenditure functions devolved 
to local gover11t11ents. She calculated the difference between the projected increment in 
internal revenue allotment of local governments in 1993, when the new local government 
code would have been fully implemented, and the inflation adjusted cost of devolved 
functions and other national assistance to local govermnent units in 1991. The latter 
represented local services whose financing were transferred fro1n the central to the local 
governments. The cost of devolved functions was based on the 1992 budgets of national 
goverrnnent agencies corresponding to the functions transferred to local government. 
Manasan noted that at the aggregate level, a 3 5 per cent internal revenue allotment to 
local gover11JTients for 1993 would result in a surplus to local governments of around 
P560 tnillion. However, the effect on each level of local gover11JTient varies. Her 
projection, based on actual data frotn a limited sample of local government units, showed 
that urban, industrial first class provinces would have surpluses, while rural, agricultural, 
third class provinces would have deficits. Both low and high income class municipalities 
would experience financial difficulties. 
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A World Bank (1993) study corroborated the findings of Manasan. It simulated 
the effects of Republic Act 7160 on local finances based on the local government 
budgets of 1990. The results showed that at the aggregate level, the increments in local 
government income tend to outweigh the additional expenditures. At 3 5 and 40 per cent 
shares of internal revenue, local goverrunents would have had surpluses in 1990 of 
P0.2 billion and P2. l btllion, respectively. However, at a 30 per cent share, the increase 
in expenditures would have been greater than the increase in revenues, resulting in a 
deficit of P2. 7 billion. At each level of local goverrunent, the simulation results showed 
that had Republic Act 7160 been operative in 1990, provinces and municipalities would 
have been in deficit, while cities and barangays would have had surpluses. 
A more recent study of the Local Development Assistance Program (1994) based 
on actual data for 1993, showed that the new allotment syste1n under Republic Act 7160 
provided local goverrunents with 1nore financial resources. The total allotment for 1993 
amounted to P36 . 7 billion which was higher than the 1991 allotment by P27.1 billion . 
. Netting out the costs corresponding to the devolved functions which amounted to P6.6 
billion, the net transfer ( or surplus) to local government amounted to P20. 5 billion in 
1993. Note that unlike the previous two studies, the calculation of the net transfer did 
not take into account other national assistance to local government units2 which were 
abolished under Republic Act 7160. Thus, the calculated amount of net transfer is 
overstated. With respect to the different levels of govermnent, the study showed that 
cities had the highest net transfer followed by municipalities and provinces. The net 
transfer of cities amounted to P6 billion, and that of the municipalities a close second at 
PS. 8 billion. The P3 billion net transfer to provinces was only half that to the cities. All 
local government units, except for two provinces (Bataan and Catanduanes) had positive 
net transfers. 
In these studies, the costs of devolved functions were based on the previous 
budgets of the national goverrunent agencies. Manasan (19926 ), and the World Bank 
(1993) noted certain li1nitations in this approach. First, the budgets of the national 
2
The data on national assistance lo local government units (NALGU) are not disaggregated by local 
government units. Manasan (1992) and the World Bank (1993) made their own estimates of the national 
assistance received by each local government unit. 
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government agencies are likely to underestimate the costs of devolved functions because 
of the spending cuts of the national govermnent in these services, as a result of its 
budgetary difficulties. Second, local goverrunents may have different priorities; they 1nay 
want different levels and composition of services than those the national government 
agencies used to provide. Finally, there could be some economies of scale in the 
provision of these services, which individual local governments could not exploit. Local 
government provision of the devolved services may entail a different cost structure. 
An even greater limitation of these studies, which can be attributed to the li1nited 
data available, is that they si1nply compare the incre1nents in the net transfers to local 
governments, and the costs of providing the services devolved to the1n. The internal 
revenue allotment should be evaluated in the wider context of all the services that have 
to be delivered by local governments and the revenues they could generate- that is, 
whether the allotment is sufficient to enable local govenunents to provide adequate levels 
of services asswning they exercise reasonable levels of revenue effort. Given the limited 
.data currently available, this is an i1nportant aspect of central government transfers to 
local governments which merits future study. 
Do central governn1ent transfers promote equity? 
Based on the theoretical and conceptual framework presented in Chapter 5, the 
equity of central government transfers is evaluated in relation to the fiscal capacities of 
local governments in a given geographic and administrative area, specifically, the 
province. The revenue shares and grants of provinces are examined in relation to the two 
components of fiscal capacities- revenue capacities and expenditures needs- and their 
summary measures- the fiscal gaps. The distribution of central government transfers to 
local governments is considered to promote equity if it provides higher amounts to 
provinces with lower revenue capacities and/or higher expenditure needs, or if it 
minimizes the disparities in their fiscal gaps. 
As in the previous chapters, the analysis is based on the local government 
financial statistics for 1991, before the new local government code took effect. The 
equity of the revenue sharing syste1n is examined for three cases. Case 1 represents the 
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actual distribution of revenue shares to local govermnents in 1991 . Case 2 simulates a 
distribution of revenue shares based on the provision of Presidential Decree No . 144, 
which was the basis of revenue sharing during that year. Since it was not fully 
implemented the distribution of revenue shares in the two cases is likely to differ. Case 3 
simulates a distribution of revenue shares under the new local govermnent code. The 
simulations are based on the total shares of the 65 sample provinces in 1991. The total 
amount is first divided by levels of govermnent (i.e., provinces, municipalities and cities), 
and then allocated to individual local government units using the formula based on 
population, land area and equal shares. Table 8.3 provides a statistical su1nmary of the 
revenue shares per capita of the provinces in the three cases, and their per capita grants. 3 
Table 8.3 Variations in distribution of central government transfers per capita, 
by province 
Maxi1num 
Minimu1n 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Skewness 
Coefficient of Variation 
Source: Author's calculations 
Revenue shares 
Case 1 Case 2 
370.60 377.95 
112.23 118.19 
177.54 177.55 
48.47 49.16 
1.44 1.74 
0.27 0.28 
Grants 
Case 3 
460.75 412.39 
97.09 3.97 
191.12 5f73 
72.55 60.44 
1.39 3.77 
0.38 1.08 
Revenue capacities and transfers. Horizontal inequity or unequal treatment of 
equals can occur as a result of unequal revenue capacities of local governments . To 
provide a given level of service, local governments with low revenue capacities have to 
impose higher tax rates on their residents than local governments with high revenue 
capacities. Transfers are a policy instruments which can address the problem of 
horizontal inequity. 
The distribution of central government transfers promotes equity if local 
governments with low revenue capacities are given relatively higher amounts than those 
with high revenue capacities. Empirically, this could be examined by the correlation 
3Sce Appendix 8.1 for the breakdown by province. 
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between the transfers and revenue capacities of local goverrunents esti1nated in Chapter 
6. Table 8.4 presents the Spearman rank correlation coefficients be.tween revenue 
capacities and revenue shares, and between revenue capacities and grants . 
Table 8.4 Correlation between revenue capacities and transfers, by province 
Cases 
Revenue shares 
Case 1 
Case 2 
Case 3 
Grants 
\ Source: Author's calculations 
S2earman rank correlation coefficient 
-0.3976 
-0.4177 
-0 .3871 
-0.1219 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficients in all the three cases of revenue 
sharing were negative and significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level of 
significance. They indicate that the distribution of revenue shares tended to promote 
equity. Provinces with low revenue capacities received higher revenue shares, and vice 
versa. The correlation coefficient between grants and revenue capaciti~s was also 
negative, but it was not significant. Among the three cases, the revenue sharing 
distribution under Presidential Decree No. 144 appears to be the most progressive, and 
that under the new local goverrunent code, the least progressive. However, this is not 
sufficient to determine which of the revenue sharing systems is the most equitable. 
The coefficient of inequality provides additional information on the equity of 
central government transfers. The transfers were added to the revenue capacities of each 
province, and the coefficients of inequality of the augmented revenue capacities in each 
case were computed . Table 8.5 shows the coefficients of inequality of revenue capacities 
of provinces without and with transfers. 
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Table 8.5 Coefficients of inequality of revenue capacities of provinces 
Cases 
Revenue capacities without transfers 
Revenue capacities aug1nented by 
revenue shares: 
Case 1 
Case 2 
Case 3 
Revenue capacities augmented by grants 
Source: Author's calculations 
Coefficient of inequality 
19.30 
11 .02 
10.69 
11.26 
23 .24 
The coefficients of inequality of augmented revenue capacities in all three cases 
of revenue sharing were lower than revenue capacities without revenue shares 
confinning that the revenue sharing distribution tended to promote equity. The 
coefficients also indicated that the most progressive distribution of revenue shares in 
relation to revenue capacity tended to be the most equitable. The coefficient of inequality 
• of revenue capacities aug1nented by grants was higher than without them, indicating that 
the distribution of grants was inequitable. 
Expenditure needs and transfers. Equalisation of revenue capacities, however, 
does not insure horizontal equity among individuals living in different areas . Differences 
in costs of providing services due to factors beyond local governments' control also 
cause horizontal inequity. Local governments in high cost areas had to spend more and 
charge their residents higher tax rates than in low cost areas. Thus, to promote equity, 
relatively higher transfers should be given to the former to compensate for their cost 
disabilities or expenditure needs. 
Table 8.6 shows the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between revenue 
shares and expenditure needs estimated in Chapter 7. They were all positive, but the 
correlation coefficients were weak, and not significantly different fro1n zero. Thus, it 
could not be concluded that revenue sharing distribution promotes equity in relation to 
expenditure needs. Grants appeared to be negatively related to expenditure needs, but 
the relation was not significant. 
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Table 8.6 Correlation between expenditure needs and transfers, by province 
Cases 
Revenue shares 
Case 1 
Case 2 
Case 3 
Grants 
Source: Author's calculations 
S2earman rank correlation coefficient 
0.0642 
0.0729 
0.0786 
-0.1402 
The coefficients of inequality of expenditure needs can also be used to assess the 
equity of transfers. Since transfers are expected to compensate for cost disabilities, they 
can be subtracted fro1n the esti1nated expenditure needs of the provinces, and the 
coefficients of inequality of expenditure needs before and after transfers can then be 
c01npared. Table 8.6 shows that the coefficients of inequality of the co1npensated 
expenditure needs were higher than the uncompensated expenditure needs, suggesting 
that transfers tended to worsen inequality. The revenue sharing under the new local 
· govenunent code tended to be the 1nost inequitable. 
Table 8.7 Coefficients of inequality of expenditure needs of provinces 
Cases 
Expenditure needs without revenue shares 
Expenditure needs compensated by 
revenue shares: 
Case 1 
Case 2 
Case 3 
Expenditure needs compensated by grants 
Source: Author's calculations 
Coefficients of inequality 
2.03 
12.01 
11.66 
18 .96 
7.30 
While the revenue sharing distributions pro1noted equity in revenue capacities, 
they seemed to worsen inequity in expenditure needs. This is because the two measures 
of fiscal capacities are weakly related. The Speannan rank correlation coefficient 
between revenue capacities and expenditure needs was only -0.1579, which is not 
significantly different from zero. So1ne provinces ( e.g. Metro Manila, Cebu, Cavite ) had 
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both relatively high revenue capacities and expenditure needs, and son1e provinces ( e.g . 
Ro1nblon, Western Samar, Mindoro Oriental) had both relatively low revenue capacities 
and expenditure needs. High revenue shares to the former would pron1ote equity on the 
expenditure side, but would worsen inequity on the revenue side; while high revenue 
shares to the latter would yield the opposite result. There should be a strong negative 
relation between revenue capacities and expenditure needs for the distribution of revenue 
shares to simultaneously promote equity in both measures of fiscal capacities. 
Fiscal gap and revenue shares. The fiscal gap provides a summary 1neasure of 
fiscal capacity which avoids this dilemma. The fiscal gap measures the difference 
between what the province must spend to provide a basic package of local services and 
its available revenues at a standard level of revenue effort, that is (Bradbury, et al. , 
1984): 
Gi = ECi -tBi (8.1) 
The first tenn on the right hand side of the fiscal gap equation representing the 
_expenditure need of province i, is equal to the product of its cost index ( C;) and the 
chosen standard of public service (E) . The average provincial per capita expenditure was 
used as the standard. The second tenn, representing the standardized revenue capacity of 
province i, is calculated by multiplying its revenue capacity (B;) and the chosen standard 
of revenue effort (t). The standard revenue effort was set equal to the average revenue 
effort computed in the random coefficient regression model, that is 55 per cent of 
revenue capacity. The level of public service and revenue effort are policy choice 
variables; they are standardised so that the fiscal gap reflects differences in fiscal capacity 
that are solely due to factors beyond the control of local govermnents. 
Figure 8.1 presents the fiscal gap per capita of the 65 sa1nple provinces. Except 
for Metro Manila, all had positive per capita fiscal gaps. Their expenditure needs 
exceeded their revenue capacities. Among the provinces with high fiscal gaps were Sulu, 
Ifugao and Mountain Province. Individuals living in these provinces were fiscally 
disadvantaged . Either they received substandard services for the same tax rates, or paid 
higher tax rates for the sa1ne level of services. The provinces with low fiscal gaps, aside 
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from Metro Manila, were Zarnbales, Laguna and Rizal (see Appendix 8.2 ) . Their 
residents had a relative fiscal advantage over residents of other provinces. 
Central government transfers could minimize the variability in fiscal gaps and 
promote horizontal equity by compensating the fiscal disabilities of the provinces 
proportionately to their fiscal gaps . Table 8.8 shows the Speannan rank correlation 
coefficients between fiscal gaps and revenue shares under the three different revenue 
sharing distributions . The coefficients are all positive and significantly different from zero 
at the 5 per cent level. Provinces with relatively high fiscal gaps tended to obtain 
relatively high revenue shares. The correlation coefficient between fiscal gaps and grants 
was also positive, but not significant. 
Table 8.8 Correlation between fiscal gaps and transfers, by province 
Cases 
Revenue shares 
Case 1 
Case 2 
Case 3 
Grants 
Source: Author's calculation 
S12earman rank correlation coefficient 
0.3700 
0.3753 
0.3497 
0.0556 
The distribution of central government transfers does not appear to be in 
proportion to the relative fiscal gaps of the provinces. Table 8.9 indicates that the 
coefficients of inequality of the c01npensated fiscal gaps were higher than without 
transfers, suggesting that transfers tended to worsen inequity. The revenue sharing 
distribution under the new local government code again appeared to be the most 
inequitable. 
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Table 8.9 Coefficients of inequality of fiscal gaps of provinces 
Cases 
Fiscal gaps without revenue shares 
Fiscal gaps compensated by 
revenue shares : 
Case l 
Case 2 
Case 3 
Fiscal gaps compensated by grants 
Source: Author's computation 
Coefficient of inequality 
10.50 
40 .53 
40.49 
59.45 
17.82 
Table 8 .10 provides a su1nmary description of the computed fiscal gaps without 
and with revenue shares in the different revenue sharing distributions . The coefficients of 
variation of the co1npensated fiscal gaps were all higher than without revenue shares, 
corroborating the coefficients of inequality. 
Table 8.10 Variations in fiscal gaps (pesos per capita), by province 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Coefficient of Variation 
Source: Author's calculations 
Fiscal gaps without 
revenue shares 
756 
-288 
458 
144 
0.31 
Compensated fiscal gaps 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
619 616 619 
-400 -408 -3 86 
281 281 267 
135 
0.48 
135 
0.48 
136 
0.51 
The inequity of revenue sharing is likely to be higher if barangays are included in 
the analysis . Under the new local government code, the share of barangays in the 
internal revenue allotment was increased from 10 to 20 per cent. Each barangay with a 
population of not less than 100 inhabitants was entitled to receive at least :p80,000. Part 
of the remaining amount was to be distributed equally among all barangays and part to 
be distributed on the basis of their population. Provinces with smaller and numerous 
barangays, therefore, would receive greater revenue shares per capita than those with 
bigger and fewer barangays. Considering, the wide diversity in the size and number of 
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barangays across provinces, this is likely to result in considerable inequity in revenue 
sharing. 
The formula for the allocation of revenue shares under the new local government 
code, particularly the higher weight assigned to equal sharing, would be likely to result in 
greater horizontal inequity. It increases the proporiion of revenue shares that is 
distributed independently of revenue capacities and expenditure needs of local 
governments. It is biased in favour of provinces with highly fragmented local 
govermnents. 
Since the enactment of the new local goverrunent code in 1991, one new 
province, 9 municipalities and 93 barangays have been created. This may have 
unfavourable effects on the costs of local government services. The expenditure 
regression result in the previous chapter showed that local government fragmentation 
results in higher per capita expenditures. A Local Development Assistance Program 
(1994) study also noted that allocation of funds to barangays could dissipate scarce 
government resources. Barangays depend ahnost solely on revenue shares. In 1993, the 
average revenue share of barangays after deducting salaries for personal services was 
only P78,850. This was too small to finance any useful projects. 
Compared to other countries, local governments in the Philippines are highly 
fragrnented with 77 provinces, 60 cities, 1542 municipalities and 40,904 barangays. 
Indonesia, a much bigger country with a land area almost 6.5 times that of the 
Philippines and a population 3 titnes that of the Philippines, is divided administratively 
into 27 provinces, 296 regencies or municipalities, and approximately 3,320 districts and 
66,000 urban and rural villages (Bawazier, 1988). Japan has only two tiers of local 
governments : prefectures and municipalities. It has consistently promoted the merger of 
municipalities because many of the existing ones are considered too small for the efficient 
supply of modern services. Japan had 47 prefectures and 3,245 municipalities (655 cities 
and 2,590 towns and villages) in 1990, compared to 10,520 municipalities in 1945 
(Yonehara, 1981; FAIR, 1992). 
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Do central government transfers reduce revenue efforts of local governments? 
A major concern regarding central government transfers is that they could result 
m lower revenue efforts on the part of local goverrunents. Since transfers are given 
without incentives for higher revenue efforts, there is a strong possibility that they 1night 
be used by local govermnents to substitute for their own revenues- that is, local taxes 
can be reduced without reducing the level of local expenditures. This is cause for 
concern because transfers are intended to augment local govermnent incomes and 
increase provision of local services which are in inadequate supply. 
Bahl and Schroeder (1983d) noted, however, that central govermnent transfers 
may not be substitutive as suspected. Given the large backlog of urunet demand for 
public services, transfers are most likely to be spent on the provision of local goverrunent 
services. The studies reviewed earlier also suggest that money received by the local 
goverrunents tends to increase public expenditures and not be passed on to the private 
sector as ta?( cuts- the phenomenon known as 'the flypaper effect' . There is also a view 
that central goverrunent transfers could result in greater local government revenue effort 
since additional revenues may be needed to operate and maintain the new facilities and 
services that are provided with the aid of transfers (World Bartle, 1993). 
The estimated revenue efforts of the provinces in Chapter 6 were regressed on 
the two major types of central government transfers and other factors acting as control 
variables. Various functional forms and specifications were tried in the estimation. Some 
of the estimation results are shown in Table 8.10 . Only revenue capacity and proportion 
of population in agriculture and services ( equation 2) appear to be significantly related to 
revenue effort. Provinces with high revenue capacities tended to have high revenue 
efforts . Most probably they have more qualified staff and the necessary tools, such as tax 
maps, to increase revenue collection efficiency. This result, however has to be taken with 
caution as the esti1nated relationship appeared highly unstable. In the other specifications 
of the 1nodel, the relationship between revenue effort and revenue capacity was not 
significant. In general, the independent variables did not perform well in explaining the 
variation in revenue efforts. The variation in revenue efforts could be due to other factors 
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( e.g ., preferences and policies, staff qualifications, political leadership) which are difficult 
to quantify. 
Table 8.11 Estirnation 1:esults of the revenue effort model regression results 
Dependent variable: Revenue effort 
No. of observations 66 66 ·66 
Regression coefficients and t-values: 
Regressors: Equation l Equation 2 Equation 3 
Constant 31.07 25 .99 52 .08 
(1.39) (1.30) 10.88 
Per capita internal revenue allotment 0.01 -0.007 0.01 
(0 .24) (-0 .17) (0.48) 
Per capita grants 0.03 0.03 -0.005 
(1.05) (1.22) (-0.37) 
Per capita revenue capacity 0.05 0.04 
(1.51) (1.67)* 
Average per capita income -0.63E-3 
(-0 .08) 
Population density -0.002 -0.002 
(-1.38) (-1.35) 
Pop'n in urban areas -0.07 
(0.49) 
Land area -0.57E-3 
(-0.78) 
Local road density -3.04 -2.55 
(-0.86) (-0 .75) 
Political fragmentation -85986 .1 -57217.0 
(-0.92) -0.70 
Population. in agriculture & services 0.37 0.40 
(1.87)* (2.18)* 
Consumer price index 0.03 
(0.29) 
R-squared 0.13 0.11 0.004 
Adjusted R-squared -0.05 -0 .12 -0.03 
Note: *Significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level (2-tailcd test) 
Source: Author's calculation 
The null hypotheses that revenue shares and grants have no effect on revenue 
efforts cannot be rejected. Central government transfers neither stimulate nor substitute 
for local revenues. The concern regarding the substitutive effects of transfers was 
unfounded and suggestions of incorporating revenue effort incentives in the allocation of 
transfers, particularly revenue sharing, appear unwarranted. Introducing revenue effort 
incentives in the revenue sharing allocation formula may result in the dilution of its equity 
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effects. If increasing local government revenue effort is considered a priority objective, it 
may be better to set a separate amount that would be distributed solely on the basis of 
revenue performance. 
Revenue sharing alternatives for the Philippines 
Revenue sharing usually serves two major purposes: I) to bridge the gap between 
the expenditure requirements and revenue capacities of recipient governments, and 2) to 
enable them to provide comparable levels of services if they exert co1nparable revenue 
effo1is. The former deals with vertical fiscal i1nbalance and pertains to the total amount 
of revenue sharing funds . The latter is about horizontal fiscal balance or equity, and is 
concerned with the manner of its distribution. The two purposes are related, but each can 
be achieved independently. 
The previous discussion noted that the revenue sharing program in the Philippines 
has failed to serve either objective. The revenue sharing progra1n is complicated by local 
govermnent frag1nentation . The existence of several tiers of local govermnents makes it 
difficult to determine the appropriate amount of revenue sharing that is necessary to 
bridge the gap between the expenditure requirements and revenue capacities of local 
governments at each tier. For example, it was noted with regard to the recent 
decentralization reforms, that although the increments in revenue share of the aggregate 
local government sector may be sufficient or more than the costs of devolved functions, 
some local govermnent tiers may experience budget difficulties. Provinces and 
municipalities are likely to experience budget deficits while cities and barangays enjoy 
surpluses. 
Local government fragmentation has also worked against horizontal fiscal equity. 
The revenue sharing allocation formula, particularly its equal sharing component, is 
biased in favour of provinces with highly fragmented local govermnent units. This in turn 
encourages greater local government fragmentation, which not only leads to greater 
inequity but also to higher costs in providing government services. In general, the current 
revenue sharing fonnula is not directly based on the fiscal capacities of local 
govermnents; thus, it can hardly be expected to achieve equity. 
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The revenue sharing practices of the countries described in the Appendix of this 
chapter provide a practical guide for reforming the current revenue sharing system in the 
Philippines. Reform can be initiated at the provincial level where expenditure needs and 
revenue capacities- or fiscal gaps- can be estimated with available data. The total 
revenue sharing fund can · be allocated by province using a formula that explicitly take 
into account expenditure need and revenue capacity factor (See Appendix 8.3) . The 
revenue share of each province can then be divided among the provincial government 
and the component cities, municipalities and barangays. 
A better alternative, considering that cities are administratively independent of the 
provinces, is first to divide the total revenue sharing fund among provinces and cities 
using the sa1ne formula, and then to divide each share among their component local 
goverrunent units. At present, however, most of the socio-econo1nic data necessary for 
estimating revenue capacity and expenditure need are limited to provinces and highly 
urbanized cities. A data base for the cities and municipalities should therefore be part of 
the agenda for refonning the revenue sharing program. 
-
It is difficult to make any prescription regarding the distribution of revenue share 
to the different local government tiers that will achieve vertical fiscal balance. Most 
services cannot be regarded as the sole responsibility of any single tier. With a highly 
fragmented local government, the benefit span of many services are likely to extend 
beyond the boundaries of each local goverrunent. There are also services which have 
economies of scale. The size and fiscal capacities of local government units at each tier 
vary and the efficient provision of local government services may require a different 
organisational set-up or assignment of functions among local government units within 
each province or city. Thus, it is better to leave the decision regarding the distribution of 
revenue shares to the different local government tiers within the province or city. A 
better balance may be struck through a process of consultation rather than a rigid and 
fixed formula which is not suited to all local goverrunents. The procedures and formula 
for revenue sharing, however, should be transparent and based on objective indicators. 
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Su111mary 
Central goverrnnent transfers to local goverrnnents can be broadly classified into two 
categories: revenue sharing and grants. Revenue sharing entails the allocation of fixed 
proportions of central government tax collections to local goverrnnents on the basis of 
fonnula prescribed by law. Grants consist of monies given to local goverrnnents, usually 
under the discretion of the President, to finance specific projects. There used to be three 
types of revenue sharing: internal revenue allotment, specific tax allotment,. and the local 
government revenue stabilisation fund. The internal revenue allotment was the 1nost 
significant of them. Presidential Decree No. 144 1nandated that local goverrnnents be 
given an annual share of 20 per cent in the national internal revenue tax collections of the 
third preceding year. The internal revenue allotment and the specific tax allotment were 
first allocated to the different local government levels, and then divided to the various 
local goverrnnent units within each tier based on three criteria: population size, land area, 
and equal share. 
The laws governing revenue sharing, however, were not fully implemented due to 
budgetary constraint. The national goverrnnent appropriated less than the amount 
prescribed by law; worse, the appropriations were never fully released to local 
goverrnnents. In conjunction with the decentralisation reforms, Republic Act 7160 
unified all previous central government transfers into the internal revenue allotment, 
which was raised to a maxi1num of 40 per cent of the national internal revenue colJection. 
The new law also amended the sharing formula by increasing the allocation of barangays, 
and by giving 1nore weight to the equal sharing factor. 
A number of studies had enquired whether the new internal revenue allotment 
would be adequate to match the new expenditure functions devolved to local 
govermnents. They all showed that full implementation of the new law would result in an 
overall surplus to local goverrunents, with cities and barangays as the biggest 
beneficiaries. However, the internal revenue allot1nent should be evaluated in the wider 
context of all services that have to be delivered by local governments and the revenues 
they could generate. Given the limited data currently available, this is an important aspect 
of central government transfers to local goverrunents which merits future study. 
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The equity of revenue sharing system was examined for three cases: ( 1) actual 
distribution; (2) Presidential Decree No. 144 allocation formula; and (3) Republic Act 
7160 allocation formula. The results show that provinces with low revenue capacity 
tended to receive proportionately higher revenue shares, and vice versa. However, there 
are indications that revenue shares were not proportionately distributed to the 
expenditure needs of provinces. Thus, while the revenue sharing distribution promoted 
equity in revenue capacities, they seemed to worsen inequity in expenditure needs. Using 
a summary measure of fiscal capacity, that is the expenditure need- revenue capacity gap 
or fiscal gap, the study reveals that the distribution of revenue shares is generally 
inequitable. Revenue shares were not distributed proportionately to the size of the fiscal 
gaps. The same is true for the distribution of grants . The study also shows that the 
revenue sharing distribution under Republic Act 7160 was the most inequitable. This can 
be partly blamed on the higher weight assigned to an equal share in the distribution 
formula, which is biased in favour of provinces with highly frag1nented local 
govermnents. 
-
Central govermnent transfers neither sti1nulate nor substitute for local revenues. 
The concern regarding the substitutive effects of transfers was unfounded . Suggestions 
of incorporating revenue effort incentives in the allocation of transfers, particularly 
revenue sharing 1nay only run counter to its equity objective. 
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Appendix 8. I Revenue shares and grants, by province (Pesos) 
Internal revenue allotment Grants 
Case I : Actual Case 2: P.O. No.144 Case 3: R.A. No.7160 
Province Total Per capita Total Per capita Total Per capita Total Per capita 
Metro Manila 892,036,977 112.23 955,182,960 120.17 780,276,498 98.17 137,766,083 17.33 
Abra 48,369,442 261.82 51,008,492 276.11 64,198,605 347 .50 13,497,633 73 .06 
Benguet 81,623,077 168.00 80,579,608 165.85 86,794,708 178.64 24,627,083 50.69 
lfugao 33,447,397 227.10 34,880,258 236.83 41,521,309 281.92 18,435,664 125.17 
Kalinga-Apayao 62,317,548 294.26 66,455,429 313 .80 77,240,062 364.73 12,883,806 60.84 
Mtn. Province 27,958,823 239.92 29,517,693 253 .29 36,770,909 315 .54 3,638,012 31 .22 
!locos Norte 86,381,162 187. 11 84,078,090 182.12 95,084,153 205 .96 22,600,147 48 .95 
Ilocos Sur 78,671,118 151.30 80,340,894 154.51 83 ,656,729 160.89 36,608,859 70.41 
La Union 72,095,273 131.38 73,815,401 134.52 69,867,576 127.32 226,297,448 412 .39 
Pangasinan 276,3 l 7,502 136.77 271,704,015 134.49 251,657,552 124.57 123,093,996 60.93 
Cagayan 138,561,572 166.97 144,366,040 173.96 141,765,217 170.83 21,683,964 26.13 
lsabela 171 ,370,3 19 158.63 181,096,611 167.63 174,790,882 161.79 185,124,571 171.36 
Nueva Viscaya 58,106,330 192.93 59,367,706 197.12 64,119,556 212.90 72,899,350 242.05 
Quirino 32,366,518 283.59 33,153,442 290.48 39,921,612 349.78 9,111,435 79.83 
Bataan 57,209,486 134.36 58,278,138 136.87 55,298,936 129.87 50,212,982 117.93 
Bulacan 172,54 1,197 114.63 179,677,982 119.37 146,549,215 97.36 57,388,324 38.13 
Nueva Ecija 207,946,839 158.41 202,662,649 154.39 209,361,704 159.49 44,947,022 34.24 
Pampanga 191,675,728 125.06 190,042,669 124.00 164,721,674 l 07.48 l 00,363,610 65.49 
Tarlac 110,535,380 128.57 113,517,558 132.04 100,006,368 116.33 60,817 ,192 70.74 \ 
Zambales 100,339,912 178.23 95,636,830 169.87 101,089,427 179.56 19,176,614 34.06 
Aurora 37,157,202 266.22 37,281,651 267 .11 44,131,916 316.19 2,187,999 15 .68 
Batangas 210,953,065 142.85 209,356,746 141.77 204,395,763 138.41 57,145,467 38.70 
Cavite 146,676,529 127.26 152,498,434 132.32 152,254,928 132.10 46,291,858 40.17 
Laguna 171 ,276,542 125.00 175,369,43 1 127.99 159,103,658 116.11 35,867,680 26.18 
Marinduque 28,020,154 151.03 29,636,154 159.74 31 ,988,667 172.42 17,047,420 91.89 
Mindoro 0cc. 64,280,774 227.47 66,608,645 235.71 72,402,860 256.21 7,421,799 26.26 
Mindoro Or. 91,250,062 165.89 87,489,878 159.06 84,420,778 153.48 11,993,865 21.81 
Palawan 195,782,429 370.60 199,667,636 377.95 243,408,315 460.75 20,625,236 39.04 
Quezon 211,084,281 153.80 210,835,176 153.62 203,491,497 148.27 16,698,043 12.17 
Rizal 110,060,204 112.60 115,525,707 118. l 9 94,903,181 97 .09 5,917,779 6.05 
Romblon 40,591,742 178.33 39,078,891 171.68 44,543,303 195.69 26,435,789 116.14 
Albay 129,490,405 143.28 125,527,431 138.89 119,865, 159 132.63 51,750,050 57.26 
. Camarines Nor. 58,911,708 150.68 58,519,825 149.67 57,417,985 146.86 4,685,281 11.98 
Camarines Sur 186,385,986 142.72 192,547,495 147.44 191,190,723 146.40 72,851,129 55.79 
Catanduanes 35,296,145 188.75 34,034,660 182.00 38,750,711 207.22 - 17,880,770 95 .62 
Masbate 93,028,448 155.21 92,593,159 154.49 89,826,545 149.87 11,675,854 19.48 
Sorsogon 74,188,274 141.86 73,416,026 140.39 69,456,614 132.81 10,160,866 19.43 
Aklan 57,918,078 152.22 57,282,930 150.55 58,117,297 152.74 27,102,348 71 .23 
Antique 64,102,206 157.75 63,889,790 157.22 64,925,449 159.77 14,536,239 35 .77 
Capiz 81,966,068 140.33 90,927,556 155.67 94,772,858 162.26 47,931,836 82.06 
Iloilo 245,963,383 139.32 239,574,494 135.70 224,420,037 127.12 123,630,723 70.03 
Negros 0cc. 402,980,255 178.55 372,768,959 165.17 393,951,693 174.55 68,478,723 30.34 
Bohol 139,129,953 146.70 141 ,988, 185 149.71 145,426,304 153.34 38,544,868 40.64 
Cebu 404,701,795 152.92 377,370,802 142.59 372,535,222 140.76 89,842,405 33.95 
Negros Or. 170,606,305 184.39 162, I 05,666 175.20 179,620,822 194.13 23,537,577 25.44 
Siquijor 15,631,911 211.44 14,90 1,208 201 .55 20,362,136 275.42 5,108,750 69.10 
Eastern Samar 69,104,890 209.83 66,745,911 202.67 73,986,157 224.65 8,805,449 26.74 
Leyte 242,555,485 163.25 232,023,841 156.16 240,994,022 162.20 34,807,090 23.43 
Northern Samar 70,005,941 182.47 68,264,839 177.93 73,255,279 190.94 21,363,511 55.68 
Western Samar 127,867,968 239.57 123,697,305 231 .76 145,327,073 272.28 16,604,301 31.11 
Southern Leyte 52,601,621 163.39 51,348,612 159.50 54,797,759 170.21 31,529,381 97.94 
Zamboanga N. 134,704,45 1 199.0 1 136,540, 199 201.73 156,0 13,379 230.50 41,298 ,490 61.01 
Zamboanga Sur 292,587,099 189.44 279,414,289 180.91 296,982,284 192.28 78 ,162,190 50.61 
Agusan Norte 98,791,491 212.25 90,432,396 194.29 l 02,782,279 220.82 14,993,619 32.21 
Agusan del Sur 94,174,213 223.82 97,747,567 232.31 l 03,080,643 244.99 1,670,465 3.97 
Bukidnon 136,840,387 162.15 140,205,218 166.14 133,823,328 158.58 9,878,473 11.7 l 
Camiguin 13,650,054 212.46 13,033,883 202.87 18,330,951 285.32 571,600 8.90 
Misamis 0cc. I 03,429,668 243 .73 89,600,126 211.14 117,122,831 276.00 5,746,018 13.54 
Misamis Or. 170,765,173 197.40 153,852,173 177.85 170,410,233 196.99 21,746,377 25.14 
Surigao Norte 89,090,021 209.14 81,154,556 190.51 95,949,095 225 .24 19,623,041 46.07 
Cotabato North 115,077,383 150.63 122,423,817 160.24 115,295,027 150.91 16,970,713 22.21 
Lanao del Norte 97,136,221 158.18 115,052,755 187.35 128,849,874 209.82 8,7!0,087 14.18 
Sultan Kudarat 74,281,081 170.41 76,681,708 175.91 76,621,677 175.78 25,910,623 59.44 
Sulu 64,510,126 137.26 65,953,975 140.34 64,353,236 136.93 19,623,766 41.76 
Maguindanao 118,979,944 157.02 123,126,554 162.49 125,106,481 165.10 10,536,796 13.91 
TOTAL 8,533,458,721 8,533,458,721 8,533,458,721 
Source: Author's calculation 
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Appendix 8.2 Fiscal Gaps, by province (in Pesos) 
Actual fiscal gap Compensated fiscal gap 
Province Internal revenue allotment Grants 
Case l Case 2 Case 3 
Metro Manila -167.96 -280.19 -288.13 -266.13 -185.29 
Abra 275.91 14.09 -0.19 -71.59 202.85 
Benguet 151.40 -16.60 -14.45 -27.24 100.71 
lfugao 351.95 124.85 115.12 70.03 226.78 
Kalinga-Apayao 321.00 26.74 7.20 -43 .73 260.16 
Mountain Province 329.73 89.81 76.44 14.20 298.5 l 
Ilocos Norte 227.29 40.18 45.17 21 .33 178.34 
llocos Sur 283.51 132.21 129.00 122.62 213.10 
La Union 227.13 95.75 92.61 99.81 -185.26 
Pangasinan 284.34 147.56 149.85 159.77 223.41 
Cagayan 266.25 99.28 92.29 95.42 240.12 
lsabcla 249.35 90.72 81.72 87.56 77.99 
Nueva Viscaya 232.21 39.28 35.10 19.32 -9.83 
Quirino 290.52 6.93 0.03 -59.27 210.68 
Bataan 130.89 -3.46 -5.97 1.03 12.97 
Bulacan 161.02 46.39 41.65 63.66 122.89 
Nueva Ecija 269.39 110.98 115.00 109.90 235.15 
Pampanga 183.81 58.74 59.81 76.33 l l8 .32 
Tarlac 264.37 135.79 132.32 148.04 193.62 
Zambales 73 .87 -104.36 -96.00 -105.69 39.81 
Aurora 242.59 -23.64 -24.53 -73.61 226.91 
Batangas 167.77 24.93 26.01 29.37 129.08 
Cavite 182.86 55.60 50.55 50.76 142.70 
Laguna 103.04 -21.96 -24.94 -13 .07 76.86 
Marinduque 242.64 91.61 82.90 70.22 150.75 
Occidental Mindoro 253.05 25.58 17.34 -3 . I 6 226.79 
O1iental Mindoro 284.27 118.38 125.21 130.79 262.46 
Palawan 254.19 -116.41 -123.76 -206.56 215.15 
Quezon 258.75 104.95 105.13 110.48 246.58 
Rizal 117.08 4.48 -1.11 19.99 111.03 
Romblon 280.52 102.19 108.84 84.83 164.38 
. Albay 264.90 121.62 126.0l 132.27 207.64 
Camarines Norte 268.46 117.79 118.79 121.61 256.48 
Camarines Sur 246.52 103.80 99.08 100.12 190.73 
Catanduanes 282.90 94.15 100.90 75.68 187.29 
Masbate 299.33 144.11 144.84 149.45 279.84 
Sorsogon 322.00 180.14 181.62 189.19 302.57 
Aklan 218.79 66.57 68 .24 66.05 147.56 
Antique 281.60 123.85 124.37 121.82 245.82 
Capiz 242.37 102.04 86.70 80.11 160.31 
Iloilo 233.57 94.25 97.87 I 06.45 163.54 
Negros Occidental 152.29 -26.27 - 12.88 -22.27 121.95 
Bohol 313 .24 166.54 163.52 159.90 272.59 
Cebu 199.29 46.37 56.70 58.52 165.34 
Negros Oriental 268.24 83 .86 93 .04 74.11 242.80 
Siquijor 301.01 89.57 99.46 25 .59 231.91 
Eastern Samar 294.30 84.47 91.63 69.65 267.56 
Leyte 241.62 78.38 85.47 79.43 218.20 
Northern Samar 310.91 128.44 132.98 119.97 255.23 
Samar (Western) 293.67 54.10 61.92 21 .39 262.57 
Southern Leyte 290.98 127.59 131.49 120.77 193.05 
Zamboanga del Norte 299.44 100.43 97.72 68.95 238.43 
Zamboanga del Sur 281.92 92.48 101.01 89.64 231.31 
Agusan del Norte 245. 13 32.89 50.85 24.31 212.92 
Agusan de! Sur 286.05 62.23 53 .74 41.06 282.08 
Bukidnon 262.81 100.66 96.67 104.23 251.10 
Camiguin 258.31 45 .85 55.44 -27.01 249.41 
Misamis Occidental 254.57 10.84 43.43 -21.43 241.03 
Misamis Oriental 196.58 -0.83 18 .73 -0.42 171.44 
Surigao del Norte 283.05 73 .91 92.53 57.80 236.98 
Cotabato (North) 299.22 148.59 138.98 148.31 277.00 
Lanao def Norte 201.76 43 .58 14.40 -8.06 187.57 
Sultan Kudarat 256.19 85.79 80.28 80.42 196.75 
Sulu 407 .30 270.04 266.97 270.37 365.55 
Maguindanao 272.65 115.64 110.16 107.55 258 .75 
Source: Author's calculation 
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Appendix 8.3 Revenue sharing practices in selected countries 
Developed countries provide useful examples of revenue sharing programs that 
are systematically designed to promote horizontal equity. 
Australia (Mathews, 1993). Australia's revenue sharing progratn is reputedly 
one of the most developed and complete in terms of promoting equity. It provides for 
both equalisation of revenue-raising capacity and expenditure needs. Its revenue sharing 
program can be characterized by the following model: 
/Ji * A 
Ai= L/3· 
l 
A R E 
where /3 · = Pi[--+~* P · + ~ * r ·] 1 
LPi Ps 
1 Ps 1 
or assu1ning that a balanced budget applies (A= E - R) : 
Es Rs /3· =Pi[-(1+ r -)- - (I - p -)] 
z Ps z Ps z 
(8.4) 
(8.5) 
(8 .5a) 
where: A - fixed a1nount of revenue sharing grants fro1n the Commonwealth 
govermnent 
Ai - revenue share of state i 
P - population 
R - revenue collections 
Y - revenue base 
E - expenditure 
r i - differential costs of standard services in state i relative to 
standard per capita cost 
Pi - differential revenue capacity of state i relative to standard revenue capacity 
s - subscript denoting standard 
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11· 
i 
The 1nodel describes the distribution of a fixed amount of revenue sharing grants fro1n 
the Commonwealth Government to states and territories, on a population basis adjusted 
for differences in relative revenue-raising capacity and differences in relative costs of 
providing services or expenditure needs. The relative revenue capacity and expenditure 
needs of the states are assessed with respect to standards in order to isolate the effects of 
state policies. The standards are based on actual state budgets, and relativity assessments 
are made with respect to specific revenue and expenditure items adjusted for differences 
due to factors which are beyond states' control. The revenue sharing grants equalized all 
states' revenue raising capacity and expenditure needs to the standard which is the 
average of all states. 
The Commonwealth Grants Com1nission, an independent statutory body, assesses 
the revenue and expenditure needs and consequently, the revenue shares of the different 
states. Major reviews of methodology and revenue shares are conducted every five years, 
followed by annual updates using new data but the same methodology. Local 
-governn1ents have separate revenue sharing arrangements, which are less comprehensive 
-
and less systematic compared to the states. This is because the large number of local 
authorities and the incomplete data make the task of comparing their revenue capacities 
and expenditure needs virtually i1npossible. 
Japan and the United Kingdo1n. Japan's Local Allocation Tax and the United 
Kingdom's Rate Support Grant (later, Revenue Support Grant) have so1ne similarities to 
the Australian model. Both revenue sharing programs consider the relative revenue 
capacities and expenditure needs of recipient govermnents in their distribution. 
Japan's Local Allocation Tax entails the allocation to local governments of a fixed 
share of certain central government taxes : 32 per cent of the total yields of the income 
tax, corporation tax, and liquor tax, 24 per cent of the consumption tax, and 25 per cent 
of the tobacco tax. The regular Local Allocation tax, consisting of 94 per cent of the 
total, is distributed to local governments on the basis of the following formula 
(Yonehara, 1981): 
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A;=aE;-R; (8.6) 
where · a - 1 ( T - A . - - ~) 
B 
(8.7) 
Ai - regular allocation tax received by local govermnent i 
E; - basic expenditure need of local government i 
R; - basic revenue of local goverrunent i 
T - the sum of deficiencies 
A - total fund for regular allocation tax 
B - the sum of the basic financial needs of local governments whose basic 
financial needs exceed their basic revenues 
The a1nount of regular allocation tax received by a local government is basically 
detennined by the difference between its basic expenditure need and basic revenue. Local 
governments (e.g., Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi and Osaka prefectures and another 170 
municipal governments) whose basic revenues exceed their basic financial need, do not 
· receive any share of local allocation tax (FAIR, 1992). The adjustment coefficient factor 
a is used when the total amount of regular allocation tax is less than total deficiencies of 
local govermnents-that is, a factor less than 1 is 1nultiplied by the basic expenditure 
need. 
The detennination of basic expenditure needs and revenues in the revenue sharing 
formula is made without reference to actual expenditures and revenues of individual local 
governments to eliininate the effects of local goverrunent policies on the allocation of 
revenue shares. The Ministry of Home Affairs co1nputes the basic expenditure need for 
each individual local government function as follows: 
E; = (Unit of measurement) x (Unit cost) x (Adjustment coefficient) 
The unit of measurement is a figure which provides an appropriate 1neasure for the cost 
of the service selected-for example, the number of policemen with respect to police 
services. The adjustment coefficient allows for differences in costs of providing services 
due to varying socio-economic and physical factors of local governments. The basic 
revenue is the sum of the local transfer tax and a prescribed percentage of the 
standardized local tax revenue. 
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The United Kingdom's revenue sharing program has undergone several changes 
in conjunction with the reforms in local government taxation . But essentially, the central 
government revenue sharing program with local governments continued to be governed 
by the difference between standardized expenditures and revenues, with the objective of 
enabling all local government authorities to provide a comparable level of services if they 
levied similar rates of local taxes. 
Canada and the United States. The revenue sharing program of Canada is 
mainly focused on equalization of revenue capacity, but Canada is currently considering 
the inclusion of expenditure needs as well. Canada's program is open ended; the total 
amount of revenue sharing funds depends on the differences in the provinces' 
standardized revenues that have to be equalized. This creates problems for the federal 
government budget when large variations in revenues among provinces occur, as has 
happened when provinces with small population have collected very large oil and gas 
revenues. The amount of revenue share received by each province depends on its relative 
revenue capacity. This is assessed on the basis of a representative tax system which 
applies an average revenue effort to each tax base. Only those provinces with revenue 
capacity below the standard (that is, the average revenue capacity of the five median 
provinces) are given grants (Mathews, 1993 ; Courchene, 1984 ) . 
There is a wide diversity in the design of revenue sharing programs in the United 
States. Many are designed in an ad hoc manner. An exception is the revenue sharing 
program of the state of Massachusetts which was designed by a task force consisting of 
economists, legislative staff members and other interested parties (Bradbury, et al., 
1984). The basic formula parallels the Australian model and has similarities to the models 
discussed by Musgrave (1961 ), and Le Grand and Reschovsky (1971 ) . Revenue shares 
are distributed to local governments based on their fiscal disadvantage, which is defined 
as the difference between a local government's fiscal gap (Gj) and a standard fiscal gap ( 
I), which is a policy choice variable. The revenue sharing fund is fixed, hence, its 
distribution to local governments must meet the following conditions : 
"i:,;A;P;=A 
(8.8) 
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Ai=r[Gi-I'J 
A · > 0 I 
(8 .9) 
(8.10) 
Equation (8.8) states that the total amount of revenue sharing fund (A) equals the 
sum of per capita revenue share (Ai) of each local government 1nultiplied by its 
population (Pi) . Conditic;:ms (8.9) and (8 .10) li1nit the distribution of revenue share only 
to those local governments whose fiscal gap is less than the chosen standard; r measures 
the fraction of the fiscal disadvantage offset by the revenue share, which is constant 
across local government. Equations (8.8) and (8.9) can be solved for the following 
equilibrium values of Ai and r: 
or 
A
._ [Gi - r]A 
I -
L;[Gi - I']Pi 
AiPi = [Gi - I']APi 
Li[Gi - I']Pi 
A 
r=----
Lj[Gi-I'JPi 
(8 .11) 
(8.lla) 
(8 .12) 
Equations (8 .11) and (8.1 la) detennine respectively, the per capita revenue share 
and total revenue share a local government receives. Both are proportional to a local 
govermnent's fiscal disadvantage. Equation (8 .12) determines the fraction of fiscal 
disadvantages of local govermnents offset by revenue shares. It depends on the total 
a1nount of revenue sharing funds and the standard fiscal gap. The standard fiscal gap is a 
policy choice variable which alters the distribution of revenue shares across local 
govermnents. A high standard fiscal gap would result in greater equalization because 
only those local governments with high fiscal gaps receive revenue shares and each 
receives a higher amount. With a low standard, the revenue sharing fund is spread thinly 
across a greater nu1nber of local govermnents, and those with high fiscal gaps receive 
less. 
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The model yields other interesting results which could be useful to policy makers . 
If full fiscal equalization is desired (that is r = 1 ), the model can provide : (1) an estimate 
of the total revenue sharing fund that is necessary: 
A= Li[G; - r]P; (8.12) 
or, (2) with a predetermined amount of revenue sharing fund, an appropriate fiscal gap 
standard: 
r=L;GiPi-A 
L;P; 
(8 .13) 
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Summary and conclusions 
The objective of this study was to assess whether central govern1nent transfers to local 
governments in the Philippines promote equity and mobilise local revenues. The 
promotion of equity is a major goal of central government transfers, but it is not often 
1net in practice. The concept of equity is not clearly defined in the policy 
pronouncements of the government. The design of transfers and their implementation 
have no theoretical basis and are largely ad hoc. 
The study examined the equity of central government transfers in relation to the 
fiscal capacities of the provinces. The literature suggests that fiscal capacity equalisation 
is one of the few policy instruments that promote both equity and efficiency. Equity is 
defined in terms of horizontal equity or 'equal treatment of equals'. Differences in fiscal 
capacities-that is the ability of governments to provide services--can result in 
.horizontal inequities. Individuals who are similar in all respects except for their place of 
residence are treated unequally in terms of the tax burden exacted and/or services 
provided by their local govern1nent. This can lead to inefficient migration and allocation 
of resources. 
The fiscal capacities of the provinces were measured by their fiscal gaps or 
expenditure need-revenue capacity gaps. First, the revenue capacities of the provinces 
were estimated using a random coefficient regression model. Four revenue base-related 
factors-namely, per capita assessed property values, establishments per capita, 
registered vehicles per capita, and percentage of renter-households-were found to be 
significantly related to the per capita revenues of the provinces. The response 
coefficients of per capita revenues to these factors, except for establishment per capita, 
varied across provinces. The provinces thus exploited their revenue bases to varying 
degrees. The highest estimated coefficients (indicating best effort or practice) measure 
the maximum contribution of each factor to the revenue of a province. These 
coefficients were applied to the respective revenue base factors of the provinces to 
calculate their revenue capacities, that is, the maximu1n revenues that they can generate. 
The estimated revenue capacities of provinces varied considerably, ranging fron1 a 
minimum of P26 per capita in Sulu to a maximum of P 1,115 per capita in Metro Manila. 
Following the measurement of revenue capacities, the expenditure needs of the 
provinces were estimated. Per capita government expenditures of the provinces were 
regressed on revenue capacities, per capita transfers, and provincial socioeconomic and 
political characteristics. The regression results showed that per capita government 
expenditures were significantly affected by various factors, which can be broadly 
classified into: resource factors consisting of revenue capacities and per capita transfers, 
political or preference factors consisting of political frag1nentation, and cost factors 
which consist of the consumer price index, population density and percentage of the 
population in agriculture and services. The last category is also referred to as 
expenditure need or cost disability factors; provinces with these characteristics need to 
spend more to provide a given standard of public services. 
Based on the regression results, provincial cost indices of providing local 
government services were calculated. The calculated cost indices vary. Metro Manila 
and Sulu-with the highest and lowest revenue capacity, respectively-had -the highest 
cost indices. The provision of a given set of public services would cost 32 percent more 
per capita in Metro Manila and 25 percent more per capita in Sulu compared to the 
average cost in the provinces of Quirino and Bukidnon. Negros Occidental had the least 
cost index; it would spend 14 percent less per capita than the average cost provinces in 
providing the same services. The expenditure need of each province was computed by 
multiplying its respective cost index by the average per capita expenditures of all 
provinces (which was used as the standard). Thus, the expenditure needs of provinces 
reflect variations attributed to differences in costs alone. A comparison of the estimated 
expenditure need and actual expenditures using the Spearman rank correlation showed 
that the provinces with high actual expenditures do not necessarily have high 
expenditure needs. 
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The fiscal gap was measured by the difference between the expenditure need and 
the standardised revenue capacity .1 Except for Metro Manila, all provinces had positive 
per capita fiscal gaps. Their expenditure needs exceeded their revenue capacities. 
Among the provinces with high fiscal gaps (in pesos per capita) were Sulu (P407), 
Ifugao (P352) and Mountain Province (P330). The provinces with low fiscal gaps, aside 
fron1 Metro Manila (-P168) were Zambales (P74), Laguna (P103) and Rizal (Pl 17). 
The fiscal gap provided the basis for evaluating the equity of central government 
transfers, particularly revenue sharing. Revenue sharing consists of national internal 
revenue allot1nent, specific tax allotn1ent and the local government revenue stabilisation 
fund which is allocated to local governments based on a three-factor formula consisting 
of population, land area and equal sharing. Revenue sharing is considered equitable if it 
compensates the fiscal disabilities of the provinces proportionately to their fiscal gaps, 
thereby minin1ising the variability of fiscal gaps across provinces. The Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient and the Schutz coefficient of inequality were the two measures 
_used to assess the equity of revenue sharing. 
The equity of the revenue sharing system was examined for three cases. Case 1 
represents the actual distribution of revenue shares to local governments in 1991 which 
is the base year of the calculated fiscal gaps. Case 2 simulates a distribution of revenue 
shares based on the provision of Presidential Decree No. 144, which was the basis of 
revenue sharing during that year. Case 3 simulates a distribution of revenue shares under 
the new local governn1ent code which took effect in 1992. The Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient indicated that provinces with high fiscal gaps tended to obtain 
high revenue shares. However, the revenue shares were not distributed proportionately 
to the size of the fiscal gaps. The Schutz coefficients of inequality of the compensated 
fiscal gaps in all three cases of revenue sharing were higher than the coefficient of 
inequality of the fiscal gaps without revenue sharing, suggesting that revenue sharing 
distributions tended to worsen inequity. The same was true of the grants given to local 
1 The standardised revenue capacity equals the product of the average revenue effort and the estimated 
revenue capacity of a province. 
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governments on a purely ad hoc basis. This is not surprising as the bases for revenue 
sharing and grant distribution are not related to the fiscal gaps of the provinces. 
The revenue sharing distribution under the new local government code appeared 
to be the 1nost inequitable. This can be partly blamed on the higher weight assigned to 
an equal share in the distribution formula. It is biased in favour of provinces with highly 
fragmented local govern1nents. Because running local governments has fixed costs, the 
expenditure regression showed that local government fragmentation resulted in higher 
per capita expenditures. In measuring expenditure needs, differences in costs due to 
political fragn1entation are not included because such differences are considered a 
political or policy choice variable. By compensating the costs of political fragmentation, 
the revenue sharing system unnecessarily encourages local government fragmentation 
which, besides being inequitable, increases the cost of local government services. 
Local government fragmentation, in particular the existence of several tiers of 
local governments, also makes it difficult to determine the appropriate amount of 
.revenue sharing that is necessary to bridge the gap between the expenditure 
requirements and revenue capacities of local governments at each tier. A1though the 
increments in revenue share of the aggregate local government sector may be sufficient 
or even higher than the costs of devolved functions as a result of the recent 
decentralisation reforms, some local government tiers may experience budget 
difficulties. 
The revenue effort-the ratio of actual revenue to revenue capacity-was used 
to evaluate the effects of central government transfers on local revenue mobilisation. 
The revenue effort was regressed on central government transfers, and other factors 
serving as control variables to avoid bias esti1nates. The regression result showed that 
central government transfers were not significantly related to the local government 
revenue effort. Central government transfers neither encouraged nor discouraged local 
government revenue effort. 
In sun1mary, the results of the study show that central government transfers 
failed to pron1ote equity and encourage local revenue mobilisation. The evaluation and 
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the reform of central govern1nent transfers n1ust, however, be considered in conjunction 
with other aspects of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
In analysing local revenue mobilisation, it is in1portant to take into account the 
constraints on local taxation. Local governments are limited to levying mostly minor 
taxes and their taxing powers are linuted by rate ceilings and tax exen1ptions prescribed 
by national laws. Local governments are also unable to fully exploit their revenue bases 
because of administrative limitations. The poor growth performance of real property tax, 
for example, is mainly attributable to the undervaluation of properties. Many local 
governments do not have sufficient technical expertise and basic tools like tax maps 
which are necessary to establish a complete inventory of real properties. 
The inclusion of revenue effort in the allocation formula for central government 
transfers-which is often recommended-may not result in greater local revenue 
1nobilisation because of the constraints on local taxation mentioned above. Reforms in 
the local tax structure and technical assistance fron1 the central govern1nent would be 
.necessary to increase revenue effort. Nationwide tax mapping and application of 
common market valuation criteria by the central government, for example, afe necessary 
steps in maximising the revenues fron1 real property tax which is the single most 
i1nportant tax of local govern1nents. 
To safeguard against the substitution of local revenues by central government 
transfers, a maintenance of revenue effort requirement is considered more appropriate 
than a revenue effort pro-rated distribution. The latter may conflict with equity. The 
revenue effort regression model shows that provinces with high revenue capacities 
tended to have high revenue efforts as well. They have the resources to hire more and 
better qualified staff. 
It is not advisable to assign too many objectives (for exan1ple, capacity 
equalisation and revenue effort promotion) on a single type of central government 
transfer. The literature suggests that for each objective there is a corresponding type or 
design of transfer. The internal revenue allotment could be designed basically to 
promote equity through fiscal capacity equalisation. It could be allocated to local 
governments in proportion to the size of their fiscal gaps relative to a ce11ain fiscal gap 
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standard. Initially this could be implemented at the provincial level where expenditure 
needs and revenue capacities-or fiscal gaps-can be estin1ated from available data . 
The revenue share of each province could then be divided among the provincial 
government and the component cities, municipalities and barangays. Note that this 
would be likely to work -against provinces with highly fragmented local governments. 
Considering the high dependence of local governments on central government transfers, 
the viability of some local govern1nent units would be affected, and mergers would be 
necessary. The highly fragmented local government system has equity and efficiency 
implications which need to be studied in depth. 
The allocation of development funds to local governments in the national and 
regional planning and budgeting process, on the other hand, can be designed as specific 
purpose transfers with the objective of promoting local government revenue effort and 
encouraging development expenditures. Local governments may be required to finance 
part of the costs of the projects they propose for national government financing in their 
. invest1nent programs, or, development funds can be allocated to proposed local 
governn1ent projects based on the amount they are willing to provide as counterpart. 
This provides the national govern1nent with an instru1nent for influencing, but not 
constraining, local government budgetary decisions. This is particularly important in the 
efficient provision of local development projects which generate externalities. 
Finally, it is important that local government fiscal and socioeconomic data be 
improved. The measurement of revenue capacity, revenue effort and expenditure need in 
this study could be greatly improved if better data were available. There is a need, in 
particular, to provide for greater uniformity in the accounting practices of local 
governments and to come up with data that better meet the demands of policy impact 
studies. Local government sector policies could then be evaluated in tenns of their 
impacts and not their objectives. 
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